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Abstract
In From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, I criticized
the ineffectiveness and short-sightedness of the U.S.-China intellectual property policy. As I argued, the
approach taken by the administration in the 1980s and early 1990s had created a cycle of futility in which
China and the United States repeatedly threatened each other with trade wars only to back down in the
eleventh hour with a compromise that did not provide sustainable improvements in intellectual property
protection. Since I wrote that article five years ago, China has joined the WTO and undertook a complete
overhaul of its intellectual property system. Because of China's WTO membership, the United States can no
longer impose unilateral sanctions on the country, as it threatened to do a decade ago. Instead, the United
States has to resolve the dispute through the WTO dispute settlement process. As the U.S. administration is
currently reviewing its options and preparing for a possible WTO dispute against China, it is timely and
important to reopen the debate about how to design an effective American intellectual property policy toward
China. This article begins by challenging the conventional view that the intellectual property law amendments
introduced in China in the wake of WTO accession were mostly introduced to conform Chinese intellectual
property laws to WTO standards. It argues that many of the amendments were created as responses to the
emerging socialist market economy and the rapidly-changing local conditions in the country. In addition, the
article takes on the recent proposals for the U.S. administration to file a formal complaint with the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body over inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights in China and explains
why the United States should not do so. The article then explores alternative protection strategies by
presenting five case studies in which intellectual property rights holders were able to protect their assets
without relying on intellectual property laws. It questions the effectiveness of the litigious approach taken by
foreign businesses while exploring differences between the Chinese and Western legal cultures. The article
concludes by examining the progress China made in the intellectual property arena by focusing on three
widely-reported incidents: the unauthorized reproduction, translation, and adaptation of Harry Potter novels,
the State Intellectual Property Office's recent decision to invalidate Pfizer's patent in Viagra, and the Chinese
authorities' heightened effort to protect trademarks used in relation to the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past year, there has been a growing debate about whether the 
United States should impose trade sanctions on China concerning 
foreign exchange, textile exports, and inadequate intellectual 
property protection.  As Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY) and 
Lindsey Graham (R-SC) declared in June 2005, “the time has come for 
actions, not more words.”1  Four months earlier, they cosponsored a 
bill that sought to impose tariffs of up to 27.5% on all Chinese imports 
if China did not revalue its currency.2 
In July 2005, the United States House of Representatives passed a 
bill that made it easier for American businesses to seek retaliatory 
tariffs against subsidized Chinese exports.3  The Bush administration 
also put substantial pressure on the Chinese authorities to limit its 
textile exports and re-imposed import quotas to restrict the annual 
growth of certain textile products to 7.5%.4  In addition, policymakers 
and the American public have severely criticized the bid of China’s 
state-run CNOOC Ltd. to purchase the California-based Unocal oil 
company, citing national security concerns.5 
                                                 
 1. Charles E. Schumer & Lindsey O. Graham, Will It Take a Tariff to Free the Yuan?, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2005, at A19. 
 2. S. 295, 109th Cong. (2005); see Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Warns China About 
Currency, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2005, at A1 (reporting that “[t]he Bush administration 
warned China . . . that its currency policies were distorting world trade, and it 
brandished the threat of retaliation against the country’s exports if Chinese leaders 
did not change course in the next year”). 
 3. H.R. 3283, 109th Cong. (2005); see Warren Vieth, Bush Wins Approval of Trade 
Pact, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2005, at A1 (reporting about the congressional bill that 
sought retaliatory tariffs against subsidized Chinese imports). 
 4. Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Puts Limits on Clothing from China, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 
2005, at C1 (reporting the Bush administration’s announcement that it would impose 
new quotas on certain Chinese textile and apparel products). 
 5. See Steve Lohr, Who’s Afraid of China Inc.?, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, § 3, at 1 
(discussing the opposition of policymakers and the American public to CNOOC’s bid 
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In response to this pressure, China voluntarily imposed export 
tariffs on its textile and apparel products,6 and revalued its currency by 
pegging the yuan to a basket of foreign currencies, as compared to the 
U.S. dollar alone.7  Meanwhile, CNOOC withdrew its unpopular $18.5 
billion bid for Unocal, leaving the company for its rival Chevron.8  To 
mend the volatile bilateral relationship, Chinese President Hu Jintao 
also agreed to meet with President Bush in the White House in early 
September.9  Among the issues to be discussed were textile exports, 
currency peg, intellectual property, nuclear nonproliferation, military 
buildup, trade surplus, and human rights.  Although the trip was 
postponed due to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, the two presidents 
met during the sixtieth anniversary meeting of the United Nations 
General Assembly.10 
To some extent, the recent developments are reminiscent of the 
turbulent U.S.-China bilateral relationship of the late 1980s and early 
1990s.  At that time, the United States had a significant trade deficit 
against China, as it does today.  Because intellectual property-based 
goods were considered key exports that helped reduce the deficit, the 
first Bush and Clinton administrations sought to induce China to 
strengthen intellectual property protection by threatening the country 
with economic sanctions, trade wars, non-renewal of most-favored-
nation status, and opposition to entry into the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”).11 
                                                 
for Unocal); Jad Mouawad, Congress Calls for a Review of the Chinese Bid for Unocal, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 27, 2005, at C3 (reporting about Congress’s proposed four-month study 
that would delay CNOOC’s takeover of Unocal by many months); Leslie Wayne & 
David Barboza, Unocal Deal:  A Lot More Than Money Is at Issue, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 
2005, at C4 (reporting about the opposition of congressional representatives, lawyers, 
bankers, and lobbyists to CNOOC’s bid for Unocal). 
 6. China subsequently “lift[ed] self-imposed textile export tariffs in reaction to 
quotas on the exports by the United States and European Union.”  Chris Buckley, 
China to End Its Taxes on Textile Exports in Retaliation for U.S. and European Quotas, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 31, 2005, at C3. 
 7. David Barboza & Joseph Kahn, Chinese to Stop Tying Currency Only to Dollar, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A1. 
 8. See David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Company Drops Bid to Buy U.S. 
Oil Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at A1 (reporting about CNOOC’s withdrawal of 
its bid for Unocal). 
 9. See Cragg Hines, Why Hu Needs the Ranch Instead of the South Lawn, HOUS. 
CHRON., Sept. 7, 2005, at B11 (reporting about the scheduled visit of President Hu 
Jintao of China). 
 10. See David E. Sanger, Bush Puts Iraq, China and Iran on Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
14, 2005, at A6 (reporting about the meeting between the presidents of China and the 
United States during the sixtieth anniversary meeting of the United Nations General 
Assembly). 
 11. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners:  Protecting Intellectual Property in China in 
the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 140-51 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From 
Pirates to Partners] (describing the United States’ use of section 301 sanctions and 
various trade threats to induce China to strengthen protection of intellectual property 
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Against that background, I published an article in this Law Review 
called From Pirates to Partners:  Protecting Intellectual Property in China in 
the Twenty-First Century,12 which criticized the ineffectiveness and short-
sightedness of the American foreign intellectual property policy 
toward China.  As I argued, the coercive approach taken by the 
administrations created a “cycle of futility” in which China and the 
United States repeatedly threatened each other with trade wars, only 
to back down in the eleventh hour with a compromise that did not 
provide sustained improvements in intellectual property protection.13  
The article also expressed concerns about the resentment the policy 
had created among the Chinese people and its collateral damage to 
the United States’ longstanding interests in promoting free trade, 
human rights, and the rule of law.14 
Since I wrote that article, China has revamped its intellectual 
property system, amending the copyright, patent, and trademark laws 
while introducing new implementing regulations, administrative 
measures, and judicial interpretations.15  In December 2001, the 
country also joined the WTO.16  Because of China’s WTO 
membership, the United States can no longer impose unilateral 
sanctions on the country concerning the lack of intellectual property 
protection, as it threatened to do a decade ago.  Instead, the United 
States has to resolve the dispute through the mandatory WTO dispute 
settlement process.17 
In February 2005, several trade groups urged the administration to 
file a formal complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
against China concerning inadequate intellectual property 
protection.18  Others, however, expressed concern that formal WTO 
                                                 
rights). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See id. at 140-48 (discussing the “cycle of futility”). 
 14. Id. at 174. 
 15. See discussion infra Part I (discussing the legal reforms China undertook in the 
wake of the WTO accession). 
 16. China became the 143rd member of the WTO on December 11, 2001.  For 
discussions of the ramifications for China’s entry into the WTO, see generally GORDON 
G. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001); NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRATING 
CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2002); SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI & MARK CLIFFORD, 
CHINA AND THE WTO:  CHANGING CHINA, CHANGING WORLD TRADE (2002); Symposium, 
China and the WTO:  Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2003). 
 17. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994 [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement], Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 64, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement] 
(mandating that disputes arising under the Agreement be settled by the WTO dispute 
settlement process). 
 18. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the request by trade groups to file a 
formal complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body against inadequate 
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actions would affect their businesses by straining the U.S.-China 
bilateral relationship.  As the administration reviews its options and 
prepares for a possible WTO case against China, it is timely and 
important to reopen the debate about the effectiveness of the 
American foreign intellectual property policy toward China.  The fact 
that most of the existing legal research was published during the 
decade-old U.S.-China intellectual property negotiations makes the 
current debate even more urgent. 
This Article draws on discussions in my earlier article and updates 
my thoughts on how the United States should convert the Chinese 
from pirates to partners.  Although the Article focuses primarily on 
intellectual property protection in China, it also offers insight into 
legal developments in East Asia, other transition and less developed 
economies, as well as the nature, strengths, and weaknesses of the 
WTO system.19  In addition, the Article explores larger questions about 
the difference between the Chinese and Western legal cultures, the 
unique nature of intellectual property protection, and the different 
considerations and concerns less developed and transition countries 
have about the one-size-fits-all intellectual property system pushed by 
the European Communities and the United States. 
Part I of this Article examines the amendments China introduced to 
its intellectual property system at the turn of the new millennium.  
Although these amendments were introduced in the wake of China’s 
WTO accession, this Part challenges the conventional view that these 
“millennium amendments” were mostly introduced to conform 
Chinese intellectual property laws to WTO standards.  Instead, it 
argues that many of the amendments were created as responses to 
China’s rapidly-changing local conditions.  This Part highlights the 
importance of domestic factors in intellectual property lawmaking and 
suggests that the development of local stakeholders may hold the key 
to improving intellectual property protection in the country. 
Part II articulates five reasons why the United States should not file 
a formal complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body over 
inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights in China.  
While this Part acknowledges that there will be benefits to using the 
WTO process against China in certain intellectual property disputes, it 
                                                 
intellectual property protection in China). 
 19. See Pat K. Chew, The Rule of Law:  China’s Skepticism and the Rule of People, 20 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 43, 47-48 (2005) (noting that “[b]y studying China, . . . 
one can also cautiously extrapolate some of what is learned to other developing 
countries’, other Asian countries’, and other transitioning socialist societies’ 
perceptions of the rule of law”). 
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contends that the general lack of enforcement of intellectual property 
rights does not present a strong case for the United States.  In fact, if 
the United States pursues such a weak case before the WTO, there will 
be serious adverse implications for not only China and the United 
States, but also the international community at large. 
Part III explores alternative strategies to protect intellectual assets 
owned by foreign businesses in China.  This Part takes the position 
that, while enforcement of intellectual property rights is important, it 
is not the only tool through which American businesses protect their 
assets.  This Part presents six hypothetical case studies to illustrate how 
intellectual property rights holders were able to protect their assets 
even when intellectual property laws were not effectively enforced.  In 
exploring these case studies, this Part draws insight from not only legal 
literature, but literature in business strategies and China studies.  
Based on the success of the alternative strategies illustrated in these 
case studies, this Part questions the effectiveness of the legalistic 
approach usually taken by foreign businesses and explores the 
differences between the Chinese and Western legal cultures. 
Part IV undertakes the difficult task of examining the progress 
China has made in the intellectual property arena.  It focuses on three 
widely-reported legal disputes that provide insight into recent 
developments in Chinese intellectual property laws—in particular, the 
unauthorized reproduction, adaptation, and distribution of “Harry 
Potter” novels, the State Intellectual Property Office’s decision to 
invalidate Pfizer’s patent in Viagra, and the Chinese authorities’ 
heightened efforts to protect trademarks used in relation to the 2008 
Beijing Olympics.  This Part contends that, although the piracy and 
counterfeiting problems in China look familiar to what they were a 
decade ago, many of these problems are actually quite different and, 
therefore, warrant a new analytical perspective. 
I. THE MILLENNIUM AMENDMENTS 
As China prepared to join the WTO, it undertook a complete 
overhaul of its intellectual property system, amending the copyright, 
patent, and trademark laws.20  It also introduced a large number of 
                                                 
 20. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective 
Nov. 1, 2001) (P.R.C.), http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/flfg/xgflfg/t20020416_ 
34754.htm [hereinafter Chinese Copyright Law]; Patent Law of the People’s Republic 
of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, 
amended Aug. 25, 2000, effective July 1, 2001) (P.R.C.), http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo 
_English/flfg/zlflfg/ t20020327_33872.htm [hereinafter Chinese Patent Law]; 
Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
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implementing regulations and administrative measures.  For example, 
the Measures on the Registration of Computer Software replaced the 
1991 Regulations on the Protection of Computer Software,21 and the 
new Regulations on the Protection of Layout-Designs of Integrated 
Circuits offered for the first time sui generis protection of layout-
designs of integrated circuits.22  To help courts interpret the many new 
laws and regulations, the Supreme People’s Court issued a number of 
judicial interpretations.23  As Xue Hong and Zheng Chengsi 
explained, “[a]lthough these judicial explanations are not legislation, 
they are binding within the Chinese judicial system . . . . The influence 
of these judicial explanations on IP rights of enforcement should by 
no means be overlooked.”24 
To make the Chinese intellectual property framework more 
complicated, international treaties provide additional protection that 
is not commonly found in the United States.  As Article 142 of the 
General Principles of Civil Law stated:  “where the provisions of an 
international treaty which the PRC has concluded or acceded to differ 
from the civil laws of the PRC, the provisions of the international 
treaty shall prevail, with the exception of those articles to which the 
PRC has made a reservation.”25  Although international treaties in 
China are far from self-executing, “a foreign plaintiff could cite any of 
the . . . treaties in a lawsuit against a Chinese entity if no domestic 
legal recourses are available, or if Chinese domestic provisions conflict 
with cited treaty provisions.”26  Nevertheless, as another commentator 
pointed out, “an international treaty is applied only when the relevant 
                                                 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective Dec. 1, 
2001) (P.R.C.), http://www.sipo.gov.cn/ sipo_English/flfg/xgflfg/t20020416_34755. 
htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Chinese Trademark Law]. 
 21. Measures on the Registration of Computer Software, translated in http://www. 
chinagate.com.cn/english/433.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). 
 22. Regulations on the Protection of Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits 
(promulgated by State Council, Apr. 2001) (P.R.C.), http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_En 
glish/ flfg/zlflfg/t20020402_33873.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). 
 23. See, e.g., CATHERINE SUN, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS 
66-67 (2004) (listing the new judicial interpretations that dealt with trademark 
protection). 
 24. HONG XUE & CHENGSI ZHENG, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY xxxvii (2002). 
 25. SUN, supra note 23, at 8 n.4 (translating article 142 of the General Principles of 
Civil Law). 
 26. Id. at 8-9.  The many treaties to which China is a signatory include the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property, the International Convention for the Protection 
of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (which is 
commonly known as the Rome Convention), and the International Convention for 
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (“UPOV”), among others.  For a list of the 
international treaties to which China is a member, see id. at 8. 
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law is inconsistent with the treaty.  If a Chinese domestic law is 
consistent with the treaty then local courts would apply Chinese law.”27 
Due to the complicated nature of the Chinese intellectual property 
framework and the many reforms the country undertook in the wake 
of the WTO accession, this Part focuses primarily on the major 
amendments to the Chinese copyright, patent, and trademark laws.28  
Through the review of these amendments, this Part challenges the 
conventional view that the legal reforms were introduced primarily to 
conform the Chinese intellectual property system to WTO standards.  
Instead, it argues that many of the new amendments were created as 
responses to the country’s rapidly-changing local conditions. 
Commentators often ignore the impact of local conditions (guo 
qing) on the Chinese intellectual property system.  This Part, 
therefore, focuses on these conditions, in particular the Chinese 
leaders’ changing attitude toward the rule of law, the emergence of 
private property rights and local stakeholders, the increasing concerns 
about ambiguities over relationships in state-owned enterprises, and 
the government’s active push for modernization.  By highlighting the 
local developments, this Part demonstrates the importance of 
domestic factors in intellectual property lawmaking and suggests that 
the development of local stakeholders may hold the key to improving 
intellectual property protection in the country. 
Among the three major intellectual property laws, the patent law 
was the first to be revised, with amendments entering into effect on 
July 1, 2001.29  There is no doubt that some of these amendments were 
introduced to conform the statute to the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs Agreement”).30  For 
example, the amended law now prohibits the “offers for sale” of 
                                                 
 27. Qingjiang Kong, Enforcement of WTO Agreements in China:  Illusion or Reality?, in 
CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:  ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM 132, 139 
(Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM]. 
 28. For comprehensive discussions of these amendments, see generally SUN, supra 
note 23; XUE & ZHENG, supra note 24; Jiwen Chen, Better Patent Law for International 
Commitment—The Amendment of Chinese Patent Law, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 61 
(2001) [hereinafter Chen, Better Patent Law]; Xiaoqing Feng & Frank Xianfeng 
Huang, International Standards and Local Elements:  New Developments of Copyright Law in 
China, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 917 (2002); Yahong Li, The Wolf Has Come:  Are 
China’s Intellectual Property Industries Prepared for the WTO?, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 77 
(2002) [hereinafter Li, The Wolf Has Come]; Ruixue Ran, Well-Known Trademark 
Protection in China:  Before and After the TRIPS Amendments to China’s Trademark Law, 19 
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 231 (2002); Louis S. Sorell, A Comparative Analysis of Selected 
Aspects of Patent Law in China and the United States, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 319 (2002).  
The discussion in this Part benefits tremendously from these sources. 
 29. Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20. 
 30. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17. 
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products that infringe upon invention patents and utility models.31  It 
also tightens the standards for obtaining a compulsory license as 
permissible under Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement32 while allowing 
for judicial review of patent invalidations pursuant to Article 41(4) of 
the Agreement.33 
However, local conditions and the rapid growth of domestic patent 
rights holders have created the need for other revisions, such as the 
simplification of the application procedures34 and the elimination of 
the unnecessary duplication of the patent invalidation and revocation 
processes.35  In addition, the amended patent law clarifies protection 
of an employee’s invention by stating that the right to apply for a 
patent in such an invention belongs to the employer unless a contrary 
agreement exists.36  To strengthen protection for both local and 
foreign rights holders, the law also requires innocent infringers to 
prove the legitimate source of the patented product.37  Where 
damages cannot be determined, the law further allows for the 
calculation of damages based on appropriate royalties.38 
The new copyright law was the second to be revised, entering into 
effect four months after the revised patent law.  To comply with the 
TRIPs Agreement, the amendments expanded copyright subject 
matter to include architectural works, compilation works, and 
databases.39  They also added to the statute the right of 
communication via information networks, public performance rights, 
and rental rights with respect to motion pictures, audiovisual works, 
                                                 
 31. See Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 11 (prohibiting the ‘offers for sale’ 
of products that infringe upon invention patents and utility models). 
 32. See id. arts. 48-50 (tightening the standards for obtaining a compulsory 
license); see also TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 31 (laying out the conditions for 
the WTO member states to introduce compulsory licenses). 
 33. See Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 46 (providing for judicial review of 
patent invalidations); see also TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 41(4) (stipulating 
that “[p]arties to a proceeding shall have an opportunity for review by a judicial 
authority of final administrative decisions and, subject to jurisdictional provisions in a 
Member’s law concerning the importance of a case, of at least the legal aspects of 
initial judicial decisions on the merits of a case”). 
 34. See Chen, Better Patent Law, supra note 28, at 67-70 (discussing the simplified 
patent application process). 
 35. See Haitao Sun, Note, Post-Grant Patent Invalidation in China and in the United 
States, Europe, and Japan:  A Comparative Study, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 273, 286 (2004) (discussing how the revised patent law eliminated the 
unnecessary duplication of the patent invalidation and revocation processes). 
 36. See Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 6 (stipulating that the right to apply 
for a patent in an employee’s invention belongs to the employer unless a contrary 
agreement exists). 
 37. See id. art. 63 (relieving users and sellers of liability if they can prove they 
obtained the allegedly infringing product from a legitimate source). 
 38. Id. art. 60. 
 39. Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, arts. 3(4), 14. 
YU.OFFTOPRINTER 6/11/2006  2:51:07 PM 
910 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:901 
and computer software.40  In addition, the amendments modified the 
fair use provision based on the three-step test laid out in Article 13 of 
the TRIPs Agreement.41 
The copyright law amendments also contained many local elements.  
For example, the expansion of copyright subject matter to acrobatic 
art42 is particularly important to Chinese rights holders, but less so to 
foreigners.  As commentators noted, “[t]he purpose of the inclusion is 
to highlight characteristic Chinese works and to protect well-known 
acrobatics.”43  The inclusion of databases in the copyright statute also 
can be partly attributed to the growth of domestic database 
producers.44 
In addition, the revised law eliminates the double standards, or the 
“super-national treatment,” in which foreign nationals enjoyed 
stronger protection than Chinese nationals under the International 
Copyright Treaties Implementing Rules for domestic and foreign 
rights holders.45  Taking into the account the growing number of 
Internet users in the country,46 the statute addresses for the first time 
online copyright issues.47  The amended law further requires that the 
assignment of property rights in a copyrighted work be in writing48 and 
places the burden on the accused infringer to prove the existence of a 
legitimate license.49  It also modifies the existing copyright licensing 
provisions50 and includes a reference to recently-enacted Chinese 
Contract Law as a basis for the fulfillment of contractual obligations.51 
The trademark law was the last to be revised and entered into effect 
only ten days before China’s WTO accession.  Compared to its 
copyright and patent counterparts, the old trademark law “was [the] 
                                                 
 40. Id. art. 10. 
 41. See id. art. 22 (enumerating the conditions for the fair use privilege). 
 42. Id. art. 3(3). 
 43. XUE & ZHENG, supra note 24, at 8. 
 44. See id. at 17 (noting that “[t]o boost the development of electronic databases, 
it was necessary to remove the limitation on the scope of compilation works, and 
extend copyright protection to original databases”). 
 45. See id. at 12 (discussing the double standards); Feng & Huang, supra note 28, 
at 919 (discussing the “super-national treatment” in which “foreign nationals enjoy 
better treatment under international conventions than Chinese nationals”). 
 46. See discussion infra text accompanying note 104 (discussing the exponential 
growth of Internet users in China). 
 47. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, arts. 10(12), 37(6), 41, 47 
(addressing online copyright issues). 
 48. Id. art. 24. 
 49. See id. art. 52 (placing the burden on the accused infringer to prove the 
existence of a legitimate license). 
 50. See id. arts. 24-28 (setting forth the formal requirements for the licensing of 
copyrighted works). 
 51. See id. art. 53 (referring to the Chinese Contract Law as a basis for the 
fulfillment of contractual obligations). 
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most distant from the WTO rules.”52  Many of the amendments, 
therefore, focused on conforming the law to the TRIPs Agreement.  
For example, the amendments expanded the registrable subject 
matter to three-dimensional marks and color marks53 and added 
protection to certification marks, collective marks, and geographical 
indications.54  In addition, the revised law strengthens and clarifies 
protection of well-known marks by recognizing unregistered well-
known marks and delineating factors used to determine the “well-
known” status of the mark.55  The new law also removes the time limit 
for challenging marks acquired by fraud or other unfair means56 and 
includes judicial review of all trademark office administrative 
decisions, including those on opposition and cancellation, refusals of 
registration, and trademark infringement.57 
Apart from substantive changes, the amended copyright, patent, 
and trademark laws also strengthen enforcement of intellectual 
property rights.  For example, the new laws now allow for preliminary 
injunctions that can be applied before or shortly after initiating the 
lawsuit.58  In situations where the plaintiff’s damages or the infringer’s 
profits cannot be determined, the laws provide for maximum statutory 
damages of RMB 500,000 (about $60,000).59 
In addition, the laws allow enforcement authorities to confiscate 
income from infringing products and to impose fines on violators.60  
                                                 
 52. Chengsi Zheng, Looking into the Revision of the Trade Mark and Copyright Laws 
from the Perspective of China’s Accession to WTO, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 313, 313 
(2002). 
 53. Chinese Trademark Law, supra note 20, art. 8 (offering protection to three-
dimensional marks and color marks). 
 54. Id. art. 3. 
 55. Id. arts. 13-14.  In determining the “well-known” status of a trademark, one 
must take into consideration the following factors: 
 (1) reputation of the mark to the relevant public; 
 (2) time for continued use of the mark; 
 (3) consecutive time, extent and geographical area of advertisement of the mark; 
 (4) records of protection of the mark as a well-known mark; and 
 (5) any other factors relevant to the reputation of the mark. 
Id. art. 14. 
 56. See id. art. 41 (exempting from the five-year limit those trademarks registered 
in bad faith). 
 57. Id. arts. 32-34, 43, 49. 
 58. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 49 (providing for preliminary 
injunctions); Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 61 (same); Chinese Trademark 
Law, supra note 20, art. 57 (same). 
 59. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 48 (providing for statutory 
damages); AIIPI, Punitive Damages as a Contentious Issue of Intellectual Property Rights, at 
1-2, http://www.aippi.org/reports/q186/q186_china.pdf (stating that article 21 of 
the Supreme Court Patent Trial Provisions provided maximum statutory damages of 
RMB 500,000); Chinese Trademark Law, supra note 20, art. 56 (providing for statutory 
damages). 
 60. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 47 (permitting enforcement 
YU.OFFTOPRINTER 6/11/2006  2:51:07 PM 
912 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:901 
To help preserve evidence and property, the laws also authorize 
administrative agencies and courts to confiscate and destroy infringing 
products and materials, as well as the tools and equipment used in the 
manufacturing process.61  Finally, foreign rights holders may enforce 
their rights through both local and national authorities.62 All of the 
laws provide for criminal liability;63 the trademark law, in particular, 
requires enforcement authorities to transfer cases to a judicial body 
for criminal investigation.64 
Although policymakers, business executives, and commentators are 
generally satisfied with the major intellectual property amendments,65 
some aspects of the Chinese intellectual property laws remain 
inconsistent with the TRIPs Agreement.  As Li Yahong observed: 
[U]nder the Chinese Copyright Law, a computer program is still 
not protected as a “literary work.”  With respect to the Chinese 
Trademark Law, the following aspects are problematic:  (1) only 
goods, not services, are mentioned in the protection of well-known 
marks, (2) registration is required for well-known marks, and (3) no 
protection is provided for geographical indications for wines and 
spirits. . . .  Further, the Chinese Anti-Unfair Competition Law . . . 
                                                 
authorities to confiscate unlawful income and to impose fine on violators); Chinese 
Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 58 (same); Chinese Trademark Law, supra note 20, art. 
53 (same). 
 61. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, arts. 47, 51 (authorizing 
administrative agencies and courts to confiscate and destroy infringing products and 
materials, as well as the tools and equipment used in the manufacturing process); 
Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 61 (same); Chinese Trademark Law, supra 
note 20, art. 53 (same). 
 62. See SUN, supra note 23, at 11 (stating that “foreign companies can directly 
request administrative enforcement to be conducted by local IP authorities”). 
 63. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 47 (providing for criminal 
liability); Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 58 (same); Chinese Trademark Law, 
supra note 20, art. 59 (same). 
 64. See Chinese Trademark Law, supra note 20, art. 59 (requiring enforcement 
authorities to transfer cases to a judicial body for criminal investigation).  Such an 
explicit provision is needed considering the limited number of cases transferred from 
the administrative authorities to police and prosecutors for criminal prosecution.  As 
Daniel Chow noted: 
[I]n 1997, of the 15,321 trademark infringement and counterfeiting cases 
brought by all levels of the AIC [Administration of Industry and Commerce] 
nationwide, only 57 cases, or 1 in every 269 cases, were transferred to PSBs 
[Public Security Bureaus] for prosecution.  In 1998, of 14,736 trademark 
infringement and counterfeiting actions brought by AICs, only 35 cases, or 1 
in every 421 cases, were transferred to PSBs.  In 1999, of the 16,938 cases 
brought by AICs, only 21, or 1 in every 807 cases, were transferred to PSBs. 
DANIEL C.K. CHOW, A PRIMER ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES AND PROTECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 217 (2002). 
 65. See Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 88 (remarking that the revised 
patent law is “the closest to being in complete compliance” with the TRIPs 
Agreement); Sun, supra note 35, at 280 (observing that “[a]mong China’s IP laws, the 
Patent Law is considered the closest to being in complete compliance with TRIPS; any 
deviations are relatively minor”). 
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requires “practicability” for a trade secret to be protected, while no 
such requirement exists in TRIPS.  Finally, China has not provided 
protection for data concerning the marketing of pharmaceutical or 
agricultural chemical products that utilize new chemical entities, as 
required by TRIPS.66 
Notwithstanding these inadequacies, policymakers and foreign rights 
holders have since turned their attention to enforcement reforms, 
rather than legal ones.  Their only remaining statutory concerns 
involve the protection of trade secrets,67 and the protection against 
unfair competition.68 
When policymakers and commentators discuss the “millennium 
amendments,” they often describe the changes as a response to 
China’s WTO accession.69  Even Chinese policymakers make similar 
statements, hoping that such a description would help earn goodwill 
in the international community while demonstrating to the outside 
world that China intends to be a respectful member of the WTO.  For 
example, an official in the Chinese Ministry of Commerce has 
declared, “[i]n the IPR area, the amendment of IPR laws and 
regulations on a large scale was initiated with a view to bringing the 
IPR protection system in line with the requirements laid out by the 
TRIPS Agreement.”70 
On their face, these statements seem valid.  The WTO Agreements 
and China’s accession agreements, for example, have called for 
greater transparency, the provision of judicial review, and rule of law 
                                                 
 66. Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 88-89. 
 67. See SUN, supra note 23, at 91 (observing that “China has not adopted any new 
national procedure or substantive rules offering civil or administrative remedies to 
proprietors of trade secrets since 2001”).  As Peter Feng pointed out, trade secrets in 
China originally “were by definition a matter of state secrets,” because the society was 
“dominated by a centrally planned socialist command economy.”  PETER FENG, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 385 (2d ed. 2003).  However, as China undergoes 
transition from a command economy to a socialist market economy, trade secret 
protection has been increasingly inadequate. 
 68. See Chengsi Zheng, TRIPS and the Amendment of Unfair-Competition Laws in 
China, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 231 (Henry Gao & Donald Lewis eds., 
2005) (discussing the inadequacy of the Chinese unfair competition laws and the 
need for reforms to enable the laws to comply with the TRIPs Agreement). 
 69. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE USTR, 2005 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON 
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 95 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 NTE REPORT], 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005_N
TE_Report/asset_upload_file469_7460.pdf (stating that, “[i]n anticipation of its 
accession to the WTO, China began modifying the full range of IPR laws, regulations 
and implementing rules, including those relating to patents, trademarks and 
copyrights, in an effort to comply with the TRIPS Agreement”). 
 70. Shi Miaomiao, China’s Participation in the Doha Negotiations and Implementation of 
Its Accession Commitments, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, supra note 68, at 23, 
32 [hereinafter Shi, China’s Participation in the Doha Negotiations]. 
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developments in China.71  Article 41(4) of the TRIPs Agreement also 
specifies an obligation in the WTO member states to provide judicial 
review of final administrative decisions.72  Upon close scrutiny, 
however, these statements are incomplete, if not misleading.  While 
the amendments were undeniably introduced at a time when China 
prepared to enter the WTO, it is an overstatement, or a half-truth, to 
claim that the amendments were introduced primarily to conform the 
Chinese intellectual property system to WTO standards.  Such a 
statement would ignore the important changes in the socialist market 
economy, the internal dynamics of the intellectual property 
lawmaking process, and contributions of the local stakeholders in the 
legal reforms.  More problematic, by creating a misimpression that 
external pressure was the key to improved intellectual property 
protection in the country, the claim would misguide the development 
of future U.S.-China intellectual property policies. 
Indeed, the TRIPs Agreement did not require many of the 
millennium amendments; rather, they were necessitated by China’s 
rapidly-changing local conditions, such as the emergence of the 
socialist market economy, the growing constituency of domestic rights 
holders, and the need for economic stimulus to accelerate China’s 
modernization efforts.  To illustrate the impact of these domestic 
factors on intellectual property law reforms, this Part focuses on the 
provisions concerning an employee’s invention, the use of contracts, 
private collective societies, online copyright infringement, and 
geographical indications. 
A. Socialist Market Economy 
Article 6 of the Chinese Patent Law provides that the right to apply 
for a patent for an employee’s invention belongs to the employer 
unless a contrary agreement exists.73  The amended law eliminates an 
ambiguity of the old law concerning situations where the employer’s 
                                                 
 71. See, e.g., Rule of Law Issues in China’s Accession to the WTO, INT’L L. NEWS, Winter 
2003, at 4 (reviewing comments by the ABA’s China Law Committee regarding 
China’s efforts to comply with international standards). 
 72. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 41(4) (stipulating that “[p]arties to a 
proceeding shall have an opportunity for review by a judicial authority of final 
administrative decisions and, subject to jurisdictional provisions in a Member’s law 
concerning the importance of a case, of at least the legal aspects of initial judicial 
decisions on the merits of a case”). 
 73. See Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 6 (stipulating that, “[i]n respect of 
an invention-creation made by a person using the material and technical means of an 
entity to which he belongs, where the entity and the inventor or creator have entered 
into a contract in which the right to apply for and own a patent is provided for, such a 
provision shall apply”). 
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equipment and resources were used to create the patent-seeking 
invention.74  As Peter Feng noted years ago about the protection of 
software, which is similar to that of patents, there was always “the 
notorious classroom conundrum:  who owns the copyright of software 
if it was developed outside one’s normal and assigned duty, but with 
the assistance of the material means of the employing unit.”75  The 
revised patent statute, however, has made the answer to this question 
clear:  if the employee has an agreement, the law gives the employee 
the right to apply for a patent in China.76 
This revision reflects the many economic changes in China in the 
past decade.  While state-owned enterprises dominated the Chinese 
economy a decade ago, the number of private enterprises has greatly 
increased, and a large number of employees of state-owned 
enterprises are now rushing to enter the private sector.  In the 
software industry, for example, 
many software engineers [in recent years] resigned from state 
enterprises or research institutes, taking software products (finished 
or unfinished) created during the course of employment with them, 
and joined private software companies or established their own 
companies.  These private companies immediately produced and 
marketed the software products, and became competitors of state 
software enterprises.77 
What was once a “classroom conundrum,” therefore, has now become 
a major business problem.78  The revised Article 6, therefore, was 
needed even without the WTO accession. 
Consider the use of contracts in copyright law, as another example.  
Although the implementing regulations of the old copyright statute 
required that copyright contracts and licenses be in writing, “the 
old . . . Copyright Law did not specify that copyright assignment and 
licensing must be in writing.”79  The copyright law amendments, 
however, clarified the law by requiring a written contract for the 
assignment of rights protected under the law80 and by upgrading the 
                                                 
 74. See Chen, Better Patent Law, supra note 28, at 66-67 (discussing the ambiguity in 
the definition of an employee’s inventions). 
 75. PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 132 (1st ed. 1997). 
 76. See Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 6 (stipulating that the right to apply 
for a patent for an employee’s invention belongs to the employer unless a contrary 
agreement exists). 
 77. XUE & ZHENG, supra note 24, at 104-05. 
 78. See id. at 105 (noting that “ownership disputes over the software developed by 
the employees become a hot issue in China”). 
 79. SUN, supra note 23, at 54. 
 80. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 25 (stipulating that 
“[a]ssignment of a right referred to in Article 10, paragraphs (5) to (17), of [the 
Copyright] Law shall require conclusion of a contract in writing”). 
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requirement from a lower regulation-level authority to a higher 
statute-level authority.81  Article 53 of the Chinese Copyright Law also 
includes, as a basis for the fulfillment of contractual obligations, a 
reference to the Chinese Contract Law.82 
In addition, the Law includes provisions that cover assignment of 
rights and use of contracts.  Although copyrights had been widely 
assigned before the most recent amendments, assignment of rights 
had not been formally included in the copyright statute.  The 1990 
Copyright Law, for example, included “a chapter on copyright 
licensing contracts, but there was no provision concerning copyright 
assignment.”83  The amendments thereafter “expanded [the copyright 
law] to cover the assignment of property rights in a copyrightable 
work.”84  In addition, the law permits contracting parties to freely 
negotiate the duration of their licenses,85 as compared to the ten-year 
renewable terms stipulated in the old copyright law. 
Combined together, the above two examples show Chinese leaders’ 
increasing comfort with the market economy, protection of private 
property, and freedom of contract.  This growing comfort has become 
especially apparent when one contrasts it with the dilemma Chinese 
policymakers had when they were considering whether they should 
introduce a new patent system in the mid-1980s.86  On the one hand, 
they wanted to create a stimulus for inventions and to rehabilitate 
scientists, inventors, and academics, many of whom suffered during 
the Cultural Revolution.87  On the other hand, they were greatly 
concerned about the changes a new system would bring to the 
country’s command economy, which was quite different from today’s 
socialist market economy.  As a result of this dilemma, early Chinese 
                                                 
 81. See Feng & Huang, supra note 28, at 920 (noting that “a unique dynamic 
behind the revision of the 1990 Copyright Law is the upgrading of certain 
fundamental features from lower level authorities, particularly the 1991 Regulations, 
to the Copyright Law itself”); see also Kong, supra note 27, at 135-36 (discussing the 
hierarchy of Chinese laws and regulations at the national and provincial levels). 
 82. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 53 (referring to the Chinese 
Contract Law as a basis for the fulfillment of contractual obligations). 
 83. XUE & ZHENG, supra note 24, at 22. 
 84. See SUN, supra note 23, at 54 (noting that the assignment of rights had not 
been formally included in the 1990 Copyright Law). 
 85. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, arts. 24-25 (setting forth formal 
requirements for the licensing of copyrighted works). 
 86. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at 136-37 (discussing the 
reluctance of Chinese leaders to introduce a new intellectual property system that 
might conflict with the socialist economy). 
 87. See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:  INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 65 (1995) (stating that China’s post-Cultural 
Revolution leadership believed “the promotion of scientific and other intellectual 
work to be crucial if the nation were to make up for the decade of development and 
training lost to the Cultural Revolution”). 
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intellectual property laws were filled with compromises that resulted 
in what commentators have called “socialist legality with Chinese 
characteristics.”88 
In 1992, following Deng Xiaoping’s famous “tour” in Southern 
China, the National People’s Congress incorporated the concept of 
the socialist market economy into the Chinese Constitution.89  
Amended in March 1993, Article 15 of the Constitution now reads:  
“The state has put into practice a socialist market economy.  The State 
strengthens formulating economic laws, improves macro adjustment 
and control and forbids according to law any units or individuals from 
interfering with the social economic order.”90  In 1997, the private 
sector was designated an important component of the changing 
economy, and “red capitalists” were invited to join the Chinese 
Community Party at the Sixteenth Party Congress four years later.91  
Today, the Constitution stipulates that “[c]itizens’ lawful private 
property is inviolable,”92 and the real estate markets in major Chinese 
cities have been booming. 
As the Chinese socialist market economy develops, some of the 
compromises in the early intellectual property laws are no longer 
needed.  As two Chinese legal commentators explained in the 
copyright context: 
[S]ignificant social and economic changes have taken place in 
China since the enactment of the 1990 Copyright Law.  The 
fundamental economic structure of the country has been further 
transformed from a central planning system (“command economy”) 
into a socialist market economy.  Based on predominant Chinese 
legal theory, law in general, and copyright law in particular, is part 
of a “superstructure” the content of which must reflect the ordering 
of its underlying economic base.  From such perspective, law must 
be adjusted commensurate to its changing socio-economic context.  
Since the 1990 Copyright Law was enacted at a stage during which 
the influence of the “command” tradition was still sizeable, it 
unavoidably bears the hallmark of a command economy and 
therefore needs to be reconfigured to suit socialist market 
paradigms.93 
                                                 
 88. See id. at 70 (using the 1984 Chinese Patent Law to illustrate “socialist legality 
with Chinese characteristics”). 
 89. CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, THREE BILLION NEW CAPITALISTS:  THE GREAT SHIFT OF 
WEALTH AND POWER TO THE EAST 27 (2005). 
 90. XIAN FA art. 15 (1982) (amended 2004) (P.R.C.) (emphasis added). 
 91. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 89, at 27. 
 92. XIAN FA art. 13 (1982) (amended 2004) (P.R.C.). 
 93. Feng & Huang, supra note 28, at 917. 
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Moreover, the notion of private profit became justifiable as the 
market developed.  Indeed, “[w]hen experiments began in enterprises 
to replace profit quotas with taxation, many units saw exploiting 
patent rights as a good way to keep more profit for themselves, taking 
advantage of the new tax incentives for research in and exploitation of 
patented technology.”94  At the turn of the millennium, the National 
People’s Congress took advantage of the millennium amendments to 
remove the outdated provisions and to align the Chinese intellectual 
property system with the socialist market economy. 
B. Domestic Rights Holders 
Since the enactment of the 1990 Copyright Law, a large number of 
domestic copyright holders have emerged.  To facilitate transactions 
among these rights holders, Article 8 of the revised copyright law 
provides that copyright holders “may authorize an organization for 
collective administration of copyright to exercise the copyright or any 
copyright-related right.”95  This new provision expressly permits the 
creation of private collective copyright administration bodies, which, 
upon authorization, can act, litigate, or arbitrate on behalf of the 
copyright holders they represent.96  The oft-cited example of these 
collective bodies is the Music Copyright Society of China.  As one 
commentator described: 
Until 2000, there was only one organization, the Music Copyright 
Society of China (MCSC) established on December 17, 1992, that 
was allowed to act on behalf of its collective members.  The MCSC 
represents Chinese singers, composers, music adaptors, heirs, music 
publishers and recording companies of Chinese nationality.  It 
currently has more than 2500 members.  Since then, a few other 
collective bodies have also been established.97 
In light of the growing number of private collective societies, one 
may wonder whether Article 8 is an example of the rent-seeking 
legislation widely criticized by Western commentators.98  Indeed, the 
rent-seeking argument becomes even stronger when one takes into 
                                                 
 94. FENG, supra note 67, at 168. 
 95. Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 8. 
 96. See id. (stipulating that “[a]fter authorization, the organization for collective 
administration of copyright may, in its own name, claim the right for the copyright 
owners and copyright-related right holders, and participate, as an interested party, in 
litigation or arbitration relating to the copyright or copyright-related right”). 
 97. SUN, supra note 23, at 63; see also XUE & ZHENG, supra note 24, at 32 (stating 
that MCSC “has successfully collected royalties for using background music from 68 
Chinese hotels in May 2001”). 
 98. See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001) (discussing how the 
U.S. copyright law has expanded as a result of industry lobbying efforts). 
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account the lack of presence of foreign collective bodies in the 
country.99  Nevertheless, regardless of whether Article 8 was the 
product of lobby efforts by MCSC and other private collective 
societies, one cannot deny that the political leverage of local copyright 
holders has increased substantially in the past decade. 
C. Modernization Efforts 
In December 1996, members of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (“WIPO”) adopted the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty to update international 
intellectual property norms in light of changes to the digital 
environment.100  In strong resemblance to these two treaties, which 
entered into force in 2002,101 Article 47(6) prohibits the 
intentional[] circumventi[on] or destr[uction of] the technological 
measures taken by a right holder for protecting the copyright or 
copyright-related rights in his work, sound recording or video 
recording, without the permission of the copyright owner, or the 
owner of the copyright-related rights, unless otherwise provided in 
law or in administrative regulations.102 
Article 47(7) also prohibits the “intentional[] delet[ion] or alter[ation 
of] the electronic right management information of a work, sound 
recording or video recording, without the permission of the copyright 
owner or the owner of a copyright-related right, unless otherwise 
provided in law or in administrative regulations.”103  These provisions 
are neither mandated by the TRIPs Agreement nor have anything to 
do with the WTO, even if we broadly define China’s WTO 
commitments.  Rather, they were included as part of China’s 
preparation to accede to the WIPO Internet Treaties. 
 Such preparation is important for two reasons.  First, the Internet 
population has been growing exponentially in China.  In the latest 
survey conducted by the China Internet Network Information Center 
(“CNNIC”), the country presently has an Internet population of more 
                                                 
 99. Compare SUN, supra note 23, at 63 (stating that it is unclear whether foreign 
copyright holders may form or join private collective societies in China), with XUE & 
ZHENG, supra note 24, at 32 (noting that “the International Copyright Treaties 
Implementing Rules recognize the function of foreign collective copyright 
management organizations”). 
 100. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65; WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76. 
 101. The WIPO Copyright Treaty entered into force on March 6, 2002, and the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty entered into force on May 20, 2002. 
 102. Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 47(6). 
 103. Id. art. 47(7). 
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than 110 million, behind only the United States.104  As the use of the 
Internet and new communications technologies increases, disputes 
over digital copyright infringement will surface in courts.  By 
including the online infringement provisions, the law provides 
certainty over the scope of rights protected on the Internet.  Such 
certainty is important to both local and foreign Internet content 
providers and will greatly facilitate electronic commerce and 
broadband deployment. 
Second, as demonstrated by the many bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements less developed countries have signed, the European 
Communities and the United States have been very aggressive in 
pushing for provisions that align local laws with the WIPO Internet 
Treaties.105  Indeed, as the administration stated in the 2005 National 
Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, “[t]he United States 
considers the WIPO treaties to reflect many key international norms 
for providing copyright protection over the Internet . . . [and] China’s 
accession to the WIPO treaties is an increasingly important priority for 
the United States.”106  If China did not include the provisions in the 
millennium amendments, it eventually would still have had to respond 
to the United States’ pressure.  In that scenario, China would have to 
divert the scarce resources it could otherwise use on reforms or 
modernization projects that are not related to digital copyright issues.  
Moreover, the early adoption of the WIPO provisions sent a strong 
signal to the international community that the country was taking 
intellectual property obligations seriously.107  This allowed China to 
earn goodwill despite its continuing struggle to improve intellectual 
property protection.  Having in place a well-developed framework may 
also ensure that the terms of the debate are not framed solely by the 
United States.108 
                                                 
 104. See CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER, 17TH STATISTICAL SURVEY 
REPORT ON THE INTERNET DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA, 4 (2005), http://www.cnnic.net.cn/ 
download/2006/17threport-en.pdf (stating that China has an Internet population of 
more than 110 million). 
 105. See Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property 
Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 392-400 (2004) (discussing the growing use of 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements to strengthen intellectual property 
abroad). 
 106. 2005 NTE REPORT, supra note 69, at 96. 
 107. See id. at 95-96 (calling attention to the progress China has recently made in 
the area of intellectual property protection). 
 108. Cf. Jonathan Berger, Advancing Public Health by Other Means:  Using Competition 
Policy, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 181, 
196-97 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) (explaining why less developed countries should 
invest resources in creating a competition regime before they are required to do so). 
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The final example concerns the protection of geographical 
indications, which has been fairly controversial in the international 
arena.  Although the TRIPs Agreement requires protection of 
geographical indications,109 it provides WTO member states with a 
great deal of freedom and latitude in implementing the provisions.  
Indeed, the regimes adopted by Europe and the United States are very 
different.110  While European countries offer protection of 
geographical indications and appellations of origin, the United States 
protects geographical indications as mere collective or certification 
marks. 
Most recently, the United States, along with Australia and other 
countries, challenged the European Communities before the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body over the lack of protection of trademarks 
and geographical indications for agricultural products and 
foodstuffs.111  As the United States claimed, the European 
Communities violated the TRIPs Agreement by failing to provide 
protection to pre-existing trademarks similar or identical to a 
geographical indication, by limiting the geographical indications the 
Communities will protect, and by limiting the access of nationals of 
other WTO member states to the procedures and protections 
provided under the Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/92 of 14 July 
1992 on the Protection of Geographical Indications and Designations 
of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs.112  Although the 
Dispute Settlement Panel found that the European Communities 
failed to provide national treatment to the rights holders and products 
of other member states, it considered the substantive protection of 
geographical indications under the EC system consistent with the 
TRIPs Agreement.113 
                                                 
 109. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 22-23 (requiring protection for 
geographical indications). 
 110. For an overview of protection of geographical indications and the discussions 
of the differences between the European Communities and the United States, see 
generally Lee Bendekgey & Caroline H. Mead, International Protection of Appellations of 
Origin and Other Geographic Indications, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 765 (1992); Albrecht 
Conrad, The Protection of Geographical Indications in the TRIPs Agreement, 86 TRADEMARK 
REP. 11 (1996); Paul Heald, Trademarks and Geographic Indications:  Exploring the 
Contours of the TRIPs Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 635 (1996). 
 111. Panel Report, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005) 
[hereinafter Geographical Indications Panel Report]. 
 112. Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the Protection of 
Geographical Indications and Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs, 1992 O.J. (L 208) 9. 
 113. See Geographical Indications Panel Report, supra note 111. 
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The revised Chinese trademark law adopted the American model of 
geographical indications protection.  Article 3 of the revised 
trademark law provides for the protection of geographical 
indications,114 and Rule 6 of the Implementing Regulations of the 
Trademark Law states that a geographical indication can be registered 
as a certification or collective mark.115  Given the controversy, one may 
wonder why China did not adopt the European model when it had an 
opportunity to do so.  The answer to this question is simple:  China 
was protecting geographical indications as certification marks before 
the amendments,116 and the adoption of the U.S. model would allow 
the country to devote its modernization efforts to other more 
important areas.  After all, “[f]rom the perspective of Chinese law 
reformers, the adoption of international norms is to serve domestic 
modernization needs and shall always be guided by Chinese social 
realities.”117  In embracing the status quo, the amendments not only 
avoided the need to introduce a new form of protection that might 
create adverse effects on the local community, but they also left the 
battle with the European Communities over geographical indications 
to the United States and other countries.  It is, therefore, no surprise 
that China joined Australia and the United States as a third party in 
European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs.118 
D. Summary 
In sum, the millennium amendments were enacted not merely to 
conform the Chinese intellectual property system to WTO standards, 
but also to meet the country’s rapidly-changing local conditions.  
Specifically, these conditions include the emergence of private 
property rights and local stakeholders, the increasing concerns about 
ambiguities over relationships with state-owned enterprises, and the 
government’s active push for economic modernization.  Even the 
                                                 
 114. Chinese Trademark Law, supra note 20, art. 3. 
 115. Implementing Regulations of the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, Rule 6, http://www.saic.gov.cn/flfg/flfg_detail.asp?flfgid=1313. 
 116. This is not a new rule, even though the old trademark law did not explicitly 
provide protection for geographical indications.  As one commentator noted, 
“[b]efore [the] amendment, a geographical indication could be protected as a 
certification trademark in China.”  Xie Lejun, Protection of Appellations of Origin in 
China, 1 CHINA PATENTS & TRADEMARKS 74, 74 (2001), quoted in Li, The Wolf Has Come, 
supra note 28, at 85; see also PETER GANEA & THOMAS PATTLOCH, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA 88 (2005) (observing that “[b]etween 1995 and May 2004, 110 
geographical indications were registered and approved by the Trade Mark Office as 
certification marks or collective marks”).  
 117. Feng & Huang, supra note 28, at 921. 
 118. Geographical Indications Panel Report, supra note 111. 
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transparency and rule of law amendments were partly introduced in 
response to the Chinese leaders’ changing attitude toward the rule of 
law, their eagerness to reduce corruption and local protectionism, and 
their determination to provide policy consistency and clarity as well as 
to streamline the judicial and administrative processes. 
As Peter Feng noted, “[t]oday, more and more things are being 
done in the name of a rights discourse, as opposed to political 
privileges, moral duties and class status.”119  Thus, the transparency 
and rule of law amendments need to be viewed against this 
background, even though the WTO Agreements and China’s 
accession agreements have posed new demands on the Chinese 
intellectual property system.  Taking note of these background and 
local demands, it is a small wonder that Professor Feng summarized 
the recent legislative development as follows: 
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in December 2001 
spurred a legislative frenzy.  All major intellectual property statutes 
were substantially revised and supplemented with new 
administrative regulations and judicial interpretations, for the sake 
of compliance with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) standards.  But more importantly, 
the transparency and anti-corruption reforms in the practice and 
procedure of the People’s Court, government units, cadre system 
and state-owned enterprises, in conjunction with the central 
leadership’s official endorsement of a “rule of law” strategy of social 
control, all have worked to give law enforcement in general, and 
intellectual property in particular, new meanings and hence new 
challenges, quite unimaginable in the 1990s.120 
II. THE WTO DISPUTE 
In February 2005, several trade groups, including the International 
Intellectual Property Alliance, the National Association of 
Manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, recommended 
that the Bush administration take WTO action against China 
concerning its lack of enforcement of intellectual property rights.121  
                                                 
 119. FENG, supra note 67, at 6. 
 120. Id. at ix (emphasis added). 
 121. See, e.g., Letter from Eric H. Smith, President, IIPA, to Sybia Harrison, Special 
Assistant to the Section 301 Committee, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Feb. 
9, 2005) [hereinafter IIPA Submission], http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2005/ CHINA%20 
2005_Feb9_PRC_OCR_Submission.pdf (recommending that “USTR immediately 
request consultations with China in the World Trade Organization, and that it place 
China on the Priority Watch List pending an out-of-cycle review to be concluded by 
July 31, at which time further appropriate multilateral and bilateral action, including 
the possible establishment of a dispute settlement panel in the WTO, will be 
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Such action was not available a decade ago, when China was still 
outside the WTO.  At that time, the United States had to rely on 
threats of trade sanctions, threats of non-renewal of most favored 
nation status, and opposition to entry into the WTO to induce China 
to strengthen intellectual property protection.  As I discussed in my 
earlier article, these threats were largely ineffective and had led to 
what I described as the “cycle of futility,” in which China and the 
United States threatened each other with trade wars, only to back 
down in the eleventh hour with a compromise that did not provide 
sustained improvements in intellectual property protection.122  The 
threats also created resentment among the Chinese people while 
inflicting collateral damage on the United States’ longstanding 
interests in promoting free trade, human rights, and the rule of law.123 
This time, however, China has joined the WTO, and the United 
States can no longer effectively threaten the country with unilateral 
trade sanctions.  Under the TRIPs Agreement, all intellectual property 
disputes arising under the Agreement are required to be settled by the 
mandatory WTO dispute settlement process.124  The WTO process 
prohibits a member state from taking retaliatory measures before it 
has exhausted all of the actions permissible under the rules.125  
Although unilateral sanctions are out of the question unless the 
United States withdraws from the WTO or unless the dispute falls 
outside the scope of the WTO agreements,126 China’s membership 
                                                 
determined”); NAT’L ASS’N OF MANUFACTURERS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
MANUFACTURERS’ RECOMMENDATIONS ON SPECIAL 301 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF CHINA 
(2005), http://www.nam.org/s_nam/doc1.asp?CID=164&DID=233159 
(recommending that the U.S. government, upon determining China’s designation as 
a Priority Foreign Country, “[b]egin preparations for filing a dispute settlement case 
before the World Trade Organization (WTO), contingent upon whether real results 
become apparent in terms of a pronounced decrease in counterfeiting in China”); 
U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., SUBMISSION FOR USTR’S SPECIAL 301 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW ON 
CHINA’S IPR PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT (2005), 
http://www.uschamber.com/international/regional/asia/050210ocr_submission.htm 
(recommending that “the Office of the United States Trade Representative . . . should 
immediately request consultations with China in the World Trade Organization”); Pat 
Choate, The Pirate Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2005, at A27 (contending that “[t]he 
United States should bring an intellectual property case against China at the W.T.O”). 
 122. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at 140-48 (discussing the “cycle of 
futility”). 
 123. See id. at 174 (suggesting that the United States’ actions may have discredited 
the idea that individual rights are to be respected and protected through the legal 
process). 
 124. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 64. 
 125. Panel Report, United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report]. 
 126. See H.J.R. Res. 27, 109th Cong. (2005) (calling for the United States’ 
withdrawal from the WTO) (rejected by the House by a vote of 338-86); see also 
Editorial, A Terrible Idea, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 6, 2005, at A26 (contending that 
Congress would be shortsighted to support a WTO withdrawal); see generally COBURN:  
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gives the United States a new process that includes consultations, 
negotiations, dispute settlement, and arbitration.  To initiate this 
process, the United States needs to file a formal complaint with the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body. 
In April 2005, the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(“USTR”) released the long-awaited results of its out-of-cycle review on 
China.127  The report stated that “[t]he United States remains gravely 
concerned . . . that China has not resolved critical deficiencies in IPR 
protection and enforcement and, as a result, infringements remain at 
epidemic levels.”128  Based on these concerns, the USTR elevated 
China to the Priority Watch List, marking the country’s first 
appearance on the list due to inadequate compliance with the TRIPs 
Agreement as well as other commitments made at the April 2004 
meeting of the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade.129  The 
administration also expressed its intention to invoke the transparency 
provisions of the TRIPs Agreement to formally request information 
concerning selected intellectual property enforcement issues, 
including criminal and administrative penalties.130 
To the disappointment of major trade groups and some legislators, 
the USTR decided against filing a formal complaint with the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body following its out-of-cycle review.  Had the 
administration done so, the complaint would have marked the second 
dispute the United States filed against China with the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body.131  Nevertheless, the USTR stated in its report its 
intention to “use WTO instruments whenever appropriate to address . . . 
concerns regarding the unacceptable levels of counterfeiting and 
piracy in China.”132 
                                                 
WTO Ignoring Intellectual Property Concerns, NAT’L J.’S TECH. DAILY, July 18, 2005 
(reporting Senator Coburn’s concern that the WTO process had made it difficult for 
the United States to protect intellectual property in China). 
 127. OFFICE OF THE USTR, OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW RESULTS (2005) [hereinafter 2005 
OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW], http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/ 
Reports_Publications/2005/2005_Special_301/asset_upload_file835_7647.pdf. 
 128. Id. at 1. 
 129. Id. at 8. 
 130. Id.  
 131. The first dispute concerned a tax break favoring computer chips produced or 
designed in China.  Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Value-
added Tax on Integrated Circuits, WT/DS309/1 (July 14, 2004) [hereinafter China—
Value-added Tax on Integrated Circuits]; see also Paul Blustein, China Agrees to Resolve 
Dispute Over Tax Breaks, WASH. POST, July 9, 2004, at E1 (reporting that China settled 
with the United States over its first complaint with the WTO); Terril Yue Jones & Bill 
Sing, China, U.S. Settle WTO Chip Dispute, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at C1 (reporting 
about the first WTO dispute between China and the United States). 
 132. 2005 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW, supra note 127, at 8 (emphasis added). 
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Disappointed by the announcement, Senator Byron Dorgan 
introduced a resolution calling for the USTR to bring a formal 
complaint before the WTO regarding violations of intellectual 
property rights in China.133  Meanwhile, U.S. business groups repeated 
their requests for the administration to take formal WTO action.134  
The USTR is currently reviewing its options and has been preparing 
its WTO dispute.  In a recent congressional hearing, a USTR official 
stated that the WTO case against China is currently in its fact-finding 
phase.135 
In October 2005, the United States invoked Article 63(3) of the 
TRIPs Agreement to formally request “clarifications regarding specific 
cases of IPR enforcement that China has identified for the years 2001 
through 2004, and other relevant cases.”136  The request was “made in 
conjunction with similar requests by Japan and Switzerland.”137  
Despite its request, the country has yet to file a complaint before the 
WTO.  The USTR’s “wait-and-see” approach is understandable.  
Although the WTO dispute settlement process provides an effective 
tool to improve intellectual property protection in China, the general 
lack of enforcement of intellectual property rights does not present a 
strong case for the United States.  If the United States pursues such a 
weak case before the WTO, there will be serious adverse implications 
for not only China and the United States, but also the international 
community at large.  This Part explains why the United States should 
                                                 
 133. See S. Res. 142, 109th Cong. (2005) (calling for the USTR to bring a formal 
complaint before the WTO regarding violations of intellectual property rights in 
China). 
 134. See, e.g., Letter from Eric H. Smith, President, IIPA to Gloria Blue, Executive 
Secretary, Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative (Sept. 9, 2005), http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPA%20China%20TSPC% 
20WTO%20compliance%20Written%20Comments%20FINAL%2009092005.pdf 
(reiterating its recommendation that “USTR immediately request consultations with 
China in the World Trade Organization”); Richard McGregor, US Threatens to Take 
Film Piracy War with China to WTO, FIN. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at 9 (reporting that the 
U.S. movie industry “threatened to push for action against China in the World Trade 
Organization as illegal DVD copies of the latest Star Wars movie went on sale on 
Beijing’s streets just a few days after its opening”). 
 135. See COBURN:  WTO Ignoring Intellectual Property Concerns, supra note 126 
(reporting that James Mendenhall, acting general counsel of the USTR, had stated 
that the WTO case “was still in the fact-finding phase” and that while there is 
“widespread anecdotal evidence” that Chinese companies are engaging in piracy, 
“knowing it intuitively is different from being able to prove it in dispute settlement”). 
 136. Letter from Peter F. Allgeier, United States Trade Representative, to H.E. Mr. 
Sun Zhenyu, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to 
the World Trade Organization (Oct. 25, 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Documen 
t_Library/ Reports_Publications/2005/asset_upload_file115_8232.pdf. 
 137. OFFICE OF THE USTR, U.S.-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS:  ENTERING A NEW PHASE OF 
GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT—TOP-TO-BOTTOM REVIEW 14 (2006), 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/asset_up
load_file921_8938.pdf. 
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not file a formal complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
over inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights in China. 
A. Lack of Definition 
Although the TRIPs Agreement stipulates that each WTO member 
state needs to provide effective intellectual property enforcement, it 
does not define what constitutes “effective” protection.138  There is no 
doubt that a software piracy rate of ninety percent, as stated in a 
recent study by the Business Software Alliance, provides strong 
evidence of ineffective enforcement.139  However, critics have 
challenged the accuracy of these figures.  For example, Gary Shapiro, 
the president of the Consumer Electronics Association, described the 
figures as “[a]bsurd on its face” and “patently obscene.”140  Indeed, 
because the numbers were supplied by a self-interested trade group, 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel is unlikely to take them at face 
value.141 
Moreover, everything is relative.  If the study by the Business 
Software Alliance was accurate—that is a very big if—we should not 
ignore the fact that the United States has a software piracy rate of 
twenty-one percent while other developed countries, like France, Italy, 
and Spain, have piracy rates that range from the mid-forties to the low-
fifties.142  A piracy rate of ninety percent for a country that did not 
have intellectual property laws twenty-five years ago is not as 
problematic as a rate of forty to fifty percent for a country that has had 
a well-established intellectual property system for more than two 
centuries. 
In fact, as some commentators have suggested, one could interpret 
the word “effective” in light of the public policy goals set forth in the 
                                                 
 138. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 41(1) (requiring that each WTO 
member state offer effective intellectual property enforcement, without providing a 
definition of what constitutes “effective” protection). 
 139. See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE & INT’L DATA CORP., SECOND ANNUAL BSA AND IDC 
GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY (2005) [hereinafter GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY], 
http://www.bsa.org/globalstudy/upload/2005-Global-Study-English.pdf. 
 140. Software Piracy:  BSA or Just BS?, THE ECONOMIST, May 21, 2005, at 93. 
 141. See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 87, at 129 n.13 (cautioning that loss figures 
supplied by the copyright industries and the U.S. government should not be taken at 
face value); COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFO. 
INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 188 (2000) (discussing the difficulty in obtaining accurate 
estimates of the costs of illegal copying); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at 
175-76 (arguing that the copyright industries tend to overstate the extent of the piracy 
problem in China). 
 142. See GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY, supra note 139, at 8 (reporting the 
software piracy rates of France, Italy, and Spain at forty-five percent, fifty percent, and 
forty-three percent, respectively). 
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TRIPs Agreement143 or the technology transfer commitment as stated 
in article 66 of the Agreement.144  As Paul Heald advocated: 
[P]rotection should further “public policy objectives . . . including 
developmental and technological objectives . . . [and enable the 
least developed members] to create a sound and viable 
technological base.”  It should also “contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare.”  These objectives hardly dictate a narrow set 
of . . . options to developing countries.  Moreover, one could 
interpret “effective” purely in terms of economic incentives:  A 
member must provide a reward adequate to stimulate . . . successful 
research and development . . . .145 
Under this interpretation, the amount of protection China should 
provide must be viewed in light of its domestic socio-economic 
conditions, technological needs, development goals, and public policy 
objectives.  What is considered ineffective in the United States, 
therefore, may be considered effective in China. 
B. Lack of Evidence 
Even if the Dispute Settlement Panel could come up with a piracy 
figure that can be used to determine ineffective enforcement, the 
United States might ultimately lack sufficient non-anecdotal evidence to 
show that China has failed its obligations.146  As of this writing, U.S. 
                                                 
 143. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 7-8 (providing safeguards to protect 
the public interest); see also J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age:  Conflict 
or Cooperation with the Developing Countries, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441, 461 (2000) 
(suggesting that articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPs Agreement, taken together, may provide 
“a basis for seeking waivers to meet unforeseen conditions of hardship”). 
 144. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 66 (requiring developed countries to 
provide incentives for their businesses and institutions to help create “a sound and 
viable technological base” in least developed countries by promoting and encouraging 
transfer of technology). 
 145. Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field:  Addressing Information Distortion and 
Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REV. 249, 286 (2003) [hereinafter Heald, 
Mowing the Playing Field]. 
 146. As Daniel Chow noted: 
[In a complaint concerning China’s failure to satisfy its TRIPs enforcement 
obligations, t]he burden of proof and persuasion will be upon the 
complaining party.  Meeting these burdens will require the complaining party 
to gather evidence of China’s failure to meet its obligations—a task that could 
take years given the complexity of the enforcement environment in China 
today—and would also require the party to prove its case before the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body.  Not only will this be a long process requiring 
several years, but there is no guarantee that the party raising the dispute 
would succeed given that it now has all of the burdens of proof and going 
forward. 
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businesses have been reluctant to supply to the USTR piracy and 
counterfeiting data from China.  Although the USTR had contacted 
industry groups and published a notice in the Federal Register,147 it 
received only thirty-four submissions from the industry through the 
Section 301 submission procedures in 2005.148  As former United 
States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick noted before he left 
office, the administration needed more information if it was to take 
formal WTO action against China.149  In August 2005, the USTR 
published another notice on the Federal Register calling for information 
about China’s compliance with the WTO commitments.150 
Among all of the American businesses in China, small and midsize 
companies were particularly reluctant to disclose information.  Their 
reactions are understandable.  Guanxi (personal connections) and 
political capital are essential to doing business in China,151 and these 
companies fear that the information they provide would result in 
political or business repercussions, such as permit delays, application 
denials, or bid rejections.  Moreover, competition in China has 
become increasingly stiff; companies not only have to compete with 
local companies, but also with the many foreign companies now 
                                                 
CHOW, supra note 64, at 253-54. 
 147. Identification of Countries Under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974:  
Request for Public Comment on Out-of-Cycle Review of the People’s Republic of 
China, 69 Fed. Reg. 74561-01 (Dec. 14, 2004) (providing a notice that requested 
public comments in the USTR’s section 301 review of countries). 
 148. 2005 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW, supra note 127, at 2. 
 149. See More Evidence Needed for China Piracy Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at C3 
(reporting that “Outgoing U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick . . . told the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States had more homework to 
do before bringing a formal complaint at the WTO”); accord Sarah Lai Stirland, 
Business Should Aid U.S. in Anti-piracy Efforts, NAT’L J.’S TECH. DAILY, July 18, 2005 
(quoting Brad Huther, the director of anti-counterfeiting and piracy of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, as saying “[t]he data [provided to the USTR] has not been 
supplied in sufficient scope and depth to the United States Trade Representative in 
order for them to bring a case—that’s something that the business community owes 
the USTR and we must do a better job at that”); see also Peter Drahos, Securing the 
Future of Intellectual Property:  Intellectual Property Owners and Their Nodally Coordinated 
Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 53, 67 (2004) (noting that the U.S. 
trade enforcement process “is a highly information-intensive exercise”). 
 150. Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Concerning China’s 
Compliance with WTO Commitments, 70 Fed. Reg. 44714 (Aug. 3, 2005) (providing 
another notice requesting for public comments concerning China’s compliance with 
its WTO commitments). 
 151. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at 210 (discussing the importance 
of guanxi to conducting business in China); Gregory S. Kolton, Comment, Copyright 
Law and the People’s Courts in the People’s Republic of China:  A Review and Critique of 
China’s Intellectual Property Courts, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 415, 451 (1996) 
(contending that “it may be difficult for foreign firms which plan to continue doing 
business in China to sue because doing so may wreck their ‘guanxi’—personal 
contacts or favors—that are integral for doing business in the PRC”). 
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rushing to the Chinese market because of “China fever.”152  As a 
former minister counselor at the U.S. embassy in Beijing noted, “[o]ur 
leaders may be right, but the Europeans get the contracts.”153  It is, 
therefore, no surprise that these firms are concerned about taking 
political action that could hurt their bottom line. 
To make the administration’s position more difficult, some 
companies disagree with the administration and the trade groups over 
whether the United States should take formal WTO action against 
China.154  To them, such action would be counterproductive, and the 
resulting bilateral tension would hurt them the most, because they are 
more vulnerable to retaliation.155  Trade groups and multinational 
corporations, by contrast, “could arouse enormous media attention or 
[obtain additional protection from local or even national leaders 
because their] investments contribute or would contribute so 
significantly to the economic development of a particular locality or 
the country as a whole.”156 
Meanwhile, those who favor formal WTO action are confronted 
with what game theorists have called a classic “prisoner’s dilemma,” in 
                                                 
 152. See HAROLD CHEE WITH CHRIS WEST, MYTHS ABOUT DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 30 
(2004) (“The Chinese market is already highly competitive.  As everyone wants to be 
in that market, a large majority of the global players are already here.  And local 
Chinese competitors are not taking this lying down.”). 
 153. ODED SHENKAR, THE CHINESE CENTURY:  THE RISING CHINESE ECONOMY AND ITS 
IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE BALANCE OF POWER, AND YOUR JOB 109 (2005); see 
Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at 167-68 (“Today, goods produced in the 
United States are also produced in Europe and Japan.  Because Europe and Japan do 
not impose similar demands on China, ‘the Chinese government will react to 
sanctions by becoming even more hostile to the United States and by switching from 
U.S. products to European and Japanese ones.’”). 
 154. See CHOW, supra note 64, at 245-46 (stating that “[m]any [multinational 
enterprises] . . . were reluctant to involve the USTR because of concerns that such 
involvement might lead to trade tensions and retaliation against their businesses by 
PRC authorities”); Veron Mei-Ying Hung, China’s WTO Commitment on Independent 
Judicial Review:  Impact on Legal and Political Reform¸ 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 77, 85 (2004) 
(asserting that “[p]rivate enterprises are afraid of suing organs responsible for 
regulating commercial activities, such as departments of taxation as well as industry 
and commerce, because these departments can easily wage a war of attrition against 
any enterprise by, for instance, not granting administrative approvals needed for 
doing business in China”). 
 155. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at 167-68 (discussing how the 
Chinese might respond negatively by switching to European and Japanese products 
and services); see also Julia Chang Bloch, Commercial Diplomacy, in LIVING WITH CHINA:  
U.S./CHINA RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 185, 206 (Ezra F. Vogel ed., 
1997) (noting that “the Chinese government will react to sanctions by becoming even 
more hostile to the United States and by switching from U.S. products to European 
and Japanese ones”). 
 156. Hung, supra note 154, at 86; see also JAMES MCGREGOR, ONE BILLION 
CUSTOMERS:  LESSONS FROM THE FRONT LINES OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 149 (2005) 
(“If your business spans the entire nation, that means to the president, premier, and 
other politburo members and ministers.  But don’t go there for anything less than a 
world-class dispute.”). 
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which players tend to cheat on others due to a lack of information 
about choices others have made.157  While coordination by the USTR 
and the introduction of a confidential process may improve the 
quantity and quality of information available to each informant, some 
companies may consider it a win-win situation to stay out of the 
conflict and free ride on the efforts of their competitors and partners.  
If the United States prevails, they will be able to benefit from the WTO 
ruling.  If the United States fails, however, they will still be able to 
maintain their guanxi and political connections.  Even better, by 
demonstrating their loyalty throughout the process, they might be 
able to develop better guanxi and political connections, thereby 
ensuring further commercial success. 
Some also would not see it as their business to think about the long-
term implications of the United States’ policy.  As one venture capital 
manager responded when he was questioned about the long-term 
impact of the U.S. economy caused by outsourcing of research-and-
developments to China and India, “[l]ook, I’m a loyal citizen but what 
happens to the United States is not my job.  I have a fiduciary 
responsibility to my investors.  The guys in Washington are supposed 
to be worrying about the United States.”158 
C. Difficulty with Enforcement 
Even if the United States were able to amass the needed evidence, 
the WTO process poses structural challenges to a general complaint 
about inadequate intellectual property enforcement.  Virtually all of 
the existing WTO cases focus on the non-implementation of specific 
provisions, rather than a lack of general enforcement.  (See Fig. 1.)  
The closest cases are those filed by the United States against Greece 
and the European Communities, in which the United States claimed 
that Greece violated Articles 41 and 61 of the TRIPs Agreement by not 
                                                 
 157. The prisoner’s dilemma is usually described as follows: 
Two criminals are arrested, but the district attorney does not have enough 
evidence to convict either of them for serious charges unless one or both 
confess to the crime.  The district attorney separates the two and makes the 
following offer to each:  “If you confess and your partner does not, I will grant 
you immunity, and you will walk out free.  However, if your partner squeals, 
and you don’t, I’m going to throw the book at you.  If neither of you 
confesses, then I’ll have to settle for misdemeanor charges, which will get you 
each a brief prison term.  If you both confess, I’ll get you both on felony 
charges, but I’ll argue for shorter sentences than if you do not confess and 
your partner does.  Think about it and tell me what you want to do. 
JAMES MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 78 (1994).  See generally ANATOL 
RAPOPORT & ALBERT CHAMMAH, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (1965) (providing a detailed 
discussion of the prisoner’s dilemma). 
 158. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 89, at 148. 
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providing effective enforcement of intellectual property rights.159  The 
cases were eventually settled. 
FIGURE 1: 
WTO Intellectual Property Disputes (as of March, 1, 2006) 
 
 No. Dispute (Complainant) TRIPs 
Provisions 
 DS28 Japan—Measures Concerning Sound 
Recordings (United States) 
14 
 DS36 Pakistan—Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products (United States) 
27, 65 and 70 
 DS37 Portugal—Patent Protection Under the 
Industrial Property Act (United States) 
33, 65 and 70 
 DS42 Japan—Measures Concerning Sound 
Recordings (European Communities) 
14(6) and 
70(2) 
 DS50 India—Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products (United States) 
27, 65 and 70 
 DS79 India—Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products (European 
Communities) 
70(8) and 
70(9) 
 DS82 Ireland—Measures Affecting the Grant 
of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights 
(United States) 
9-14, 63, 65 
and 70 
E DS83 Denmark—Measures Affecting the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights (United States) 
50, 63 and 65 
E DS86 Sweden—Measures Affecting the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights (United States) 
50, 63 and 65 
                                                 
 159. Request for Consultations by the United States, Greece—Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs, WT/DS125/1 (May 
7, 1998); Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities—
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs, 
WT/DS124/1 (May 7, 1998). 
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 DS114 Canada—Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products (European 
Communities) 
27(1), 28 and 
33 
 DS115 European Communities—Measures 
Affecting the Grant of Copyright and 
Neighbouring Rights (United States) 
9-14, 63, 65 
and 70 
E DS124 European Communities—Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights for 
Motion Pictures and Television 
Programs (United States) 
41 and 61 
E DS125 Greece—Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights for Motion Pictures and 
Television Programs (United States) 
41 and 61 
 DS153 European Communities—Patent 
Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products 
(Canada) 
27(1) 
 DS160 United States—Section 110(5) of the US 
Copyright Act (European Communities) 
9(1) 
 DS170 Canada—Term of Patent Protection 
(United States) 
33, 65 and 70 
 DS171 Argentina—Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceuticals and Test Data 
Protection for Agricultural Chemicals 
(United States) 
27, 65 and 70 
 DS174 EC—Protection of Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs 
(United States) 
3, 16, 24, 63 
and 65 
 DS176 United States—Section 211 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998 (European 
Communities) 
2-4, 15-21, 41, 
42 and 62 
 DS186 United States—Section 337 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930 and Amendments Thereto 
(European Communities) 
2, 3, 9, 27, 41, 
42, 49, 50 and 
51 
 DS196 Argentina—Certain Measures on the 
Protection of Patents and Test Data 
(United States) 
27, 28, 31, 34, 
39, 50, 62, 65 
and 70 
 DS199 Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent 27 and 28 
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Protection (United States) 
 DS224 United States—US Patents Code 
(Brazil) 
27 and 28 
 DS290 EC—Protection of Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs 
(Australia) 
1, 2, 3, 4, 16, 
20, 22, 24, 41, 
42, 63 and 65 
 E = Disputes on Enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement 
 
Out of all the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement, Articles 41, 46, 
and 61 provide the strongest support for the United States’ complaint.  
Article 41 requires WTO member states to “ensure that enforcement 
procedures as specified in [Part III of the TRIPs Agreement] are 
available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act 
of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this 
Agreement . . . .”160  Article 46 states an obligation for the judicial 
authorities to “create an effective deterrent to infringement.”161  
Although Article 61 does not mention the word “effective,”162 it 
requires member states to provide such remedies as “imprisonment 
and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with 
the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity.”163  
This Article was one of the two used by the administration in its WTO 
dispute against Greece; it is apposite because policymakers and trade 
groups increasingly focus on not just effective enforcement, but on 
“effective, deterrent enforcement.”164 
Notwithstanding these provisions, challenging China on non-
implementation grounds is likely to be very difficult, as most of the 
laws required under the TRIPs Agreement are already on the books.  
As Part I described, China made significant changes to its intellectual 
property regime in the wake of the WTO accession.165  In the early 
1990s, it also had made many substantial revisions to its intellectual 
property system in response to agreements signed with the United 
States.166  Indeed, the USTR and many other U.S. officials had 
                                                 
 160. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 41(1) (emphasis added). 
 161. Id. art. 46 (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. art. 61. 
 163. Id. (emphasis added). 
 164. See, e.g., IIPA Submission, supra note 121, at 2 (discussing China’s failure to 
provide “effective, deterrent enforcement” in fulfillment of their obligations under 
the TRIPs Agreement). 
 165. See discussion supra Part I (discussing the intellectual property reforms China 
undertook in the wake of its WTO accession). 
 166. See generally Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11 (discussing the U.S.-China 
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conceded that the problem with intellectual property protection in 
China is not with the laws, but with enforcement of these laws.  As the 
2005 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers stated, 
“[w]hile China has made significant progress in its efforts to make its 
framework of laws, regulations and implementing rules WTO-
consistent, serious problems remain, particularly with China’s 
enforcement of intellectual property rights.”167 
However, should the United States go after China on non-
enforcement grounds, the TRIPs Agreement might be on China’s 
side.  Under Article 41(5) of the Agreement, a WTO member state is 
not required to devote more resources to intellectual property 
enforcement than other areas of law enforcement.168  If China were 
able to show that their enforcement problems with piracy and 
counterfeiting were no more excessive than their problems with, say, 
tax collection (which are very serious),169 China would be likely to 
prevail.  After all, it is hard to imagine any country putting intellectual 
property protection ahead of tax collection.  Nor does the WTO 
require it to do so.  Moreover, as an attorney experienced with U.S.-
China trade has noted: 
Foreign investors should be warned . . . that China’s legal reforms 
have exceeded its enforcement abilities.  Although China seems 
committed to its reforms, it still lacks the legal infrastructure to 
competently and efficiently handle intellectual property disputes.  
Moreover, Beijing’s ability to enforce its intellectual property 
regulations is seriously hampered by local resistance to change, 
particularly when local authorities sense that such change will take 
power out of their hands.170 
To some extent, the intellectual property problems in China are not 
that different from those experienced in the United States and other 
developed countries, which have been struggling with massive 
                                                 
agreements in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the resulting changes to the Chinese 
intellectual property system). 
 167. 2005 NTE REPORT, supra note 69, at 95. 
 168. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 41(5). 
 169. See JOHN L. CHAN, CHINA STREETSMART:  WHAT YOU MUST KNOW TO BE 
EFFECTIVE AND PROFITABLE IN CHINA 103 (2003) (noting that “in a developing economy 
like China, where tax rules are constantly changing, the loopholes are plenty and 
enforcement and interpretation vary from area to area”); see also PANITCHPAKDI & 
CLIFFORD, supra note 16, at 162-3 (discussing how local protectionism, or 
“warlordism,” has affected the development of the auto industry); John H. Jackson, 
The Impact of China’s Accession on the WTO, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 
supra note 27, at 19, 27 [hereinafter Jackson, Impact of China’s Accession] (“China’s 
implementation of WTO obligations is partly an adjustment problem.  It is also partly 
a problem of the central government’s power vis-à-vis local governments.”). 
 170. Kim Newby, Doing Business in China:  How the State of 1.3 Million Can Tap the 
Nation of 1.3 Billion, 19 MAINE BAR J. 238, 241 (2004). 
YU.OFFTOPRINTER 6/11/2006  2:51:07 PM 
936 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:901 
unauthorized copying problems since the emergence of Napster and 
other file-sharing technologies.171  In the past two years, the recording 
and movie industries have filed many rounds of lawsuits throughout 
the world against individuals distributing copyrighted works illegally 
via peer-to-peer networks.172  The file-sharing problems are so 
important that courts around the world are now inundated with cases 
addressing secondary copyright liability.173 
At some point, we need to recognize that intellectual property, due 
to its abstract nature, is generally treated differently from physical 
property.  It does not matter whether it is in China or in the United 
States.174  Even in major U.S. cities, it is not uncommon to notice street 
vendors selling pirated CDs and DVDs in the presence of police 
officers.  Even though the officers are very unlikely to buy the fake 
products, the fact that they have no problems—either moral or legal—
with the street vending activities has greatly weakened the U.S.’s moral 
claim.175 
Moreover, many intellectual property rights holders have 
complained about the difficulty of convincing federal prosecutors to 
take piracy and counterfeiting cases seriously.176  Some district 
attorneys’ offices, they maintain, just refuse to take those cases.  From 
China’s standpoint, the lack of support from the U.S. authorities for 
                                                 
 171. For discussions of the massive unauthorized copying problem created by peer-
to-peer file-sharing technology, see generally Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907 (2004); Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 653 (2005) [hereinafter Yu, P2P and the Future]. 
 172. See, e.g., Yu, P2P and the Future, supra note 171, at 658-76 (discussing the 
enforcement tactics used by the recording industry in 2003). 
 173. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 
2770 (2005) (holding that the distributors of peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies 
could be liable for copyright infringement committed by individuals using their 
products if they had “induced” their users to undertake infringing activities); BMG 
Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2005] F.C.A. 193 (Can.) (addressing the issue of whether 
setting up the facilities to allow copying amounts to authorizing infringement); 
Universal Music Austl. Pty Ltd v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (2005) 65 I.P.R. 289 
(Austl.) (holding the defendant liable for authorizing users to infringe on music 
copyrights and directing it to modify the software application to reduce 
infringement). 
 174. See Peter K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyright Piracy, 26 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 127, 131-40 (2003) (challenging the common misconceptions 
that copyright piracy is a cultural problem or the product of technological 
backwardness). 
 175. Arguably, state police officers could claim that it is not within their jurisdiction 
to combat the federal crimes of commercial piracy and counterfeiting.  However, the 
scenes remain troubling and greatly weaken the moral strength of the United States’ 
arguments against China. 
 176. See, e.g., Remarks of Timothy P. Trainer, Esq., President, International Anti-
Counterfeiting Coalition, Inc., at “Free Trade and Counterfeit Havens:  A Cross-
Industry Dialogue” Symposium at Michigan State University College of Law (Oct. 12, 
2004). 
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prosecuting intellectual property crimes is particularly interesting.  
After all, the Chinese authorities have been heavily criticized for their 
reluctance to take action against the alleged infringers. 
Compared to enforcement of domestic laws, enforcement of the 
TRIPs Agreement is even more difficult, as the issue has been further 
compounded by the political dynamics of the WTO negotiations.  As 
Ruth Okediji aptly observed, the WTO member states can be seen as 
playing “a two-stage game” with respect to the negotiation and 
enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement.177  Although commentators and 
policymakers in less developed countries have questioned the fairness 
of the Agreement, developed countries won the first-stage negotiation 
game by forming coalitions among themselves and by convincing their 
less developed counterparts to join them in an agreement that created 
minimum standards for intellectual property protection.178  The 
strategies used to complete the first-stage game, however, have left 
developed countries with a much harder enforcement game to play—
both among themselves and vis-à-vis less developed countries.  As 
Professor Okediji noted: 
Having accomplished the primary goal of binding developing 
countries to high standards of intellectual property protection, 
developed countries must now deal with the costs of “winning” the 
first stage game.  These include constraints on sovereign discretion 
in the area of policy development, and battles over extant policy 
differences between the member states.179 
As less developed countries become increasingly dissatisfied with 
the international intellectual property system and as they acquire 
more sophisticated knowledge about the international intellectual 
property regime, it is unlikely that developed countries will be able to 
win the enforcement game as easily as they won the negotiation game.  
Moreover, enforcement, by nature, is a more difficult game.  That 
game is further complicated by the fact that some countries might 
                                                 
 177. Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO:  Reconsidering the TRIPS 
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 823 (2003).  Unlike Professor Okediji, this 
Author considers the game played by the WTO member states as a three-stage game, 
with stages in negotiation, implementation, and enforcement.  Nevertheless, these 
differences will not affect the implications of Professor Okediji’s important insight 
into the multi-stage game the TRIPs members have to play when they move from 
negotiation to enforcement. 
 178. There are many explanations why developed countries have agreed to join the 
TRIPs Agreement.  See generally Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 105, at 325-26 
(discussing the various reasons why countries joined the TRIPs Agreement); Peter K. 
Yu, TRIPs and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 371-79 (2005) 
(outlining the four different narratives commonly used to account for the 
establishment of the TRIPs Agreement). 
 179. Okediji, supra note 177, at 823. 
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have negotiated treaties knowing well in advance that those treaties 
would not be fully enforced due to domestic implementation 
constraints.180  Indeed, as Andrew Mertha and Robert Pahre 
maintained, “a state with an implementation constraint [like China 
and other less developed countries] may make greater concessions 
knowing that they will not be implemented.”181 
D. Adverse WTO Rulings 
Although the United States initially dominated the WTO dispute 
settlement process and has scored major victories against less 
developed countries,182 the WTO process does not guarantee victory 
for the United States—or, for that matter, any other developed 
countries.  Indeed, when Congress deliberated the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, U.S. lawmakers expressed concern about the tension 
that adverse WTO rulings would pose to the country’s long-held 
constitutional principles and legal tradition.183  A few days before 
Congress voted on the statute, Senate Robert Dole introduced a bill to 
establish a statutory commission to review adopted WTO panel reports 
adverse to the United States.184  (The bill was eventually abandoned.185) 
Even today, many policymakers take the position that the United 
States should withdraw from the WTO.  Every five years, the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act of 1994 requires the USTR to submit to 
Congress a report of “the effects of the WTO Agreement on the 
interests of the United States, the costs and benefits to the United 
States of its participation in the WTO, and the value of the continued 
participation of the United States in the WTO.”186  After submission of 
the report, legislators can introduce a bill calling for the United 
                                                 
 180. See generally Andrew Mertha & Robert Pahre, Patently Misleading:  Partial 
Implementation and Bargaining Leverage in Sino-American Negotiations on Intellectual 
Property Rights, 59 INT’L ORG. 695 (2005) (discussing the negotiation of treaties that 
parties know in advance will not be fully implemented).  It is no coincidence that the 
authors illustrated this partial implementation process with the bilateral intellectual 
property agreements signed between China and the United States.  Id. 
 181. Id. at 697. 
 182. See William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System:  The First Ten Years, 8 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 17, 17 (2005) [hereinafter Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System] (noting 
that “[t]he first half of [the first ten years’ operation of the WTO dispute settlement 
process]—from 1995 through 1999—was characterized by extensive use of the system 
by the United States initially, and later by the EU”). 
 183. S. 1438, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 
Sovereignty Debate:  United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round 
Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 157, 186-87 (1997) (discussing the proposed WTO 
Dispute Settlement Review Commission). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 187. 
 186. Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, 19 U.S.C. § 3535 (2000). 
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States’ withdrawal from the WTO.  Following the USTR’s most recent 
report, Representative Bernard Sanders (I-VT) introduced such a 
bill,187 which the House subsequently rejected by a vote of 338-86. 
The dissatisfaction of the WTO among policymakers is 
understandable.  The WTO dispute settlement process does not 
benefit the United States all the time.  Since the inception of the 
WTO, the United States has lost a number of major disputes.  In 
December 1999, for example, the European Communities successfully 
challenged Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 in United States—
Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974.188  In this dispute, the 
European Communities claimed that the strict time limits imposed by 
the U.S. statute did not provide sufficient time for a WTO member 
state to implement recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body 
based on rules and procedures of the international trading body.189  
Although the Dispute Settlement Panel ultimately upheld the 
challenged sections, it confirmed that a WTO member state could not 
pursue retaliatory actions before it had exhausted all of the remedies 
permissible under the WTO rules.190  In effect, the Panel limited the 
ability of the United States to impose unilateral trade sanctions 
without going through the WTO dispute settlement process. 
A year later, the United States lost its dispute with the European 
Communities over Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, which 
enables some restaurants and small establishments to play copyrighted 
music without compensating copyright holders.191  In this dispute, the 
European Communities argued that the homestyle and business 
exemptions of the U.S. Copyright Act were in violation of the TRIPs 
Agreement.192  The United States defended that the exemptions were 
valid under Article 13 of the Agreement, which allows member states 
to “confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain 
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
right holder.”193  The Dispute Settlement Panel held for the European 
                                                 
 187. See H.J. Res. 27, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 188. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 125. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See id. 
 191. Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 
WT/DS/160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Section 110(5) Panel Report].  For 
discussions of the dispute, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and 
Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 
(2001); Laurence R. Helfer, World Music on a U.S. Stage:  A Berne/TRIPS and Economic 
Analysis of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93 (2000). 
 192. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (2004). 
 193. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 13. 
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Communities, maintaining that the business exemption was 
inconsistent with Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne 
Convention as incorporated into the TRIPs Agreement.194  Following 
the panel decision, the European Communities and the United States 
pursued arbitration to determine the penalty award,195 which the 
United States did not pay until more than a year later.196 
Most recently, in United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, the tiny Caribbean islands of 
Antigua and Barbuda mounted a David-and-Goliath challenge against 
the United States over its federal and state prohibitions of Internet 
and telephone gambling.197  The complainants argued that the 
restrictions were inconsistent with the market access provisions of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services,198 which allow for the supply 
of gambling and betting services on a cross-border basis, as well as the 
U.S. Schedule of Specific Commitments.199  The United States counter-
argued that WTO member states were entitled to maintain restrictions 
on Internet gambling, which fall within the scope of exceptions 
“necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order.”200  
The Dispute Settlement Panel found for the complainants, 
maintaining that the U.S. gambling regulations were in violation of 
the WTO Agreements.  On appeal, the Appellate Body partially 
reversed the panel decision, upholding some of the U.S. federal laws 
as permissible exceptions.201  Nevertheless, the Appellate Body 
affirmed the panel decision that some of the U.S. laws were 
inconsistent with the market access commitments made by the United 
States during the Uruguay Round.202 
                                                 
 194. See Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 191. 
 195. See Recourse to Arbitration Under Article 25 of the DSU ¶ 5.1, United States—
Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001) 
(determining the award at $1,219,900 per year). 
 196. “As part of the Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, signed into law on 
16 April 2003, the US Congress approved the $3.3 million appropriation for 
European music right holders; the sum was subsequently paid to the representative 
body of European right holders (GESAC).”  Fair Play?, COPYRIGHT WORLD, July/Aug. 
2004.  Thanks to Professor Won-Mog Choi for pointing out the payment. 
 197. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling 
and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Online Gambling Panel 
Report]. 
 198. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement, supra note 17, Annex 1B, art. XIV(a), 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994). 
 199. See Online Gambling Panel Report, supra note 197. 
 200. See id. 
 201. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005). 
 202. See id. 
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There is no doubt that the United States and the European 
Communities have dominated the dispute settlement process in the 
first few years of the WTO’s existence, especially when the disputes 
involved intellectual property and the TRIPs Agreement.  (See fig. 2.)  
Indeed, many of the United States’ losses came from its archrival, the 
European Communities.  However, in recent years, less developed 
countries have had more frequent use of the WTO process.203  If the 
WTO rules are on their side, even tiny Caribbean islands can prevail 
over a trading giant like the United States.204  One can only imagine 
what it will be like when an emerging trading power like China 
decides to face-off with the United States. 
FIGURE 2: 
Distribution of Parties in WTO Intellectual Property Disputes 
(as of March 1, 2006) 
 
Countries Cases as Complainants Cases as 
Respondents 
United States 15 4 
European 
Communities 
6 5 
Australia 1 0 
Canada 1 2 
Brazil 1 1 
Argentina 0 2 
India 0 2 
Japan 0 2 
                                                 
 203. See Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States—US Patents Code, 
WT/DS224/1 (Feb. 7, 2001) (challenging U.S. patent laws for violations of articles 27 
and 28 of the TRIPs Agreement); see also Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System, supra 
note 182, at 24 (noting that “the US and the EC no longer were as dominant as 
complainants in the system” and that “developing country use of the system increased 
dramatically” in the second half of the first decade of operation of the WTO dispute 
settlement process). 
 204. But see William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 51, 
90 (1987) [hereinafter Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT] (questioning whether less 
developed countries will “have the diplomatic or economic muscle to ensure that the 
decision is implemented” even if they win their case, based on the United States’ past 
refusal to implement successful GATT findings against the United States by smaller 
countries). 
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Denmark 0 1 
Greece 0 1 
Ireland 0 1 
Pakistan 0 1 
Portugal 0 1 
Sweden 0 1 
 
As in most WTO cases, it is unlikely that either China or the United 
States will win the entire case.  Indeed, because of the customary 
length and detail in the WTO panel reports, both the winning and 
losing parties are likely to score some important points.  As William 
Davey observed, “the US lost the Film case and the EC lost the Section 
301 case and neither appealed, perhaps because in each case the 
losing party won some useful points.”205  Thus, if the United States files 
a complaint against China in the WTO process, it has to be ready for 
China to score some major points even if it wins. 
Obviously, this argument cuts both ways, as the converse is also true.  
Just as China would score some useful points should it lose a WTO 
case, the United States would do the same and, therefore, would be 
shielded from a complete disaster if it lost on a bad case.  
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the United States and other 
developed countries, such a filing would be unwise and dangerous, 
because the points it scores might not compensate for the symbolic 
effect of losing the first WTO case against China.  Such a loss would 
also have a devastating impact that could spill over into other areas of 
international trade as well as disputes involving other developed 
countries. 
E. Need for Guidance 
The WTO dispute settlement process, if used properly, will help the 
United States’ long-term interests in promoting free trade by 
providing China with the needed guidance as it makes transition to 
full compliance with WTO rules.  As Long Yongtu, the chief 
negotiator for China’s entry into the WTO, worried, “[l]acking 
expertise and professionals qualified on international rules may make 
China[] . . . ‘a blind man riding a blind horse’ within the WTO.”206  
                                                 
 205. Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System, supra note 182, at 19-20. 
 206. Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 104 (quoting Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, 
Chinese Economists Fear Favored West May Threaten Sovereignty, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
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Well-conceived challenges before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
are, therefore, needed to provide guidance during this critical 
transitional period. 
As I have discussed elsewhere, foreign pushes are sometimes needed 
to fuel China’s intellectual property reforms.207  Indeed, 
commentators, like noted China analyst Kenneth Lieberthal, have 
suggested that “the reformers in the government plan to use the WTO 
entry requirements to force the domestic reforms that they believe will 
make Chinese firms competitive internationally in the coming 
decades.”208  As a result, an adverse decision by a dispute settlement 
panel “may help respondent’s government counteract domestic 
pressures if that government can honestly argue that condemnation 
by [the WTO] is likely and retaliation by trading partners is 
possible.”209 
In addition, an adverse WTO decision can help break up the local 
monopolies and entrenched piracy interests that are lobbying against 
legal reforms and greater competition within the country.210  Thus, 
WTO challenges need to be strategically used to maximize the 
                                                 
Nov. 13, 2001); see PANITCHPAKDI & CLIFFORD, supra note 16, at 153 (quoting Wang Fei, 
a judge in the High People’s Court in Shanghai, as noting that they were “very 
confused by WTO rules”). 
 207. See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 368 (2003) 
(noting that “foreign pushes were undoubtedly helpful in establishing the Chinese 
intellectual property system in the early 1990s”); Yu, TRIPs and Its Discontents, supra 
note 178, at 377 (noting that foreign pushes are sometimes needed because 
“countries . . . might not be able to implement policy changes that are in their best 
interests, at least of the country as a whole”); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent 
Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166, 178 (1994) (noting that 
“[o]utsiders can play a constructive role by insisting that the issues be addressed 
within a larger and principled framework” and thus prevent internal political forces 
from blocking the adoption of an optimal, long-run strategy); Robert P. Merges, Battle 
of the Lateralisms:  Intellectual Property and Trade, 8 B.U. INT’L L.J. 239, 243-44 (1990) 
[hereinafter Merges, Battle of the Lateralisms] (observing that “representatives of the 
‘pirate’ industries may have enough political clout to block the proposed changes” 
even though the changes might be in the best interests of a country as a whole). 
 208. Kenneth Lieberthal & Geoffrey Lieberthal, The Great Transition, in HARV. BUS. 
REV., DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 1, 7 (2004); see also Richard Janda & Men Jing, China’s 
Great Leap of Faith:  Telecommunications and Financial Services Commitments, in CHINA AND 
THE LONG MARCH TO GLOBAL TRADE:  THE ACCESSION OF CHINA TO THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 66, 67 (Sylvia Ostry et al. eds., 2003) (noting that “[t]he Chinese 
leadership obviously chose to use WTO entry not only to solidify existing reforms, but 
also as an engine for further and more dramatic reforms in the key financial services 
and telecommunications sectors”) [hereinafter CHINA AND THE LONG MARCH]; WTO 
Deal Is Major Victory for China’s Zhu, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1999, at A21 (“WTO is the 
lever that the reformers need to open the system.  You can’t reform from above.  You 
can’t reform from below.  So you reform from outside.” (quoting Rick Baum, political 
scientist, University of California at San Diego)). 
 209. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, supra note 204, at 74. 
 210. See PANITCHPAKDI & CLIFFORD, supra note 16, at 163-64 (discussing how 
domestic legal reforms accompanying China’s accession to WTO may provide hopes 
for local partners in reducing local favoritism). 
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benefits created by China’s WTO accession.  If the right complaint is 
brought, the United States might even be able to enlist the support of 
local companies, which are equally concerned about the 
anticompetitive behavior of the monopolies and entrenched players. 
Although the WTO has a broad coverage, some complaints are less 
well-suited than others for the WTO dispute settlement process.  For 
example, the United States failed in its attempt to use the WTO 
process to open the Japanese market for American films.211  If the 
United States is not careful in bringing these challenges, it might 
create a new “cycle of futility” similar to the one created in the early 
1990s.212  In this new cycle, the United States might threaten to take, or 
might actually take, formal WTO action on a weak WTO case on 
inadequate intellectual property enforcement, only to find 
unsustained improvements in intellectual property protection in 
China. 
This is particularly problematic, because a formal WTO complaint 
will strain the bilateral relationship between China and the United 
States, regardless of who wins at the end.213  So far, the United States 
has filed only one complaint against China with the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body, which has been quickly settled.214  Likewise, China 
has been a co-complainant in only one dispute with the United States, 
which the latter lost despite its appeal to the Appellate Body.215  
                                                 
 211. See Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and 
Paper, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998) (finding that the United States had not 
demonstrated that the Japanese measures nullified or impaired the benefits accruing 
to the US within the meaning of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade); see 
also Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System, supra note 182, at 28 (noting that “the 
experience in the Film case demonstrates that the WTO rules are not well suited to 
disciplining indirect and informal barriers to market access”); Jackson, The Impact of 
China’s Accession, supra note 169, at 24 (observing that the effectiveness of the WTO 
dispute settlement system has created “a tendency to throw things at the dispute 
settlement system”). 
 212. See Peter K. Yu, Still Dissatisfied After All These Years:  Intellectual Property, Post-
WTO China, and the Avoidable Cycle of Futility, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 143, 148-51 
(2005) (discussing the new cycle of futility). 
 213. See ROBERT HUDEC, ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES 25-26 
(1978) (discussing how the legalistic approach would promote conflict and 
contentiousness in an organization that sought to promote negotiated solutions); 
Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, supra note 204, at 70 (arguing that a legalistic 
approach may be counterproductive “because it poisons the atmosphere in which 
[diplomatic] contacts take place . . . [and because] economic relations between the 
contending parties may deteriorate generally as positions in the dispute harden and 
bad feelings spill over into other areas”); Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to 
Resolving Global Intellectual Property Disputes:  What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business 
Strategists, and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 585 (2002) 
(noting that “as with all adversary processes, the dispute settlement procedure creates 
hostility between the disputing parties”). 
 214. China—Value-added Tax on Integrated Circuits, supra note 131. 
 215. Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
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Because the countries had been adversaries in only two cases, 
“initiation of a complaint would be something of a slap in the face.  
The ignominy of a loss would also loom larger.”216  Nevertheless, as 
more complaints are filed and as both parties have their share of wins 
and losses, the impact of a WTO dispute on bilateral relations will be 
greatly reduced, and the consequences of filing a risky case will be less 
severe. 
F. SUMMARY 
China spent fifteen years negotiating exhaustively for its entry to the 
WTO.  While policymakers and commentators initially expressed 
reservations about China’s joining the international trading body, 
most of them, by now, have agreed that China’s WTO accession will 
benefit the international trading system in the long run.  Indeed, 
some commentators have suggested that China will play a major role 
in the organization, given the fact that it joined the organization “[a]t 
a time when trade protectionism and unilateralism threaten to 
reemerge, and the demand for a more equitable distribution of the 
benefits of globalization is loud.”217  Thus, it is important that the U.S. 
administration be patient and provide guidance as China learns to 
become a respectable member of the international trading body. 
Although this Article argues against a complaint against the general 
lack of intellectual property enforcement, it does not argue against 
the use of the WTO dispute settlement process on all intellectual 
property matters.  Indeed, it takes the position that WTO challenges 
will be particularly helpful in areas in which Chinese laws do not 
comply with the TRIPs Agreement,218 as well as those in which the 
challenges are supported by prior WTO panel decisions.  By contrast, 
WTO challenges will be the most risky in areas in which the laws meet 
the TRIPs requirements, but are not enforced effectively.219  If the 
United States insists on pursuing the latter, it needs to understand the 
                                                 
Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R, 
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R, 
WT/DS259/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003).  Other co-complainants were the European 
Communities, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand, and Brazil. 
 216. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, supra note 204, at 71. 
 217. Deborah Z. Cass et al., China and the Reshaping of the World Trade Organization, 
in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 27, at 15. 
 218. For discussion of aspects of Chinese intellectual property laws that are 
inconsistent with the TRIPs Agreement, see supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 219. See Angela Gregory, Chinese Trademark Law and the TRIPs Agreement—Confucius 
Meets the WTO, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 27, at 321, 342 
(arguing that the WTO dispute settlement process may be more effective “in 
situations of deficiencies in substantive law rather than in cases in which the 
substantive law meets TRIPs requirements but enforcement is lacking”). 
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limitations and the potential consequences of its strategy.  A weak case 
before the WTO will not only be unhelpful in liberating trade, but 
could potentially backfire on the entire international community.  
Pursuing such a case is worse than not bringing the case at all. 
III. THINKING OUTSIDE THE IP BOX 
If the United States could not file a complaint with the WTO, one 
might wonder what other alternatives the country has in dealing with 
China’s rampant piracy and counterfeiting problems.  Elsewhere, I 
discussed four different areas in which policymakers and business 
executives should focus their remedial efforts:  (1) educate the local 
people; (2) create local stakeholders; (3) strengthen laws and 
enforcement mechanisms; and (4) develop legitimate alternatives.220  
Even with these remedial efforts, foreign businesses are likely to suffer 
from rampant piracy and counterfeiting, at least in the short term.  
Thus, this Part explores the alternative protective measures 
intellectual property rights holders can take to protect their assets. 
The two common approaches used to protect intellectual property 
in China are administrative enforcement and litigation.  Although the 
former is cheaper, quicker, more flexible, and less antagonistic, the 
latter protects the rights holders from corruption and local 
protectionism221 while allowing for damage compensation and pre-
litigation remedies.222  With the introduction of specialized courts with 
judges possessing intellectual property expertise since the 1990s, 
                                                 
 220. See Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 207, at 428-37 (discussing four areas in 
which policymakers and business executives should focus remedial efforts to combat 
piracy and counterfeiting). 
 221. See, e.g., Thomas Lagerqvist & Mary L. Riley, How to Protect Intellectual Property 
Rights in China, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 28 (Mary L. 
Riley ed., 1997) (maintaining that “[i]n China, administrative enforcement is 
occasionally seen as more cost effective than either civil or criminal proceedings 
against counterfeiters”); id. at 32 (asserting that Chinese judges are less likely than 
administrative agencies to bend to local pressure); Yiqiang Li, Evaluation of the Sino-
American Intellectual Property Agreements:  A Judicial Approach to Solving the Local 
Protectionism Problem, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 391, 414-15 (1996) (maintaining that “[t]he 
courts are . . . more powerful than administrative agencies”); Kolton, supra note 151, 
at 451 (noting that “it may be difficult for foreign firms which plan to continue doing 
business in China to sue because doing so may wreck their ‘guanxi’—personal 
contacts or favors—that are integral for doing business in the PRC”); see also Susan 
Finder, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Through the Courts, in CHINESE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 255 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999) 
(discussing issues potential litigants in Chinese courts must be aware of when 
considering whether to seek enforcement of their intellectual property rights through 
the Chinese courts). 
 222. GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra note 116, at 290 (noting that “damage 
compensation and pre-litigation remedies are now only available from the courts, 
which will increase their importance tremendously over the long run”). 
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courts in major cities have been greatly improved.  As a result, rights 
holders in these cities have increasingly resorted to the use of courts.  
In 2002, for example, the total numbers of patent and trademark cases 
adjudicated were 2080 (an increase of 30.24% over 2001) and 707 (an 
increase of 46.68%), respectively.223  Apart from these “dual 
enforcement” mechanisms, rights holders have also sought criminal 
enforcement,224 enforcement through customs control,225 and, more 
recently, litigation in the United States or other major markets outside 
of China.226  Notwithstanding these approaches, businesses continue to 
struggle with inadequate intellectual property protection in China. 
While this Part acknowledges the importance of legal reforms and 
development of the rule of law, it highlights the fact that the legal 
route is not the only way to protect intellectual assets.  Instead, 
intellectual property protection is one of the many tools to achieve the 
ultimate goal of successfully doing business in China.  
Notwithstanding their importance, the other tools are seldom 
discussed by commentators.227 
To fill this void, this Part presents six hypothetical case studies228 in 
which intellectual property rights holders were able to protect their 
assets even when intellectual property laws were not effectively 
enforced.  This Part draws insight from not only legal literature, but 
literature in business strategies and China studies.  An understanding 
of the non-legal literature is particularly important, because the 
protection of intellectual assets is as much a business strategy as a legal 
issue.  By presenting these case studies, this Part seeks to provide 
insight into both the causes of piracy and counterfeiting in China and 
                                                 
 223. SUN, supra note 23, at 12. 
 224. See id. at 224-25 (discussing criminal enforcement). 
 225. See id. at 211-19 (discussing the use of border control measures provided by 
the Chinese Customs Law). 
 226. See Chiang Ling Li, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China, in CHINA’S 
PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, supra note 68, at 241, 257 [hereinafter Li, Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights] (citing an example of how a multinational electrical 
component company “was able to pursue patent infringement and product quality 
actions against the copied products outside of the PRC” because “most of the 
products of [the counterfeit] factories were exported outside of the PRC”); Emma 
Schwartz, D.C. Firms View China with Caution, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006, at 1 
(discussing the growing use of U.S. courts by Chinese firms). 
 227. See, e.g., LOKE KHOON TAN, PIRATES IN THE MIDDLE KINGDOM:  THE ART OF 
TRADEMARK WAR 132-33 (2004) (discussing informal enforcement options for 
trademark holders); John Donaldson & Rebecca Weiner, Swashbuckling the Pirates:  A 
Communications-Based Approach to IPR Protection in China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 221, at 409 (discussing alternative, non-legal 
strategies for protection intellectual property in China); Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 
221, at 7 (same). 
 228. Although these case studies have been expanded and improvised, they are 
based on or inspired by real case studies. 
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the many barriers faced by local authorities in their enforcement of 
intellectual property laws. 
Following the case studies, this Part questions whether the legalistic 
approach usually taken by foreign businesses is wise and productive in 
light of the country’s historical aversion to courts and its significant 
emphasis on mediation.229  As researchers from McKinsey & Company 
have found, “[m]any multinational companies in China are losing the 
battle to protect their intellectual property, largely because they rely 
too heavily on legal tactics and fail to factor IP properly into their 
strategic and operational decisions.”230  This Part concludes by 
exploring the differences between the Chinese and Western legal 
cultures and how these differences may have created different 
expectations between China and the United States over the role of the 
WTO dispute settlement process. 
A. Competition 
The first case study concerns a publisher of popular comic books.231  
Immediately after the books were published, unauthorized copies 
appeared in the market—some even before the publication of the 
originals.  Although most consumers were able to distinguish between 
the genuine versions and the pirated copies, some of them failed to do 
so.  Even for those who were able to notice the difference, some chose 
to purchase the pirated copies because they were much cheaper than 
the original products. 
To deal with piracy, the publisher could sue the pirates in courts or 
seek administrative enforcement.  Instead, it chose to compete directly 
against the pirates.  To do so, it wrapped the comic books in hard-to-
reproduce plastic, upgraded the quality of the graphics and paper, 
and included inexpensive educational prizes with each issue.  
Although its action no doubt increased production costs, the 
additional preparation made the comic books more expensive and 
difficult to copy.  As the pirates turned to other, easier targets, 
subscriptions and profits increased. 
                                                 
 229. For discussions of the emphasis on mediation in China, see generally Jerome 
A. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1201 (1966); 
Stanley Lubman, Mao and Mediation:  Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 
55 CAL. L. REV. 1284 (1967); Stanley B. Lubman, Dispute Resolution in China After Deng 
Xiaoping:  “Mao and Mediation” Revisited, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 229 (1997). 
 230. Meagan C. Dietz et al., Protecting Intellectual Property in China, 3 MCKINSEY Q. 6, 
6 (2005). 
 231. This case study was inspired by and improvised from Donaldson & Weiner, 
supra note 227, at 432. 
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This case study is instructive for a number of reasons.  It highlights 
the fact that pirates and counterfeiters are rational businesspeople 
who seek profits and opportunities.  As one commentator has pointed 
out, the total cost of piracy “includes the cost of producing and 
distributing the fakes and the cost of paying penalties, weighed against 
the embarrassment of being caught, the probability of being 
convicted, and the severity or inconvenience of any non-monetary 
penalties that are likely to be imposed.”232  By increasing the cost of 
producing the fakes, the publisher successfully reduced the pirates’ 
profit margin while making its products a less attractive piracy target. 
Foreign rights holders sometimes forget that they do not need to 
solve all of China’s piracy and counterfeiting problems.  Unlike 
governments, they need not worry about the overall interests of 
businesses and nationals in the country.  Instead, they merely need to 
focus on making themselves less attractive piracy targets.  Surprisingly, 
despite the widespread reports of piracy and counterfeiting in China, 
many businesses expand into China without adequate planning and 
sophisticated protection strategies.  As researchers from McKinsey & 
Company noted: 
When we studied the Chinese operations of ten multinationals 
competing in IP-sensitive industries (including consumer 
electronics, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, 
and software), we found that many executives think of protecting IP 
solely in legal terms—and sometimes only after property has been stolen.  
The most successful companies, however, take strategic and 
operational action to protect their IP before that happens, thus 
lowering their litigation costs and improving the odds that their IP 
will remain safe.233 
Moreover, many foreign businesses ignore the differences in 
Chinese intellectual property laws, and some have the mistaken belief 
that what works in their home countries will work in China.  For 
example, although registration is essential to trademark protection in 
China, many U.S. businesses fail to register their marks, hoping 
misguidedly that they can claim prior use without a registration.234  
Some also overlook the significance of registering the Chinese 
translations or transliterations of their marks.  Pfizer, for example, did 
                                                 
 232. Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 221, at 17. 
 233. Dietz et al., supra note 230, at 6 (emphasis added). 
 234. See Li, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 226, at 257 (noting 
that “in many cases, multinational companies do not have their intellectual property 
rights registered or otherwise protected in the PRC”); see also CHAN, supra note 169, at 
105 (noting the need to understand the difference between the Chinese and the U.S. 
trademark systems). 
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not register its Chinese name WEIGE, even though it registered the 
English name VIAGRA in China.235  Even worse, as a Beijing-based 
attorney noted, “[c]ompanies—particularly those from the U.S.—are 
used to writing a cease and desist letter, which in China destroys your 
case.  If you write a cease and desist letter you will never be able to get 
sufficient evidence through an investigation.”236 
In fact, failure to take proactive measures may even result in 
underprotection of their products.  A case in point is the recently 
settled three-year dispute between General Motors and Chery 
Automobile Company,237 in which General Motors claimed that the 
Shanghai-based carmaker copied its Chevy Spark in designing the 
Chery QQ.  Because General Motors did not have patents in China for 
its car designs, it sued Chery for trade secrets infringement.238  Had the 
American automaker filed Chinese patents in the first place, as it did 
in its home market, it would have a much stronger claim239 and might 
not even need the “assistance” of the Chinese government to secure 
an out-of-court settlement.240 
Thus, proactive protective measures, like those taken by the comic 
book publisher in the present case study, are very important.  By 
making products more expensive and difficult to copy, it sent a strong 
message to the pirates that they would make more money by choosing 
a more vulnerable target.  Indeed, if its competitors had been less 
                                                 
 235. Id.  For example, “[i]n . . . Pfizer, Inc. v. Shenzhen Wanyong Information Network, 
the court held that the plaintiff’s registered trademark, ‘VIAGRA,’ was not well known 
among Chinese people, though the plaintiff’s medicine was well known for its 
informal Chinese name ‘weige’ (which means ‘a strong brother’ in Chinese).”  Hong 
Xue, Domain Name Dispute Resolution in China:  A Comprehensive Review, 18 TEMP. INT’L 
& COMP. L.J. 1, 14-15 (2004). 
 236. Secrets of Success in China, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Oct. 1, 2004, at 40 (quoting 
James Haynes, a partner of Beijing-based IP firm Tee & Howe). 
 237. See John Schmid, Two Cars and One View: U.S. Taken for a Ride, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Jan. 25, 2004, at 1A (reporting about the intellectual property dispute 
between General Motors and Chery Automobile Company over the copying of 
General Motors’ Chevy Spark). 
 238. See Secrets of Success in China, supra note 236, at 40. 
 239. See id. (quoting Wen Xikai, the deputy director general of the Law & Treaty 
Department of the State Intellectual Property Office, as suggesting that the trade 
secrets case is more difficult, because “evidence is very important” for that type of 
case). 
 240. Intellectual Property Battle Between GM and Chery Reaches Settlement, CHINA IP 
EXPRESS, Dec. 1, 2005, at http://www.iprights.com/publications/chinaipexpress/ 
ciex_268.asp (reporting that “GM and Chery extended their appreciation to Chinese 
government for helping to resolve the dispute”).  Although Chery agreed not to use 
the CHERY trademark in the United States, which is likely to be confusingly similar to 
General Motors’ CHEVY trademark, Malcolm Bricklin, Chery’s American partner, 
claimed that “Chery [was] not required to pay any compensation to GM under the 
settlement agreement . . . [and that] the agreement clears the way for a smoother 
introduction of the newly designed, Chinese-made, vehicles into the United States, 
starting in 2007.”  Id. 
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protective of their products, the publisher’s actions might have driven 
the pirates to its competitors, increasing their losses while reducing 
their ability to compete.  In doing so, the publisher would have 
achieved what the Chinese describe as “killing two birds with one 
stone”—it fought both the pirates and the competitors by improving 
its products. 
Some skeptics might question the wisdom of this competition 
strategy, citing the additional upgrading costs and the unethical 
nature of the pirates’ behavior.  However, the strategy makes good 
business sense.  The improvement would reduce the losses caused by 
piracy, and such reduction, if planned carefully, would more than 
compensate for the higher production costs.  In addition, by 
improving the products, the publisher would have rewarded its loyal 
customers for paying a higher price for the originals.  It also would 
help convince customers that genuine products are worth the higher 
price they pay.  In economic terms, the improvement would highlight 
the fact that pirated products are imperfect substitutes.  Such signaling 
is important, because the Chinese eventually would demand products 
of higher quality as their living standards improve. 
Although the facts on which this case study was based were taken 
from China, software companies around the world have widely used a 
similar competition strategy, offering such post-sale benefits as 
warranty service, replacement guarantees, free upgrades, and contests 
or giveaways.  For example, Microsoft recently limited the 
downloading of updates to customers who have purchased genuine 
Microsoft products.241  Many companies and industry groups also have 
actively highlighted the danger of using fake computer products, 
which often bring with them unwanted computer viruses and spyware.  
In doing so, these software companies force users to decide not only 
between genuine and pirated products, but also between products 
with additional benefits and those without. 
B. Shaming 
The second case study deals with a baby food manufacturer that had 
been struggling with counterfeit products from local factories.242  
While the company went to the local authorities to seek administrative 
enforcement, it also took a proactive approach.  When the authorities 
                                                 
 241. See Michelle Kessler, Copy-protection Gear Sneaks into Products, USA TODAY, Aug. 
16, 2005, at 1B (reporting that Microsoft “now requires users to prove that they have 
an official version of its Windows operating system before downloading updates”). 
 242. This case study was inspired by and improvised from Donaldson & Weiner, 
supra note 227, at 426. 
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raided the factories, the right holder brought reporters and a camera 
crew from the local media.  In doing so, it not only exposed the 
counterfeiters and created evidence for the authorities, but also 
showed to the local community the shoddy quality of the fake 
products and the unsanitary facilities of the counterfeit factories.  
After a series of well-publicized raids, the counterfeiting problem was 
significantly reduced. 
This case study is insightful for three reasons.  First, unbeknownst to 
many Western business executives, public shaming is an effective 
strategy in China.243  From the standpoint of Chinese psychology, 
public shaming causes the infringer to lose “face,” or mianzi in 
Chinese.  As one commentator explained:  “Face is about one’s self-
respect and prestige and, crucially, about one’s standing in the group.  
It is an essentially public phenomenon, though it has powerful (albeit 
secondary) emotional consequences.  The emotions are about dignity 
and dignity’s enemy, shame.  This polarity runs deep in the lives of 
Chinese people. . . .”244 
As far as legitimate businesses, as compared to nameless 
counterfeiters, are concerned, the embarrassment caused by the 
public apology will create a significant deterrent.  It is, therefore, no 
surprise that Chinese companies have insisted on public apologies 
from the infringers.  As an attorney noted: 
When negotiating or litigating with a Chinese party, foreign 
companies often encounter a strong demand for making a public 
apology in addition to monetary compensation.  Often it is quite 
difficult to persuade Chinese parties to withdraw a demand for a 
public apology, even at the expense of conceding more in 
damages.245 
In light of this Chinese tradition, Chinese copyright law, unlike its 
Western counterparts, includes specifically the remedy of apology.246  
Both Articles 46 and 47 of the statute state that anyone who commits 
an act of copyright infringement “shall bear civil liability for such 
remedies as . . . making an apology.”247  As Peter Feng explained: 
                                                 
 243. See MCGREGOR, supra note 156, at 10 (noting that “China is a shame-based 
society, very different from the guilt-based West”). 
 244. CHEE, supra note 152, at 48. 
 245. SUN, supra note 23, at 61. 
 246. This remedy is not available in trademark or patent law.  Indeed, as Thomas 
Pattloch noted, “[r]ecent remarks by relevant officials within the Chinese People’s 
Courts indicate that future Interpretations by the [Supreme People’s Court] might 
exclude such a right for patent infringement proceedings.”  GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra 
note 116, at 316. 
 247. Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, arts. 46, 47. 
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Traditionally, an apology to the injured party was seen as 
appropriate after a confession of guilt or wrongdoing, although it 
was more a moral duty than a legal requirement.  Today, apologies 
are often ordered by the court in its judgments.  They are published 
in newspapers and other media with a wide enough circulation to 
eliminate the “adverse effects” of the infringement.  The content, as 
well as format and page, is court approved.  If a wrongdoer or 
infringer fails to apologize as ordered, the court may draft and 
publish an apology instead and charge the expense to the 
wrongdoer.248 
Alternatively, and more often these days, the court “will publish its 
verdict in the newspaper and charge the cost to the wrongdoer.”249  To 
some extent, the request for an apology has lost its purpose of seeking 
a “voluntary admission of error and regret.”250  Today, an apology is 
more like a shaming penalty or the alternative remedy of “eliminating 
the effects of the [infringing] act,” or both.251  It is, therefore, no 
surprise that one commentator noted that the remedies of apology 
and elimination of adverse effects are often rendered together.252  
After all, “[a]pologies are one way to compensate for the adverse 
effects caused by the infringement.”253 
Second, although the local authorities might not be concerned 
about counterfeiting, they might be very concerned about public 
health.  While foreign businesses have widely criticized the 
Communist system for contributing to the country’s lack of respect for 
intellectual property rights, they often ignore the heavy emphasis the 
system has placed on the people’s well-being.254  Because of this 
emphasis, the authorities may consider a violation of quality control or 
consumer protection laws a more serious offense than a violation of 
intellectual property laws.  As a commentator has noted, “China has 
especially several laws and regulations containing statutory warranties 
of the quality of goods manufactured or sold in such cases.  If the 
product copy is of inferior quality, selling it under a trade mark is an 
offense, as is advertising it or selling it directly to a consumer.”255  Thus, if 
                                                 
 248. FENG, supra note 67, at 42-43. 
 249. Id. at 43. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, arts. 46, 47 (providing for the 
remedy of “eliminating the effects of the [infringing] act”). 
 252. See SUN, supra note 23, at 60. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See TED C. FISHMAN, CHINA INC.:  HOW THE RISE OF THE NEXT SUPERPOWER 
CHALLENGES AMERICA AND THE WORLD 170 (2005) (recalling that “[i]n an April 2004 
scandal, 130 people were arrested for making phony infant formula using starch and 
water and contributing to the deaths of twelve children”). 
 255. Mary L. Riley, Strategies for Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights in China, in 
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the ultimate goal is to close down the counterfeit factories, it may be 
ill-advised for foreign rights holders to focus only on intellectual 
property protection, as such protection might not always be the most 
effective. 
Non-intellectual property-based alternatives are particularly 
important when rights holders have to address piracy or 
counterfeiting problems outside of the major Chinese cities.  In those 
places, government officials are often charged with many competing 
duties, including combating crimes, promoting public health and 
social welfare, and handling unemployment and other economic 
problems.  Their reluctance to close down counterfeit factories, 
therefore, may be due to the fact that they are also charged with 
handling unemployment.256  By closing down the counterfeit factories, 
they would have converted the counterfeiting problem into an 
unemployment problem.  Even worse, from their standpoint, the 
unemployment problem is more serious, because it affects the local 
community while the counterfeiting problem concerns only foreign 
rights holders. 
The baby food company in the present case study smartly turned 
this problem on its head.  Instead of creating a new and more serious 
problem for the local authorities, it reminded the officials that their 
trouble would not go away even if they chose to ignore the counterfeit 
problem.  After all, they still had to deal with the public health 
problem.  More importantly, the public health problem would be 
more serious than the counterfeiting problem, because it concerned 
primarily the local community.  As a result, the company created 
                                                 
PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 221, at 65, 70; see 
CHOW, supra note 64, at 206 (noting that “enforcement actions against counterfeiting 
can be brought with the Administration of Industry and Commerce (AIC) under the 
Trademark Law and its Implementing Rules or the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, or 
with the Technical Supervision Bureau (TSB) under the Consumer Protection Law or 
the Product Quality Law”); TAN, supra note 227, at 56 (stating that, “[a]s certain forms 
of trademark infringement may also be actionable under the [Product Quality Law], 
trademark owners may choose to take action through the local [Technical 
Supervision Bureaus]”); Li, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 226, at 
257 (citing an example of how a multinational electrical component company was 
“able to take actions against the offending factories based on product quality 
grounds” even though it “did not file patents in China to protect its inventions”). 
 256. See Simon P. Cheetham, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Luxury Goods, 
in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 221, at 385 (stating 
that the local economies are concerned about “the employment, foreign exchange, 
and increased industrial development provided by counterfeiting factories”); Yu, From 
Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at 210 (suggesting that the Chinese authorities would 
be concerned about “the unemployment problem that may result from the closure of 
pirate factories”). 
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incentives for the local authorities to close down the counterfeit 
factories. 
Third, by bringing in the local media, the company was able to 
attract large-scale public attention, which in turn raised the concerns 
of local parents over the health and well-being of their children.257  
The publicized raids, therefore, created domestic pressure on the 
local authorities by drawing the local community to the side of the 
foreign right holder.  By erasing the local-foreign divide, the raids also 
reduced the xenophobic sentiments that the local authorities might 
harbor toward foreign businesses.  While some officials might still be 
concerned about the unemployment problem the factory closure 
would create, they were less likely to leave the factories open 
considering the wide local support the company had generated. 
C. Education 
The third case study involves a joint venture created by a Western 
athletic shoe company and a local manufacturer and distributor.258  In 
China, joint ventures are the typical business structures used by 
foreign companies to gain a foothold in the market.  In some 
regulated industries, like the media industry, joint ventures were the 
only way to enter the country before China’s WTO accession.259  These 
joint ventures are important; they help increase market access, bridge 
cultural differences, overcome local protectionism, and utilize guanxi 
established by local partners.260  There is one major problem, however:  
many local partners do not understand how intellectual property 
protection operates and why they need such protection.  Such a lack 
of understanding not only creates confusion and disagreement, but 
also has led to the underprotection of the foreign partner’s valuable 
assets.261 
                                                 
 257. Nevertheless, the media strategy could backfire on the rights holders by 
“send[ing] the public into a state of panic” and turning away potential customers.  Li, 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 226, at 252 (cautioning that “[i]n 
cases of baby formulae, pharmaceuticals, and foods and beverages, information about 
counterfeiting may send the public into a state of panic”).  To avoid panic, the rights 
holders need to “focus on providing a positive message to the public about the 
genuine products.”  Id. 
 258. This case study was inspired by and improvised from Donaldson & Weiner, 
supra note 227, at 420. 
 259. See Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives:  An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to 
Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 31 (2001) 
[hereinafter Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives] (discussing the restrictions on wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises in the media sector). 
 260. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at 209-10 (listing the benefits of 
establishing joint ventures in China). 
 261. See Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 101 (discussing how “a Xiamen 
company registered the ‘yinlu’ trademark and allowed its U.S. joint venture partner to 
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In this case study, the Western partner asked the Chinese 
manufacturer for a portion of the joint venture profits to cover its 
design charges.  The Chinese partner refused, believing that its 
Western partner was greedy and wanted to get more than its fair share 
of revenues.  The negotiation dragged on for days without resolving 
the dispute.  After a few days and some karaoke, the Western partner 
used a different approach.  This time, it explained to the Chinese 
partner the importance of design charges and taught the local partner 
how to charge for design work itself.  The Chinese partner was 
surprised; it did not know that it could charge separately for design 
work.  After realizing that it could do so, it quickly agreed to the 
Western partner’s request.  It even mobilized to lobby the local 
regulators and the national legislature for the right to design fees. 
This example is instructive for many reasons.  A Chinese partner 
might refuse to protect products, not because it does not want to 
protect intellectual property, but because it does not understand why 
it needs to protect such assets, does not know that it could protect its 
own intellectual property rights, and has the misunderstanding that 
intellectual property is an unfair Western tool to eke out profits from 
hardworking Chinese people.  By educating the Chinese partner, the 
Western shoemaker provided more information, alleviated its 
concern, and created goodwill.  It also laid the much-needed 
groundwork for future partnerships that call for an allocation of 
intellectual property fees. 
While education is always important, it is critically important in 
China, in which the cultural customs are different and intellectual 
property remains a new, and sometimes alien, concept.  Consider the 
following additional facts about the shoemaker in the present case 
study.262  Concerned about the limited disposable income local 
consumers have to buy the latest shoe models, the local manufacturer 
successfully convinced its Western partner to promote the company’s 
lower-priced “classic” model, which was sold for only a third of the 
price of other more advanced models.  Although this discount strategy 
had quadrupled sales and substantially enlarged the Chinese market 
in the first few years, the Western partner had its reservations.  Fearing 
that the strategy would harm its image as a high-end technologically-
advanced shoemaker, the company asked the local manufacturer to 
alter its strategy.  Frustrated and confused, the manufacturer ignored 
                                                 
use the mark freely”). 
 262. The story with the additional facts was inspired by and improvised from the 
New Balance story described in Chew, supra note 19, at 56-59.  For a journalistic 
account of the story, see Gabriel Kahn, Factory Fight, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2002, at Al. 
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the company’s request.  Very soon, the discounted “classic” shoes 
appeared in Japan and Taiwan, as well as in Australia and Europe.  
The Western partner was enraged; it terminated the manufacturing 
and distribution agreement and sued the Chinese manufacturer for 
infringement of its intellectual property rights. 
The added facts are actually taken from a true story concerning the 
shoemaker New Balance.  In her analysis of the story, Pat Chew 
discussed how cultural factors may help explain the ineffectiveness of 
distribution and joint venture agreements in offering adequate 
intellectual property protection for Western companies.  As she 
explains: 
The contract may prohibit employees of the Chinese joint-venture 
partner from disclosing the American partner’s proprietary 
information to “third parties.”  The Chinese, however, may define a 
“third party” differently than American business practices.  In 
China’s collectivist, socialist, relationship-oriented society, the 
notion of outsider status may be quite narrow.  For instance, cultural 
traditions would likely indicate that family members, “extended-
family” members, close friends, party members, and state-affiliated 
companies and their representatives are not outsiders, and hence, 
would not be considered as “third parties.”263 
While Professor Chew’s observation is insightful and important, 
education could play a pro-active role in minimizing the potential 
misunderstanding between the two partners.  For example, the shoe 
company could have either educated the local partner about what the 
term “third parties” meant even if it had failed to clearly define the 
term in the contract.264  Even better, it could have introduced the 
licensing concept to the local manufacturer, explaining why licensees 
in Australia, Europe, Japan, and Taiwan should be treated as members 
of its “extended family.”  In doing so, the shoe company might have 
reduced the chance of creating confusion when it later asked the 
                                                 
 263. Chew, supra note 19, at 58-59. 
 264. Moreover, as one commentator noted: 
When dealing with a partner who has control over a manufacturing or 
distribution process, it is critical that the main agreements directly address the 
extent to which subcontractors, agents, or other third parties are allowed 
access to a foreign party’s intellectual property.  Further, the agreements 
should stipulate that written arrangements must be in place before third 
parties are allowed to have such access.  Signing substantive non-disclosure 
agreements with all parties holding access to key information further 
strengthens a foreign party’s position in the event of unauthorized disclosure. 
Newby, supra note 170, at 242.  Nevertheless, foreign businesses, and their lawyers, 
need to avoid long boilerplate contracts.”  Id. at 240; see id. (noting that “[c]ontract 
lawyers must be prepared to negotiate an acceptable compromise between a five-page 
model agreement issued by the Chinese authorities and a 60-page American-style 
agreement covering every imaginable indemnity, representation, and warranty”). 
YU.OFFTOPRINTER 6/11/2006  2:51:07 PM 
958 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:901 
manufacturer to abandon its discount strategy.  Indeed, it might even 
have been able to convince the local partner to switch to a mutually-
beneficial strategy that boosts sales in China without inflicting harm 
on the shoe company’s other markets. 
Despite the importance of education and the wide criticism of the 
ignorance of intellectual property rights in China, Western 
governments and businesses remain reluctant to invest in education.  
Their reluctance—and short-sightedness—is understandable.  
Education is a long-term strategy, and it does not bear fruit for many 
years.  While American presidents are limited to two terms of four 
years, most CEOs of American companies do not last that long.  As a 
result, neither the government nor the businesses have incentives to 
invest in long-term educational efforts. 
Indeed, education is not the only under-focused area; intellectual 
property enforcement itself remains underserved.  Despite the 
existence of rampant piracy and counterfeiting in China, many 
foreign businesses in China have allocated only limited budgets for 
intellectual property enforcement.  As one attorney noted in 
frustration, “in the U.S., companies spend millions of dollars in patent 
litigation.  But, they are not willing to allocate adequate budgets to 
China IP enforcement, instead hoping miracles will occur.”265  If 
companies are unwilling to devote the resources needed for such a 
basic aspect of intellectual property management as enforcement, it is 
no surprise that they will be unwilling to devote resources to 
education. 
Although the case study focuses mainly on education, it also 
provides insight into the stakeholder issue.  As I advocated elsewhere, 
foreign governments and intellectual property rights holders need to 
help China develop local stakeholders.266  A case in point is the China 
Software Alliance (“CSA”), the domestic software lobby formed in 
March 1995.  As one commentator described the contributions of this 
lobby: 
                                                 
 265. SUN, supra note 23, at 16. 
 266. See Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 207, at 431-33 (discussing the need to 
develop local stakeholders as part of a four-part strategy to combat piracy and 
counterfeiting).  One might question whether it would be wise for U.S. companies to 
help develop stakeholders in China, because these stakeholders will eventually 
become their competitors.  While I am sympathetic to this concern, there are three 
possible responses.  First, U.S. companies do not need to create stakeholders in areas 
that are key to their success.  Instead, they can focus on areas that will complement 
their business or create synergy for them.  Second, the benefits far outweigh the costs.  
Just as countries do not want to keep their trading partners weak and poor, companies 
should encourage the development of local stakeholders.  Finally, there are only very 
limited alternatives, if any at all, and the development of stakeholders may perhaps be 
the best available alternative. 
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CSA successfully lobbied the NPC to emphasize the importance of 
having a separate software protection regulation, and also 
convinced the legislature “to add clauses that prohibit purchasers 
from trying to decipher software that makers had encrypted to 
prevent piracy.”  To bolster enforcement, the CSA cooperated with 
the Business Software Alliance of the United States (BSA) to operate 
a national hotline for reporting piracy and wrote newspaper articles 
to promote public awareness of the enforcement of IP laws.267 
By educating the local partner about the possibility of charging 
design fees in the first hypothetical, the shoe company did what the 
baby food company in the previous case study had done—it created a 
local stakeholder.  As a result of its effort, the Western partner now 
has a local ally to depend on for lobbying its government.  While 
foreign pressure is sometimes needed, domestic pressure is always 
effective.  Indeed, by increasing domestic pressure on the local and 
national governments, the Western partner will be able to avoid any 
xenophobic sentiments created by its aggressive tactics. 
Some policymakers and business executives have suggested that 
lawsuits and crackdowns are useful educational tools.  In the context 
of file-sharing, for example, Cary Sherman, the president of the 
Recording Industry Association of America, took the position that 
“lawsuits are a very potent form of education.”268  This unpopular 
approach, nevertheless, is risky and has been proven ineffective in 
China.  There are too many reasons for crackdowns on piracy and 
counterfeiting activities by the Chinese authorities, and many Chinese 
view publicized raids with great skepticism.  As Ted Fishman wrote: 
The purposes behind the publicized raids are always obscure, and 
the Chinese who read about them are skeptical about taking the 
raids at face value.  Are they the result of turf wars among the 
government fiefdoms that are themselves knee-deep in 
counterfeiting?  Did the raided factories push the Party’s tolerance 
of violent and eroticized Western entertainment too far?  Did they 
pirate a movie backed by the Chinese government?  Or was that 
day’s demonstration of will just a show for a foreign trade group 
coming to China to—yet again—express its grave concerns over 
intellectual-property theft?269 
                                                 
 267. Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 100-01. 
 268. Benny Evangelista, Online Music Finally Starts to Rock ‘n’ Roll, SAN FRAN. CHRON., 
Dec. 29, 2003, at E1 (quoting Cary Sherman, president of the RIAA); see also Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2794 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (noting that the RIAA’s lawsuits “have served as a teaching tool, making 
clear that much file sharing, if done without permission, is unlawful”). 
 269. FISHMAN, supra note 254, at 236. 
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Thus, although both education and enforcement actions will raise 
awareness of intellectual property rights among the Chinese, 
education is a more effective approach. 
D. Co-optation 
The fourth case study centers on a Western manufacturer whose 
production process required the purchase and installation of very 
expensive and complicated equipment.  When the company realized 
that its product had been pirated in China, it hired a team of private 
investigators, who subsequently discovered the source of the piracy.  
Instead of going to court or seeking administrative enforcement, the 
company offered to purchase the pirate factory.270  Because it was very 
expensive to build a similar factory from scratch, the pirates decided 
not to establish a new factory and accepted the company’s offer 
instead.  Gradually, the former pirates found the benefits of such a 
licensing arrangement; they not only earned income, but needed not 
fear factory closure, jail time, or financial damages.  The story had a 
happy ending. 
This case study invites a number of moral questions—in particular, 
whether and why one should reward the criminal acts of other people?  
However, moral questions aside, co-optation can be a very effective 
strategy, as it will take away the essential means of illegal reproduction.  
One should not forget that there are many causes of piracy.  
Sometimes, it is just greed; other times, however, it is poverty and 
desperation.  As an administrative official reportedly recounted to his 
attorney friend, one poor street vendor committed suicide after his 
pirated goods had been taken away from him.271  In the present case 
study, the manufacturer not only avoided this difficult problem by 
giving the factory workers an alternative means to earn an honest 
living, but it created the potential for converting a pirate to a future 
partner. 
                                                 
 270. See, e.g., CHEE, supra note 152, at 109 (using Cadence Design Systems as an 
example of Western firms that “managed to get the Chinese companies who [sic] 
pirated its products to become licence holding companies—who [sic] now have an 
interest in stopping the IP from spreading any further”); Clifford J. Shultz II & Bill 
Saporito, Protecting Intellectual Property:  Strategies and Recommendations to Deter 
Counterfeiting and Brand Piracy in Global Markets, 31 COLUM. J. WORLD BUS. 18, 22-23 
(1996) (arguing that companies consider co-opting pirates when more heavy-handed 
approaches would be costly); Eric M. Griffin, Note, Stop Relying on Uncle Sam!—A 
Proactive Approach to Copyright Protection in the People’s Republic of China, 6 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 169, 188 (1998) (stating that co-optation through buy-outs or joint ventures 
may help alleviate the piracy problem). 
 271. See Secrets of Success in China, supra note 236 (remarks of Wen Xikai, Deputy 
Director General of the Law & Treaty Department, State Intellectual Property Office). 
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Moreover, the co-optation strategy would allow the Western 
manufacturer to create goodwill in the local community.  As discussed 
earlier, government officials outside of major Chinese cities often have 
to deal with not only intellectual property problems, but also other 
seemingly more pressing problems, like unemployment and social 
welfare.  Because of their dual, or multiple, capacity, they are often 
more receptive to a co-optation proposal than to one that requires 
factory closures.  While the latter would create a more serious 
problem for the local community, the former would reduce two 
problems—piracy and social welfare. 
Unfortunately, despite its benefits, the co-optation strategy does not 
work for every situation.  Foreign businesses, therefore, need to 
carefully determine when and whether to utilize this strategy.  When it 
is easy and inexpensive to re-establish the factory, co-optation would 
be similar to paying ransom to a kidnapper without asking him or her 
to release the hostage.  In such a scenario, the pirates will continue 
selling their factories, only to set up another one in a different, often 
nearby place.  The manufacturer will have to buy the same factories 
over and over again, while protection of its products will not improve. 
Thus, if a company decides to use co-optation, it needs to conduct 
due diligence regarding the owner of the pirate factory, in particular 
whether it has the ability, or even plans, to set up another pirate 
factory.272  To avoid misunderstanding and to preserve its future 
working relationship with the factory, it is ideal for the Western 
partner to explain the due diligence practice and its justification 
before pursuing the practice.273  As an attorney experienced in U.S.-
China transactions explained: 
Due diligence is a concept distastefully alien to the Chinese.  
Chinese companies are not comfortable with outsiders inspecting 
books, records, and management practices.  The Chinese view a 
detailed request for information as reflecting a lack of trust.  Even 
Chinese companies with a history of foreign business interactions 
may be reluctant to share sensitive information with a foreign party.  
Sending a standard multi-page due diligence checklist to a Chinese 
                                                 
 272. CHOW, supra note 64, at 244 (observing that “[s]everal recent cases in China 
have highlighted the risks involved in dealing with unscrupulous third party 
contractors who have clandestine business relationships with counterfeiters at the 
same time that they are under contract to the [multinational enterprise]”); see also 
CHEE, supra note 152, at 109 (underscoring the importance of due diligence 
investigations in transactions in China). 
 273. See Newby, supra note 170, at 240 (suggesting that American companies 
explain both the scope of the review and the depth of the details required by the 
review). 
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target company is a common mistake made by American investors 
and one that can be a deal killer.274 
E. Reinvestment 
The fifth case study focuses on a Western mobile phone company 
which understands the importance of reinvesting in the local 
community.275  Every year, it invests a portion of its profits into the 
local community to promote cultural and educational benefits.  
Drawing on this case study, this Section proposes a new strategy in 
which foreign businesses ask for penalty awards in the form of cultural 
or educational benefits in the local community, or as contributions to 
a special patent fund that will be used by local inventors when they file 
patents both in China and abroad.276 
One of the standard criticisms made by trade groups and rights 
holders is that penalties in China are too low to serve any deterrent 
effect.  As the International Intellectual Property Alliance wrote in its 
recent report, “[i]ndustry is very concerned that the apparently 
grudging minor changes will not result in significantly more criminal 
cases with deterrent penalties and thus piracy levels will not be 
markedly affected.”277  Indeed, foreign rights holders are known to 
joke about how they have “won the case but lost the money” in 
China.278  Even worse for the rights holders, judgments in the country 
are not automatically enforced.  Thus, the winning party often “has to 
spend extra time, effort and money to enforce the favourable 
judgment,” and their success will be greatly reduced when the 
                                                 
 274. Id. 
 275. See Doris Estelle Long, China’s IP Reforms Show Little Success, IP WORLDWIDE, 
Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 5-6 [hereinafter Long, China’s IP Reforms] (discussing Motorola’s 
Project Hope, which “has contributed funds to assist in the construction of local 
primary schools throughout China”); see also CHAN, supra note 169, at 3 (noting that 
some foreign companies have “invested in university programmes, training projects 
and other large-scale infrastructure “to show they are a ‘good friend’ of China”); R. 
Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards, Introduction to INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS:  GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 1, 27 (R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy 
J. Richards eds., 1988) [hereinafter GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT?] (arguing 
for the investment of a portion of the benefits the United States would gain from the 
elimination of piracy). 
 276. See, e.g., Secrets of Success in China, supra note 236, at 43 (quoting Wen Xikai, the 
deputy director general of the Law & Treaty Department of the State Intellectual 
Property Office, as reporting that “[e]ach province or municipality has established a 
patent fund and if an enterprise has a good invention and wants to file abroad they 
can apply to the fund”). 
 277. IIPA Submission, supra note 121, at 2. 
 278. Ruay Lian Ho, Compliance and Challenges Faced by the Chinese Patent System Under 
TRIPS, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 504, 522 (2003). 
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financial circumstances of their adversaries change or when funds 
used to pay for the judgment have been absconded.279 
The low penalty is understandable for at least three reasons, even if 
we ignore the statutory stipulation that damages in China can be 
calculated for a maximum period of only two years from the date of 
filing of the complaint, as compared to a maximum of six years in the 
United States.280  First, the cost of living in China is much lower than 
that in the Western world.  Thus, a calculation of the product value 
based on the price at which infringing product is sold in a market 
other than China, or at which the manufacturer priced it for the 
Chinese market, is far from reliable.  Such a figure tends to distort 
decisions Chinese consumers make over the product. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that there will be a uniform product price in 
China, given the drastically different living standards that exist in 
different parts of the country.  Indeed, commentators have widely 
challenged the myth of a single market in China.281  Because of the 
country’s largeness, the cost of living in the East is far higher than that 
in the West, and the cost of living in the North may vary from that in 
the South.  To some extent, one needs to recognize China as a 
“country of countries,” rather than a homogenous one.282 
Second, many judges are concerned that foreign rights holders will 
either take the penalty awards back to their home country, or to major 
cities in which their headquarters are located.  Giving foreign rights 
holders large penalty awards, therefore, would drain the local 
community of its limited resources.  Indeed, as a judge reasoned, 
foreign rights holders seem to be “more concerned with stopping 
future infringement than with receiving excessive compensation for 
past infringement.”283  It is, therefore, not unusual for judges to 
calculate compensation rewards based on the lower, rather than 
higher, estimates. 
Third, heavy compensation seems morally wrong when the 
infringement involves a state-owned or collectively-owned enterprise.  
As Peter Feng explained: 
                                                 
 279. SUN, supra note 23, at 14. 
 280. See id. at 61 (discussing the difference between how damages are calculated in 
China and in the United States). 
 281. See, e.g., CHEE, supra note 152, at 3-9 (challenging the widely-held myth of a 
single market among businesspeople in China). 
 282. Cf. SHENKAR, supra note 153, at 134 (pointing out that “China’s enormous 
labor reserve, with pay scales radically lower in the hinterland than on the coast and 
in urban areas . . . , creates the equivalent of a country within a country”). 
 283. FENG, supra note 67, at 48. 
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[I]n the case of state-owned and collectively-owned enterprises, the 
cost of compensation is ultimately borne by the state or collective, 
which traditionally has the responsibility to take care of the 
employees’ livelihood.  As one judge commented concerning the 
compensation policy in a case of patent infringement before him, 
the innocent workers did no wrong; they expended labor and skill 
in producing the infringing products on which they earn their 
meager livelihood.  The court should not shut it eyes to reality by 
depriving the workers of their only income.284 
When Western businesses invest money they earned from the 
penalty awards back into the local community, the judges’ second and 
third concerns are largely removed.  Even better, from the perspective 
of foreign businesses, the reinvestment strategy would help them win 
the acceptance and goodwill of the local leaders and residents.  Like 
the co-optation strategy, reinvesting in the local community also would 
help alleviate xenophobic sentiments among the Chinese people and 
their widespread skepticism toward Western institutions.  In addition, 
such a strategy might also allow them to create local stakeholders by 
demonstrating to the local officials the benefits of adequate 
intellectual property protection and by including the local community 
in the benefits of the success of foreign businesses with major 
intellectual property assets.285  The possibility of the local community 
losing these benefits might even motivate local authorities to pursue 
infringers that refuse to pay the penalty awards. 
In recent years, local officials have learned this benefit indirectly.  
Because of the rampant piracy and counterfeiting problems, local and 
national governments as well as the private sector have allocated 
substantial resources for cracking down intellectual property 
infringement activities.  As Daniel Chow has noted: 
The authority to combat counterfeiting results in larger budgets and 
more staffing, power, and prestige.  Raids are also potential revenue 
generating activities because the authorities confiscate cash, goods, 
machinery, and equipment, including cars, and then sell the 
confiscated goods at public auctions . . . .  Government authorities 
also routinely ask companies to reimburse the cost of lodging where 
travel is required, the cost of hiring trucks to load and move 
confiscated goods, and the cost of storing the goods if a private 
                                                 
 284. Id. 
 285. See Long, China’s IP Reforms, supra note 275, at 6 (using Motorola’s Hope 
Project to illustrate how the reinvestment of funds to help pay for local primary 
schools in China allowed local officials to benefit from protection of Motorola’s 
intellectual property rights). 
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warehouse needs to be rented.  Some government authorities will 
also ask companies to pay case handling fees.286 
Thus, the more actively the authorities crack down on piracy and 
counterfeiting activities, the bigger the budgetary income they will 
receive for the benefit of the community. 
Finally, the reinvestment strategy would help generate much-
needed funds for education and awareness efforts.  As discussed 
above, the corporate budgets for intellectual property enforcement 
for many Western companies in China are limited, and business 
executives who are in charge of these budgets are often reluctant to 
spend them on long-term educational efforts.  Reinvestment of these 
penalty awards, however, will serve to indirectly increase the 
enforcement budgets and allow the company to fund what they 
otherwise cannot afford or are unwilling to pay for.  Moreover, 
because judges are likely to reduce the penalty awards if they are not 
reinvested back into the local community, foreign companies actually 
would be better served by allowing the awards to be paid in the form 
of educational or cultural benefits or as contributions to a special 
patent fund. 
F. Isolation 
The final case study concerns a manufacturer of state-of-the-art 
electronics products.  Although the firm was eager to take advantage 
of the lower manufacturing and distribution costs and the potentially 
enormous future market in China, it was reluctant to relocate there, 
because of the fear that its patented technology would be stolen due 
to limited protection of intellectual property and inadequate 
enforcement of contract law in China.  To protect its key technology, 
the manufacturer separated the high-technology components of its 
products from their low-technology counterparts, producing the 
former in the United States while manufacturing the latter and 
assembling the finished products in China.  In doing so, the firm was 
not only able to resolve the dilemma, but also benefited from the 
growing Chinese market. 
This case study is instructive for several reasons.  First, it illustrates, 
again, the importance for foreign businesses in China of taking pro-
active measures to protect their intellectual assets.  Despite increased 
globalization, physical distance and technological barriers remain 
effective defenses against piracy.  In the present case study, for 
                                                 
 286. Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1, 31 (2000). 
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example, the electronics manufacturer, by isolating its key 
technologies, successfully protected against intellectual property 
infringement without pulling out of the Chinese market.  If natural 
barriers are unavailable, companies can consider creating artificial 
barriers by carefully formulating a nondisclosure strategy to protect 
their trade secrets and critical know-how.  In Edwin Mansfield’s 
influential study on the relationship between intellectual property and 
foreign direct investment, a respondent was reported to have 
refrained from “implement[ing] manufacturing operations . . . that 
use [its] highest level of technology due to uncertainty over adequacy 
of trade secret protection.”287  Another respondent was reported to 
have minimized risks “by not disclosing critical catalyst or process 
know-how information to the licensee.”288 
Second, the present case study highlights the different factors a firm 
needs to consider when making decisions about why they want to 
relocate to China.  As Paul Heald and Keith Maskus have noted, it is 
important to distinguish a business decision to relocate manufacturing 
and research facilities to a country from one that seeks to establish a 
market for its finished product.289  While intellectual property is the 
main concern for the latter, it is of marginal importance to the 
former.  Indeed, except for trade secret and contractual protection, 
there is empirically no strong correlation between other forms of 
intellectual property and a firm’s decision to relocate manufacturing 
and research facilities.290  Instead, a decision to relocate manufacturing 
facilities is likely to be determined by such “location advantages” as 
“market size and growth, local demand patterns, transport costs and 
distance from markets, low wage costs in relation to labor productivity, 
abundant natural resources, and trade protection that could 
                                                 
 287. EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 27 (Int’l Fin. Corp. Discussion Paper No. 19, 
1994). 
 288. Id. at 30. 
 289. See Heald, Mowing the Playing Field, supra note 145, at 258-60 (discussing the 
different concerns about intellectual property protection between the marketing 
division and the research and manufacturing division of a foreign company); see also 
Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct 
Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109, 119-28 (1998) 
(discussing the various factors influencing foreign direct investment flows). 
 290. As Professor Heald noted: 
Moving a research and development facility to a country without patent, 
trademark, or copyright law does not increase a firm’s risk of damaging 
disclosures or increase its cost of doing business.  In the absence of 
involuntary disclosure fears, MegaCorp’s research and manufacturing 
divisions should be relatively indifferent to the level of patent, trademark, and 
copyright protection found in a developing country. 
Heald, Mowing the Playing Field, supra note 145, at 259. 
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encourage ‘tariff-jumping’ investments.”291  Likewise, a decision to 
relocate research and development facilities is likely to be affected by 
“the level of education and training of the local workforce, the 
condition of its financial sector, the health of its legal system, and the 
transparency of governmental procedures.”292 
Third, the case study illustrates how the type of business structure a 
firm adopts may affect its ability to protect intellectual property.  For 
example, wholly foreign-owned enterprises, or WFOEs, are in a better 
position to protect intellectual property than joint ventures.293  
Although foreign companies favored the formation of joint ventures 
in the past decade, they now have increasingly embraced WFOEs as 
the model business structure to enter the Chinese market, which has 
become increasingly open, thanks partly to the WTO accession.  
WFOEs not only enable foreign rights holders to maintain control 
over their businesses, but allow them to protect their key technologies 
by either isolating them or preventing comprises by mistakes made by 
local partners who are unconscious, or have limited awareness, of 
intellectual property protection.294 
Moreover, technology transfer remains a major requirement for the 
establishment of joint ventures in China, especially when partnerships 
with state-owned enterprises are involved.295  Those who are willing to 
transfer technology are also greatly rewarded.296  As some experts have 
                                                 
 291. Maskus, supra note 289, at 123. 
 292. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field, supra note 145, at 259. 
 293. See CHAN, supra note 169, at 117 (recommending the establishment of WFOEs 
under “circumstances that involve companies with sensitive technologies and 
proprietary manufacturing processes to protect”); CHOW, supra note 64, at 179 (noting 
that “[a]dopting the WFOE form for a manufacturing facility, research and 
development center, and an investment holding company will help to reduce the risks 
of authorized access to proprietary rights by vesting greater control and security in the 
foreign investor”); MCGREGOR, supra note 156, at 92 (“Avoid joint ventures with 
government entities unless you have no choice.  Then understand that this 
partnership is about China obtaining your technology, know-how, and capital while 
maintaining Chinese control.”). 
 294. See discussion Part III.C (discussing how local partners sometimes may be 
unconscious, or have limited awareness, of intellectual property protection). 
 295. See OFFICE OF STRATEGIC INDUS. & ECON. SEC., BUREAU OF EXP. ADMIN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, US COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA i (1999) (assessing “the extent to which US commercial technology 
is being . . . ‘coerced’ from US companies engaged in normal business practices and 
joint ventures in China in exchange for access to China’s market”); see also Michael S. 
Lelyveld, US Companies Are “Not Being Smart’ in China, J. COMMERCE, Mar. 1, 1999, at 1A 
(discussing the findings of the report). 
 296. As one commentator noted: 
Those who were ready to transfer more cutting-edge technologies and to 
hand in the underlying capabilities were amply rewarded:  They were granted 
permission to locate in the most desirable areas; given preferential 
governance and equity terms; provided with prolonged tax holidays and duty 
exemptions; and, perhaps most importantly, given preferential access or the 
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noted, China “require[s] trade ‘offsets’ in the form of technology 
transfers from foreign joint ventures . . . [and] has been frank about 
its need to acquire technology because of the prohibitive cost of trying 
to modernize from scratch.”297  In addition, technology transfer 
through the establishment of joint ventures “was considered necessary 
for China to increase local added value, maintain local employment 
and speed up the process of industrialisation; and more important, 
through technological learning, to build up indigenous technological 
capabilities.”298 
Chinese leaders have long held the belief that transfer of 
technology is more important than the cost and quality of service.  For 
instance, when China was exploring opportunities to set up a joint 
production venture in the telecommunications field, it chose to team 
up with a Belgian firm, partly because of the firm’s willingness to 
transfer advanced switching technology.299  This focus on technology 
transfer is understandable, considering the large-scale modernization 
efforts China is currently undertaking as well as the country’s long 
history of modernization reforms, which can be traced back to the 
Self-Strengthening Movement of the mid-nineteenth century.300  
Nevertheless, in the wake of the WTO accession, “China has agreed to 
eliminate technology transfer requirements and offsets as a condition 
for investment or importation immediately upon entry,”301 and the 
Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises and its implementing 
regulations were subsequently enacted to eliminate compulsory 
technology transfer.302 
                                                 
promise of access to the much-coveted domestic market. 
SHENKAR, supra note 153, at 67. 
 297. Lelyveld, supra note 295. 
 298. XIAOBAI SHEN, THE CHINESE ROAD TO HIGH TECHNOLOGY:  A STUDY OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SWITCHING TECHNOLOGY IN THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION 63 
(1999). 
 299. See id. at 64 (noting that “[t]he most important factor was that BTM [Belgium-
based Bell Technology Manufacturing Company] agreed to transfer technologies for 
component production, including the production technology of its custom LSI (large 
scale integrated circuit) chip” and that, at the time of the agreement, “no other 
supplier was prepared or able to offer the transfer of such advanced technology”); see 
also id. at 63-103 (discussing the establishment of Shanghai Bell as a Belgian-Chinese 
joint venture and the resulting transfer of System-12 technology). 
 300. See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 259, at 22-24 (2001) 
(discussing the self-strengthening movement and China’s modernization efforts). 
 301. PETER NOLAN, CHINA AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:  NATIONAL CHAMPIONS, 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND THE BIG BUSINESS REVOLUTION 196 (2001). 
 302. As Shi Miaomiao, the deputy director general of the WTO Department in the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce, stated: 
In the investment area, China has revised the Law of People’s Republic of 
China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture; and the Law on Wholly 
Foreign Owned Enterprises and their respective implementing regulations, 
including the elimination of the requirements on trade and foreign exchange 
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While the isolation strategy has many benefits, its effectiveness has 
been greatly undermined in recent years.  As the literacy and 
education levels of the Chinese increase, a growing number are now 
entering colleges and universities.  Indeed, recent studies have shown 
that China is facing an educational crisis due to the limited number of 
higher education institutions for the large number of qualified 
college-aged students.303  Moreover, a growing number of Chinese, 
who have worked abroad and have acquired foreign training and 
experience, are now returning to China to work.304  Because of the 
increasing relocation of research and development centers, China also 
benefits from an influx of expatriate workers.305  As a result, 
technological capacity in China has greatly improved, and most 
products and technologies, except for very advanced ones, can now be 
reverse-engineered in China.  Thus, even though it is still useful to 
isolate critical technology from China, the effectiveness of the strategy 
has been greatly reduced in regards to all but the very latest 
technologies. 
G. Summary 
The above case studies demonstrate how some foreign businesses 
were able to protect their intellectual assets even when intellectual 
property laws were ineffectively enforced.  While these studies offer 
insight into possible alternative strategies to protect intellectual 
property in China, they also call into question the effectiveness and 
expediency of the legalistic approach usually taken by Western 
companies.  To some extent, the discussion is reminiscent of the 
differences between the Chinese and Western legal cultures and of the 
                                                 
balancing, local content, export performance and compulsory technology 
transfer. 
Shi, China’s Participation in the Doha Negotiations, supra note 68, at 31-32. 
 303. See CHEE, supra note 152, at 110-11 (noting the enormous talent pool in 
China); Bruce Einhorn, No Peasant Left Behind, BUS. WK., Aug. 22, 2005, at 102 (noting 
the “daunting” educational challenge in China). 
 304. See Bruce Einhorn & John Carey, A New Lab Partner for the U.S.?, BUS. WK., Aug. 
22, 2005, at 116 (noting that “Beijing is . . . working hard to lure American-educated 
Chinese scientists back to the mainland”); see also SHENKAR, supra note 153, at 5 
(noting that “Chinese students are now the largest contingent of foreign students in 
the United States” and that “returnees are bringing with them not only academic 
knowledge, but also . . . application know-how and business-related experience”).  See 
id. at 75-77 for a brief discussion of the return of the “Turtles,” or returnees.  See 
DAVID ZWEIG, INTERNATIONALIZING CHINA:  DOMESTIC INTERESTS AND GLOBAL LINKAGES 
161-210 (2002), for a discussion of educational exchanges between China and the 
outside world. 
 305. See SHENKAR, supra note 153, at 66 (noting that “China was able to obtain 
technology on a scale unprecedented for a developing nation, culminating in the 
establishment of research and development (R&D) centers, the epitome of 
technology transfer”). 
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millennia-old debate between the Confucianists and the Legalists in 
China.306 
In this debate, the Confucianists questioned whether laws were 
needed or expedient.307  As Confucius, the most influential Chinese 
philosopher of all time, explained in the Analects:  “Govern the people 
by regulations, keep order among them by chastisements, and they 
will flee from you, and lose all self-respect.  Govern them by moral 
force, keep order among them by ritual and they will keep their self-
respect and come to you of their own accord.”308  This concept of 
governance by moral norms can be traced back to the pre-Confucius 
period of Western Zhou (1122-771 B.C.), during which rituals or rites 
(li) were heavily emphasized.309  These rites, broadly defined, covered 
a wide range of political, social, and familial relationships in society 
and informed people of their normative roles, responsibilities, and 
obligations to others.310  In a Confucian society, people learn to adjust 
their views and demands to accommodate other people’s needs and 
desires, to avoid confrontation and conflict, and to preserve 
harmony.311  Litigation, therefore, is unnecessary. 
The Legalists, by contrast, believed it was impossible to teach people 
to be good.  Laws and punishment (fa), therefore, were needed to 
maintain public order by instructing people what and what not to 
                                                 
 306. For discussions of the debate between the Confucianists and the Legalists, see 
generally Chew, supra note 19, at 48-51; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 
259, at 32-38. 
 307. See ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 9 (2d ed. 1998) (noting that the Confucianists “criticized the 
hedonistic pleasure-pain psychology relied on by the Legalists, which, [they] argued, 
would lead people to think only in terms of their self-interest and make them litigious, 
trying to manipulate the laws to suit their own interests”). 
 308. CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS bk. II, ¶ 3 (Arthur Waley trans., 
Vintage 1989) (500 B.C.). 
 309. See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 259, at 32-33 & n.207 
(tracing the origins of the Chinese aversion to litigation). 
 310. See Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in 
China:  Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1081, 1109-10 
(1996) (discussing the concept of li and social roles). 
 311. See id. at 1109; see also Benjamin Schwartz, On Attitudes Toward Law in China, in 
GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL (Milton Katz ed., 1957) (noting that 
“[t]he proper disposition with regard to one’s interests is the predisposition to yield 
rather than the predisposition to insist”), quoted in JEROME A. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL 
PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1963:  AN INTRODUCTION 62, 65 
(1968); Alice Tay, The Struggle for Law in China, 21 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 561, 562 
(1987) (noting that “Chinese tradition personalizes all claims, seeing them in the 
context of social human relationships”); Margaret Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion in 
Contemporary Chinese Courts, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 163, 168 
(Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000) (noting that “[t]oday, litigation in the public 
courts is still viewed with disfavor in China, for it represents a breakdown in 
relationships that should be avoided.  Ideally, broken relationships should be 
restored, but litigation makes restoration difficult”). 
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do.312  Although Legalism was embraced in a very short period of time 
in the Qin dynasty (221-207 B.C.), it never dominated the Chinese 
society until very recently.313  In fact, fa was often associated with the 
harsh, despotic, and unpopular Qin rule that united the country and 
centralized its bureaucracy.314  As the Chinese would reason, “when 
government leans heavily on fa to reinforce its authority, it does so 
because it has no effective ability to rule by li.”315  Thus, to many 
Chinese, laws should be used only as the last resort.316 
Notwithstanding the unpopularity of fa and the overall reluctance 
of the Chinese to use a legal system, laws had not been abolished in 
imperial China.  Rather, li and fa coexisted, and the Chinese emperors 
have used both concepts to govern the country.317  Indeed, 
comprehensive legal codes were enacted in the Qin and Han 
dynasties, and the Tang Code, created after the Han dynasty, became 
the basis of the later codes of the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing 
dynasties.318 
                                                 
 312. See Butterton, supra note 310, at 1110 (explaining that “fa is a penal concept; it 
is associated with punishment, serving to maintain public order through the threat of 
force and physical violence”). 
 313. See, e.g., CHEN, supra note 307, at 93 (“[T]he concept and doctrines of legality, 
unlike the precepts of Confucianism, had never occupied a central role in traditional 
imperial China.  There has not existed a legal culture with elements like officials’ 
fidelity to law or citizens’ consciousness of their legal rights . . . .”); FENG, supra note 
67, at 11 (maintaining that “[t]here is . . . an entrenched Confucian-strategist 
tradition which regards formal law as an inefficient and cumbersome instrument for 
governance”).  Even today, there are significant differences between the rule of law 
model Western countries projected on to China and the rule of law model embraced 
by Chinese leaders.  See generally Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, 
One Hundred Schools Contend:  Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 
486-510 (2002) (discussing the different rule of law models). 
 314. See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 259, at 34 (noting that fa was 
the dominant Chinese ideology in the Qin dynasty); Butterton, supra note 310, at 
1108 (same).  See generally GRAY L. DORSEY, JURISCULTURE:  CHINA 125-30 (1993) 
(discussing Legalism in the State of Qin). 
 315. Butterton, supra note 310, at 1110. 
 316. See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 87, at 10 (noting that “[p]ublic, positive law was 
meant to buttress, rather than supersede, the more desirable means of guiding society 
and was to be resorted to only when these other means failed to elicit appropriate 
behavior”); CHEN, supra note 307, at 11 (maintaining that fa “is to be employed as a 
last resort to maintain social order when li has failed to do so”); Jeffrey W. Berkman, 
Intellectual Property Rights in the P.R.C.:  Impediments to Protection and the Need for the Rule 
of Law, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 32 n.144 (1996) (explaining that Confucianism 
“saw law as an instrument of last resort necessary to punish those who could not follow 
the normative ideal of social harmony arising from the many social relationships 
within society”); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 259, at 34 (noting that 
“[t]o the Chinese, fa should always be employed as the last resort”). 
 317. See CHEN, supra note 307, at 11 (noting that “[t]here was thus a coexistence of 
both li and fa in traditional China” and that “[a]ll the dynastic empires subsequent to 
the Qin dynasty continued to develop codes of law and legal institutions”). 
 318. See id. at 12.  The Tang Code remains the oldest surviving code in the country.  
Id. 
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While the debate between the Confucianists and the Legalists is 
interesting from a philosophical standpoint, it is also relevant to our 
discussion.  This debate not only provides insight into questions like 
whether China will have the rule of law in the near future or whether 
the tens of thousands of Chinese laws and regulations will be 
eventually enforced,319 but also broader questions concerning the 
nature of the WTO dispute settlement process and China’s perception 
of that process. 
One might recall the “general disagreement [before the 
establishment of the WTO] among GATT members over whether the 
principal role of GATT dispute settlement panels should be to render 
judicial-like decisions or to promote negotiated settlements through 
conciliation,”320 which commentators attributed to the differences 
between Japan and the United States over their domestic dispute 
settlement traditions.  As William Davey suggested, “the United States 
is a more litigious society than Japan, which places a high premium on 
consensus.”321 
The GATT debate was later extended to the WTO context, raising 
questions about whether the legalistic, rule-oriented approach of the 
dispute settlement process would be more effective and preferable to 
an alternative approach focusing on negotiation and conciliation.322  
Although commentators have widely credited the Uruguay Round for 
embracing the rule-based approach in establishing the mandatory 
dispute settlement process,323 recent behavior of developed country 
                                                 
 319. See Chew, supra note 19, at 62 (suggesting that the debate between 
Confucianism and Legalism will raise questions about the prospects of rule of law in 
China). 
 320. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, supra note 204, at 57.  As Professor Davey 
described the two conflicting viewpoints: 
[T]he legalistic view is that the General Agreement is a code of conduct and 
embodies a balance of concessions.  If a contracting party violates the code 
and tips the balance, it is appropriate to label that party as a violator and to 
put pressure on it to conform its conduct to the code, if necessary by 
threatening some form of retaliation.  On the other hand, the antilegalistic 
position is that the General Agreement is not a code of conduct per se, but 
more of a commitment by the contracting parties to deal in good faith with 
each other in trade matters so as to work out a mutually acceptable solution to 
any disagreement.  The United States is generally perceived to support the 
legalistic position, while the EC and Japan are considered supporters of the 
antilegalistic view. 
Id. at 66. 
 321. Id. at 67. 
 322. See generally id. at 65-81 (discussing the philosophical debate about whether a 
legalistic, rule-oriented approach of the dispute settlement would be more effective 
and preferable to one that focuses on negotiation and conciliation). 
 323. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements 
of the Uruguay Round:  Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 
275, 277 (1997) (describing the process as having a “complex system of enforcement, 
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members in the WTO process, in particular the United States, have 
called into question whether the dispute settlement process is a rule-
based system with mechanisms for negotiation and consensus building 
or a negotiation/consensus-based process backed by default rules.324  
After all, article IV of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization has emphasized “the special character of 
the WTO, which is both a legally binding intergovernmental treaty of 
rights and obligations among its Members and a forum for 
negotiations.”325 
A case in point is the incompliance of section 110(5) of the United 
States Copyright Act with the Berne Convention as incorporated into 
the TRIPs Agreement.  Even after the Dispute Settlement Panel had 
found the United States in violation of the TRIPs Agreement in United 
States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, the United States refused 
to revise its copyright law.326  If this trend continues—and, worse, if 
countries like China follow the United States’ lead—one has to 
wonder how effective the rule-based dispute settlement approach will 
be in maintaining worldwide protection of intellectual property rights, 
whether the legalistic approach makes sense in the international 
system that lacks an effective supranational enforcement 
mechanism,327 and whether the dispute settlement process will offer 
the same level of protection to less developed countries as it does to 
their developed counterparts.328  If the WTO dispute settlement 
                                                 
complete with fairly short deadlines and provision for retaliation, in case a member 
state does not comply with a decision”). 
 324. Although commentators have focused on the dispute settlement aspects of the 
WTO process, the process also includes mechanisms for negotiation and conciliations.  
Under the procedure, a WTO member state can initiate consultations with another 
member state that allegedly has breached obligations under the treaty.  
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 4, 
Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 112, 116.  If consultations fail, the parties may pursue good 
offices, conciliation, or mediation within the WTO.  Id. art. 5. 
 325. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 17. 
 326. See Status Report by the United States, United States—Section 110(5) of the US 
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/24/Add.9 (Aug. 19, 2005) (stating that the United States 
“has been consulting with the US Congress and will continue to confer with the 
European Communities in order to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of this 
matter”).  This dispute is particularly important, because it concerned two economic 
superpowers—the European Communities and the United States.  As China’s 
economic power increases, it is logical to conceive that the United States’ response in 
United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act might serve as a model for China’s 
behavior in the WTO system. 
 327. See Okediji, supra note 177, at 822 (noting that “the choice to utilize diplomacy 
instead of the dispute settlement process in addressing the public health crises 
arguably was a superior strategic move”). 
 328. As one commentator noted, the United States’ approach may encourage other 
WTO member states “to replace effective enforcement of intellectual property rights 
with a cynical ‘exemptions plus compensation’ approach to TRIPS.”  Richard Owens, 
TRIPS and the Fairness in Music Arbitration:  The Repercussions, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
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process is not as rule-based as its proponents have claimed, one may 
have to wonder what the United States can achieve through the 
process and, from China’s perspective, what it really means when the 
United States files a formal WTO complaint against the country. 
Moreover, China’s perception of the dispute settlement process may 
ultimately affect developments in the international trading system.329  
As one commentator has noted: 
the study of Chinese accession has rendered problematic many of 
the assumptions that have traditionally governed our (Western) 
understanding of the WTO and has therefore entailed the need for 
more appropriate alternative perspectives and scenarios of what may 
occur once China accedes (given its size and distinct legal and 
cultural traditions).330 
Although commentators have feared that China’s accession would 
lead to an “litigation explosion” and the “increasing litigiousness of 
the WTO dispute mechanism,”331 China’s behavior in the WTO in the 
past few years seem to have suggested otherwise.  From the standpoint 
of dispute settlement approaches, China was closer to Japan than to 
the United States; “[h]istorically, [it] has never been shy to express its 
preference for amicable means of dispute settlement in diplomacy.”332  
Thus, China might be skeptical of the WTO dispute settlement 
process, or even reluctant to use it. 
                                                 
49, 53 (2003).  Such an approach, according to the commentator, might undercut the 
minimum standards for intellectual property protection under the TRIPs Agreement 
while creating instability in the international trading system.  Id. 
 329. See Cass et al., supra note 217, at 5 (observing that “China’s entry to the WTO 
has the potential to have a significant impact upon the world trading system precisely 
because it occurs at a time when many of the old verities of geo-politics and law, and 
law and diplomacy, are being questioned”).  For discussions of China’s participation 
in the WTO dispute settlement process, see generally Henry S. Gao, Aggressive 
Legalisism:  The East Asian Experience and Lessons for China, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN 
THE WTO, supra note 68, at 315; Liyong Jiang, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
and China’s Participation, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, supra note 68, at 303. 
 330. Alan S. Alexandroff & Rafael Gomez, General Introduction to CHINA AND THE 
LONG MARCH supra, note 208, at 1, 2. 
 331. See Deborah Z. Cass, China and the ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade 
Law, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 27, at 40, 45 (noting the 
concern that “China’s entry might weaken the dispute settlement system” by creating 
“non-compliance with Appellate Body rulings . . . [and an] overload of the dispute 
settlement system”).  But see Sylvia Ostry, WTO Membership for China:  To Be and Not to 
Be—Is That the Answer?, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 27, at 31, 
38 (contending that “the issue of the increasing litigiousness of the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism is a broader issue that the Chinese accession will amplify but 
does not create”). 
 332. Kong, supra note 27, at 151; see also Pitman B. Potter, The Evolution of Law in 
Contemporary China:  Challenges for WTO Implementation, in CHINA AND THE LONG MARCH, 
supra note 208, at 136, 140 (noting that “[a] comparison of WTO norms on dispute 
resolution with Chinese norms reveals apparent convergence in form but significant 
divergence in substantive performance”). 
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IV. PROSPECTS OF CHINA’S IMPROVEMENTS 
Since the mid-1990s, China has introduced many intellectual 
property laws and regulations.  The country now has so many laws that 
it is very hard for the authorities to properly enforce all of them even 
if they have the political will to do so.  As William Alford noted 
insightfully, the problem with China is not a lack of laws, but the 
existence of too many.333  Laws, nevertheless, are important, because 
intellectual property laws will only be as effective as they are enforced.  
Thus far, enforcement, has been a major stumbling block to effective 
protection of intellectual property rights in China. 
This Part undertakes the difficult task of examining the progress 
China has made in the intellectual property arena.  Although 
researchers and trade groups have provided empirical evidence of the 
extent of piracy and counterfeiting in China, such evidence does not 
track the progress China has made in the intellectual property arena.  
To measure progress, one has to examine not just the extent of the 
Chinese piracy and counterfeiting problems, but the extent of those 
problems when all the political, social, economic, cultural, and 
technological conditions are kept constant.  Because China is 
changing very rapidly and there is no easy way to account for all the 
different variables, it is virtually impossible to measure the progress 
China has made in the intellectual property arena. 
Thus, instead of attempting the futile task of developing a metric to 
measure China’s progress, this Part explores three widely-reported 
legal disputes that provide insight into recent developments in 
Chinese copyright, patent, and trademark laws.  In particular, it 
focuses on the unauthorized reproduction, adaptation, and 
distribution of “Harry Potter” novels, the State Intellectual Property 
Office’s decision to invalidate Pfizer’s patent in Viagra, and the 
Chinese government’s heightened efforts to protect trademarks used 
in relation to the 2008 Beijing Olympics.  Based on the belief that the 
protection of intellectual assets is as much a business strategy as a legal 
issue, this Part examines both the legal and non-legal aspects of the 
three disputes.  While there are still many existing problems for 
intellectual property rights holders in China, this Part contends that 
many of these problems are quite different from what they were a 
decade ago and, therefore, warrant a new analytical perspective. 
                                                 
 333. See William P. Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter:  American 
Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 21 (1994) 
(noting that he was “tempted to write an article entitled ‘Why China Has Too Much 
Law—And Too Little Legality’”). 
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A. Harry Potter 
Harry Potter is one of the most popular fictional figures of all time.  
Since its debut, the “Harry Potter” series has sold more than 270 
million copies in sixty-two languages,334 and all of the four “Harry 
Potter” films have swept box offices throughout the world.  When 
Scholastic, Inc. released Harry Potter and the Half-blood Prince—the latest 
installment of the “Harry Potter” series—in July 2005, it ordered an 
initial print run of 10.8 million copies, followed by a second print run 
that brought the book’s total production to 13.5 million.335  On the 
first day alone, the book sold an estimated 6.9 million copies in the 
United States, dwarfing the one-day sales record of five million set two 
years ago by the previous installment, Harry Potter and the Order of the 
Phoenix.336 
Although the publisher had been very careful in protecting the 
book, going so far as to take legal action to enjoin a Canadian grocery 
store that had inadvertently sold the book before its scheduled 
release,337 pirated copies became widely available on the Internet in 
less than twelve hours after the book hit stores.338  Within two days, 
early chapters of the book had been translated into French, Spanish, 
German, and Russian without author J.K. Rowling’s authorization.339  
By the end of the month, an unauthorized Chinese translated version 
of the book—with typos and omissions—went on sale in Beijing.340  
According to Rowling’s attorney, more than a hundred cease-and-
desist letters and take-down notices had been sent to Web sites in 
Brazil, Canada, China, Poland, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, as well as to eBay on which pirated copies of 
the book were auctioned.341 
                                                 
 334. See Martin Hickman, Price War Declared Over Harry Potter, INDEP. (London), July 
16, 2005, at 10 (reporting that “[t]he first five Harry Potter books have sold more than 
265 million copies in 200 countries and have been translated into 62 languages”); 
Edward Wyatt, Potter Book Sets Record in First Day, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2005, at B3 
(reporting that the latest installment of the “Harry Potter” series had sold an 
estimated 6.9 million copies in the United States on the first day). 
 335. See Wyatt, supra note 334. 
 336. Id. 
 337. See Michael Geist, Harry Potter and the Amazing Injunction, TORONTO STAR, July 
18, 2005, at C3 (reporting that the author and publisher not only sought to enjoin the 
grocery store from selling the books and the book purchasers from disclosing 
information about the copyrighted story). 
 338. Jerome Weeks, Piracy Perused, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 29, 2005, at 25A. 
 339. Murdo Macleod, Rowling’s Millions Get Lost in Translation, SCOTLAND ON 
SUNDAY, July 31, 2005, at 11. 
 340. Alexa Oleson, Presto! Potter Book Pirated in China, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 1, 2005, at 4. 
 341. Richard J. Dalton Jr., Publishers:  It’s Not Nice to Share, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Aug. 9, 
2005, at A2. 
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Unauthorized copying of “Harry Potter” novels was not new.  In fact, 
there are many interesting developments concerning the previous 
installment.342  Like Harry Potter and the Half-blood Prince, unauthorized 
translations of Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix had appeared on 
the Internet before the authorized version was available.343  As a 
Chinese fan involved in the translation maintained, “[w]e wanted to 
create this ourselves.  We wanted to encourage an exchange of views 
between fans.  This is not a money-making operation.  If anyone feels 
their rights are being infringed all they have to do is tell us and we will 
remove it.”344 
In fall 2000, a raid by the Chinese authorities discovered fake Harry 
Potter books being produced by a publisher in the southwestern 
Chinese city of Chengdu.345  Interestingly, the pirate was tracked down 
when Chinese private investigators found an unauthorized copy of the 
pirated book published with the publisher’s name.  As an attorney 
involved in the case noted, “[t]he funny thing was, the book we 
bought in Guangzhou turned out to have been a fake of a fake.  It had 
been printed by another printing house that used [the publisher’s] 
name.”346  Once the pirated books were discovered, the publisher 
quickly settled the dispute, agreeing to pay a $2,500 fine within six 
months and to publish an apology in China’s Legal Times.347 
While the “Harry Potter” stories illustrated the extent of copyright 
piracy in China, they provide important insights into recent copyright 
developments in the country.  First, as the Chengdu story has shown, 
copyright problems in China have become more complicated than 
they were a decade ago.  Unlike the past, when the infringing 
products are often verbatim copies of the originals, the parties 
involved in the dispute these days include legitimate companies, as 
well as underground operations and mom-and-pop pirates.  For 
                                                 
 342. For example, before the newest installment was even released, books 
purporting to be the fifth, sixth, and even the finale of the Harry Potter series appeared 
in China.  Among the many “imaginary” titles were Harry Potter and the Leopard-Walk-
Up-to-Dragon, Harry Potter and the Golden Turtle, and Poor Dad, Rich Dad and Harry Potter.  
Aileen Jacobson, Harry Potter and the Wizards of Ersatz, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 14, 2002, 
at B2; see John Pomfret, Chinese Pirates Rob ‘Harry’ of Magic, and Fees, WASH. POST, Nov. 
1, 2002, at A1. 
 343. See Alice Yan, Harry Potter and the Case of Copyright Infringement, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, July 14, 2003, at 4 (reporting that “[a] Chinese-language version of 
the first 10 chapters of Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix has appeared on 
domestic websites three months before the book’s official release on the mainland”). 
 344. Id. 
 345. Jacobson, supra note 342; Pomfret, supra note 342. 
 346. Pomfret, supra note 342 (quoting Joseph Simone, attorney with the Hong 
Kong office of the law firm Baker & McKenzie). 
 347. Jacobson, supra note 342; Pomfret, supra note 342. 
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example, the infringing publisher in Chengdu, Bashu Publishing 
House, was a legitimate enterprise.348  There is no doubt that their 
books had violated both copyright and trademark laws.  However, 
their unauthorized products were not typical rip-offs, but rather 
unauthorized sequels.  While the overall quality of these products may 
not be comparable to that of Rowling’s originals, it is undeniable that 
the publisher and its editors had expended a substantial amount of 
time, skill, and effort to prepare the unauthorized products. 
As the Chinese continue to learn about the law and test the limits of 
copyright protection, this type of infringement will increase—to the 
point that the infringement eventually will raise difficult questions 
concerning the level of substantial similarity between the originals and 
the allegedly-infringing products and the limits of fair use.  Because 
courts will be in a better position to adjudicate these complex 
copyright questions, litigation, in the near future, is likely to become a 
more important protective tool than administrative enforcement.349 
Unauthorized sequels like those in the Chengdu story are not 
limited to China; they are found in other countries.  A recent example 
concerns the allegedly-infringing “Tanya Grotter” book series.350  The 
protagonist of that series is a young orphan living in a magical world 
named Tanya Grotter.351  In November 2002, Rowling’s publisher sent 
a cease-and-desist letter to the Russian publisher, alleging copyright 
infringement.352  The defendant claimed that the books, which were 
inspired by the Potter books, were rooted in Russian culture and 
                                                 
 348. See Jacobson, supra note 342 (reporting the view of the attorney involved in the 
case that it was easier to track down the Chengdu publisher because it was “a 
legitimate organization”); see also David R. Baker, Cisco Suit Could Test Chinese 
Intentions, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 28, 2003, at B1 (reporting about the intellectual property 
dispute between Cisco Systems and the Shenzhen-based Huawei Technologies, a 
legitimate telecommunications equipment manufacturer); Peter S. Goodman, Pirated 
Goods Swamp China, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2004, at E1 (reporting about the intellectual 
property dispute between General Motors and Shanghai-based Chery Automobile 
Company, a legitimate car manufacturer). 
 349. As one commentator noted, “administrative actions are more common in 
trademark cases where most cases are clear-cut and infringement is easy to prove.  In 
more complex patent and copyright matters, it is more difficult to prove either the 
existence of a right (copyright) or the infringement (patent).”  GANEA & PATTLOCH, 
supra note 116, at 290. 
 350. For discussions of potential copyright infringement involving the “Tanya 
Grotter” book series, see generally Alex Rodriguez, Potter ‘Parody’ Conjures up Trouble, 
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 2002, at C5; Peter K. Yu, The Downside of Being Harry, IP L. & BUS., 
May 2003, at 26. 
 351. Louise Jury, Russia’s Tanya Grotter Copies Potter’s Magic, INDEP. (London), Nov. 
8, 2002, at 13.  Like Potter, Grotter wears glasses.  Unlike Potter, however, Grotter is a 
girl who attends the Abracadabra School for Young Witches.  Instead of a broomstick, 
she rides a double bass.  Although she does not have a scar, she has an unusual mole 
on her nose. 
 352. Rodriguez, supra note 350. 
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folklore and should be considered parodies of the Potter books.  
Notwithstanding the parody defense, Rowling’s publisher successfully 
obtained an injunction in the Netherlands blocking the Dutch 
translation of the allegedly-infringing books.353 
Unauthorized prequels, sequels, and spin-offs also can be found in 
the developed world.  A Google search, for example, reveals a large 
number of Harry Potter fanzines, fan fictions, and fan sites in Canada, 
the United States, and the United Kingdom, featuring stories that use 
without authorization “Harry Potter” characters and images from 
“Harry Potter” books and movies.  These sites are particularly difficult 
for the rights holders to deal with,354 because they usually are not 
created by traditional pirates who seek to free ride on the creative 
efforts of others, but rather by obsessive fans who are also avid 
promoters of the “Harry Potter” mystique.  In December 2000, Warner 
Brothers learned this the hard way when it threatened to sue a fifteen-
year-old English schoolgirl for putting up a Web site that used the 
domain name www.harrypotterguide.co.uk.355  The studio eventually 
backed down after she and others organized a boycott of “Harry 
Potter” merchandise in protest through another Web site, 
potterwar.org.uk.356 
Second, local stakeholders are emerging in China, and, as a result, 
piracy affects both local and foreign rights holders alike.  A case in 
point is the online release of the unauthorized Chinese versions of the 
“Harry Potter” novels.  The unauthorized versions not only affected 
Rowling and her publisher, but also hurt Renmin Wenxue publishing 
company, the local state-owned publishing house that holds the rights 
to publish the Chinese translation of the “Harry Potter” books.  
Although the local publisher had planned to release its authorized 
translation of Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix in October 2003, 
                                                 
 353. Robyn Dixon, Harry Potter Battles Attack of the Clones, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003, 
at 41; see Dan Lerner, Rowling Blocks Book Publication, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 4, 
2003, at 6 (reporting that Rowling “won a court battle in an attempt to block the 
Dutch publication of a Russian novel about a girl wizard called ‘Tanya Grotter’ after 
arguing it copied one of her bestsellers”). 
 354. For discussions of fan sites and fan fictions, see generally Rebecca Tushnet, 
Legal Fictions:  Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651, 
664-83 (1997); Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing:  Personal Use in Cyberspace, 
35 GA. L. REV. 1129, 1139-49, 1181-89 (2001). 
 355. See Kieren McCarthy, Warner Bros Backs Down on Harry Potter Web Site, THE 
REGISTER, Dec. 15, 2000, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2000/12/15/ warner_bros_ba 
cks_down/ (discussing the “Potter War” between Warner Brothers and “Harry Potter” 
fans). 
 356. See id. 
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it eventually had to move its production schedule forward to protect 
itself against piracy, both online and offline.357 
This local impact is often lost on foreign rights holders.  While 
foreign movie producers are understandably frustrated when pirated 
copies of their movies appear shortly after the film release,358 piracy 
has deeply affected the box-office success of many domestic Chinese 
movies, including those by acclaimed Chinese director Zhang Yimou 
and those featuring famous Hong Kong actors.359  By compelling local 
products to compete against cheap, pirated copies of more 
sophisticated foreign software, piracy also has made the establishment 
and development of the local software industry very difficult.360  Even 
Professor Zheng Chengsi, the leading Chinese academic on 
intellectual property law, suffered from piracy when unauthorized 
digital copies of his intellectual property law books were sold on the 
Internet.361 
Moreover, piracy affects local consumers as much as it affects the 
rights holders.  For example, fake books might have endings that are 
different from the originals, the entertainment one gets from a 
bootlegged DVD might be unsatisfactory,362 and pirated software might 
come with harmful computer viruses.363  Indeed, when British authors 
                                                 
 357. See Satoshi Saeki, Harry Potter Latest Victim of China’s Lucrative Piracy Mart, DAILY 
YOMIURI (Tokyo), Aug. 9, 2003, at 18 (reporting that the local publisher had to move 
its production schedule forward to protect itself against piracy). 
 358. See Star Wars Piracy Rife, TORONTO SUN, May 23, 2005, at 24 (reporting that 
“[u]nauthorized copies of the latest Star Wars movie went on sale on the streets of 
Beijing . . . just days after the blockbuster film premiered in China”). 
 359. See, e.g., Catherine Armitage, Unlikely Hero, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Mar. 29, 
2003, at B10 (attributing the box-office success of Zhang Yimou’s Hero partly “to the 
elaborate and expensive effort that went into protecting it from being pirated before 
its release”); Joseph Kahn, The Pinch of Piracy Wakes China Up on Copyright Issue, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002, at C1 (discussing the impact of unauthorized DVDs on the action 
adventure movie The Touch); Mark Magnier, A Tiger Still Crouching, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
22, 2004, at E4 (reporting about how box office receipts of Zhang Yimou’s The House 
of Flying Daggers had decreased dramatically after pirated copies appeared on the 
street). 
 360. See Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 92 (discussing how the piracy of 
foreign software harms the local software firms as much as the foreign software 
companies). 
 361. Mure Dickie, Book About Copyright Is Pirated in China, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 
15-16, 2005, at 5 (recounting a case in China that found Beijing-based Scholar Digital 
guilty of offering bootlegged digital versions of a series of books on copyright piracy 
authored by Professor Zheng Chengsi). 
 362. See Nathan Lee, Through a Lens, Darkly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, § 2, at 1 
(discussing the poor quality of bootlegged DVDs). 
 363. But see FISHMAN, supra note 254, at 244 (maintaining that “[o]ften the 
[software] packages sold in China’s bootleg stalls perform better than legitimate 
versions, because the sellers have gone to the trouble of updating their wares with all 
the original manufacturers’ updates, a somewhat tedious process that buyers who pay 
full price have to go through on their own”). 
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petitioned the U.S. government in the nineteenth century to extend 
copyright protection to their works, they cautioned explicitly that the 
lack of effective protection of foreign copyrights would confuse the 
American public “as to whether the books presented to them as the 
works of British authors, [we]re the actual and complete productions 
of the writers whose names they b[ore].”364 
Consider, for example, the Chinese bootlegged version of President 
Bill Clinton’s autobiography, My Life.  This version not only reduced 
the book’s size by half, but also omitted key passages from the 
autobiography.365  Even worse, it added new, nonexistent twists to the 
former president’s life.  According to this pirated version, President 
Clinton said upon meeting Senator Hilary Clinton when she was a 
student, “She was as beautiful as a princess.  I told her my name is Big 
Watermelon.”366  In addition, he was found repeatedly quoting 
Chairman Mao Zedong, dropping such famous sayings as “You want to 
know the taste of the pear, then you have to eat it yourself.”367 
Notwithstanding the rampant piracy problem in China, intellectual 
property protection has been improving in the country.  As the 
Chinese economy grows and the middle class becomes larger, the 
Chinese will have more disposable income and purchasing power.  
When people are poor, they are more willing to settle for fake PRADA 
handbags or low-quality VCDs (video compact discs).  When they 
become richer, however, they may start looking for higher-priced 
genuine products and luxury goods.  Indeed, some commentators 
have suggested that China’s WTO accession might improve local living 
standards to the point that Chinese consumers will be more interested 
in buying genuine products.368  As stated in a recent study by Ernst & 
Young: 
The Chinese luxury market . . . is expected to grow 20%, annually 
until 2008 and then 10% annually until 2015, when sales are 
expected to exceed US$11.5 billion.  By 2010, China is expected to 
have a quarter-billion consumers who can afford luxury products, 
nearly 17 times the present number.  By 2015, Chinese consumers 
                                                 
 364. S. REP. NO. 134, 24th Cong., 2d Sess., ¶ 9 (1837), reprinted in R.R. BOWKER, 
COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND LAW:  BEING A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPLES AND LAW OF 
COPYRIGHT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BOOKS 341, 343 (1912). 
 365. See Oliver August, Clinton’s Mentor Was Mao, Chinese Readers Are Told, TIMES 
(London), July 21, 2004 (reporting about how President Clinton’s autobiography has 
been truncated and modified). 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. 
 368. See, e.g., CHOW, supra note 64, at 254 (suggesting that China’s WTO accession 
might improve living standards and encourage Chinese consumers to buy genuine 
and legitimate products). 
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could be as influential as the Japanese and account for 29% of all 
global luxury goods purchases.369 
Third, the Chinese market is large, unique, and complex.  The 
conventional wisdom about how one does business in a foreign 
country, therefore, may not be applicable to the country.  
Commentators have emphasized the correlation between intellectual 
property protection and foreign direct investment.370  However, studies 
have shown that many companies that are doing business in China are 
not particularly concerned about intellectual property issues.371  
Rather, they are there to take advantage of the lower labor and 
production costs,372 or to build up their market share and position 
before the Chinese economy takes off. 
As Microsoft’s founder Bill Gates famously noted on PBS in an 
exchange with Warren Buffett, chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: 
Although about three million computers get sold every year in 
China, people don’t pay for the software.  Someday they will, 
though.  And as long as they’re going to steal it, we want them to 
steal ours.  They’ll get sort of addicted, and then we’ll somehow 
figure out how to collect sometime in the next decade.373 
To a great extent, Mr. Gates rightly sees piracy losses as promotional 
expenses needed to capture an emerging market.  Had it not been for 
the widespread piracy of Microsoft’s products, these products would 
not have become the industry standard in China.374  Interestingly, 
                                                 
 369. ERNST & YOUNG, CHINA:  THE NEW LAP OF LUXURY 1 (2005), 
http://www.ey.com/ global/download.nsf/China_E/050914_Report_E/$file/China-
The%20New%20Lap%20 of%20Luxury_Eng%20(Final).pdf. 
 370. See Josh Martin, Copyright Law Reforms Mean Better Business Climate, J. COM., Mar. 
7, 1996, at 2C (reporting on a World Bank survey of major U.S. companies that 
demonstrated the correlation between intellectual property protection and foreign 
investment). 
 371. See Paul Tackaberry, Intellectual Property Risks in China:  Their Effect on Foreign 
Investment and Technology Transfer, J. ASIAN BUS., Fall 1998, at 34, 45, quoted in Li, The 
Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 79 n.9 (suggesting that the size and promise of the 
Chinese market provides the main attraction for foreign direct investment); see also 
Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship Between Intellectual Property 
Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 163, 164 (1998) (stating 
that “the available empirical evidence does not conclusively establish the relationship 
between IPRs and FDI decisions”). 
 372. See Maskus, supra note 289, at 123 (identifying “market size and growth, local 
demand patterns, transport costs and distance from markets, low wage costs in 
relation to labor productivity, abundant natural resources, and trade protection that 
could encourage ‘tariff-jumping’ investments” as examples of “location advantages”); 
see also Heald, Mowing the Playing Field, supra note 145, at 258-60 (discussing the 
different concerns about intellectual property protection between the marketing 
division and the research and manufacturing division of a foreign company). 
 373. Brent Schlender et al., The Bill & Warren Show, FORTUNE, July 20, 1998, at 48. 
 374. As Lawrence Lessig has observed: 
When the Chinese “steal” Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on 
Microsoft.  Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken.  But it 
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though, Chinese leaders have recently pushed for the expanded use of 
open source software by government agencies as a substitute to 
expensive Microsoft products.375  To ward off competition, Microsoft 
had agreed, in response, to provide the Chinese authorities with 
access to its proprietary code while donating computers and software 
to state agencies and local schools.376  One may wonder whether Mr. 
Gates overstated the appeal of his promotional strategy or whether he 
is still trying to “figure out how to collect sometime in the next 
decade.” 
Fourth, for those companies that have successfully adapted to the 
local market environment, rampant piracy and counterfeiting 
problems, though annoying, did not affect their ability to make 
profits.  For example, the Chinese licensee of the “Harry Potter” books 
sold more than a million copies despite the widespread piracy 
problem, both online and offline.377  On the first day alone, the book 
sold more than 10,000 copies, setting a Chinese national record for 
daily sales.378  Similarly, many major Western companies—like Coca-
Cola, Kodak, Motorola, and Procter & Gamble—have been enjoying 
substantial profits for years even though they were confronted with 
serious piracy and counterfeiting problems.379 
To be successful, business executives need to remember that “China 
is . . . not a ‘get rich quick’ market or one for the faint hearted.”380  
While business executives and pundits often talk about the proverbial 
                                                 
gains users who are used to life in the Microsoft world.  Over time, as the 
nation grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather 
than steal it.  And hence over time, because that buying will benefit Microsoft, 
Microsoft benefits from the piracy.  If instead of pirating Microsoft Windows, 
the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating system, then these Chinese 
users would not eventually be buying Microsoft.  Without piracy, then, 
Microsoft would lose. 
LAWRENCE, LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:  HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO 
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 65 (2004). 
 375. See Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 106 (reporting that “[i]n August 
2002, the open source operating system called Yangfan (or ‘raise the sail’) Linux was 
released by a government-sponsored software development group in China, which is 
expected to replace Windows and Unix on all Chinese government PCs and servers”). 
 376. See FISHMAN, supra note 254, at 247 (noting Microsoft’s agreement to provide 
the Chinese authorities with access to its proprietary code and its donations of 
computers and software to state agencies and local schools); Henry Chu et al., 
Developing Nations See Linux as a Savior from Microsoft’s Grip, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004, at 
A4 (reporting about Microsoft’s opening up of its proprietary code to governments); 
Steve Lohr, Microsoft to Give Governments Access to Code, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2003, at C10 
(same). 
 377. See Harry Potter Wins Press Award in China with a Million Copies Sold Last Year, 
XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERV., Sept. 2, 2004, LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File. 
 378. Id. 
 379. SUN, supra note 23, at 4. 
 380. CHEE, supra note 152, at 29. 
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market of 1.3 billion people, that market does not exist.381  Indeed, 
most of the successful foreign companies in China understand the 
actual market conditions of the country and are well-prepared for the 
many challenges of the emerging market, including widespread piracy 
and counterfeiting.  For these companies, an improvement in 
intellectual property protection merely “increas[es the] already 
acceptable profit ratios,” rather than being the necessary precursor to 
profitability in the first place.382 
Finally, as the widespread online piracy of the “Harry Potter” books 
has illustrated, the problem that rights holders encounter on the 
Internet are not that different from the massive copyright piracy they 
face in China.  To be fair, the former is different from the latter; while 
the former focuses on commercial copying, the latter consists of 
primarily private or noncommercial copying.  Nevertheless, U.S. 
courts have not embraced this public-private, commercial-
noncommercial distinction.  In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,383 for 
example, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California stated clearly that the use of the Napster file-sharing service 
could not be considered private use or “personal use in the traditional 
sense,” partly because users reaped economic benefits by “get[ting] 
for free something they would ordinarily have to buy.”384  Although 
commentators have widely criticized the court’s interpretation of the 
word “commercial,”385 the court’s reasoning seems to suggest that 
there are remarkable similarities between the Chinese piracy problem 
and the unauthorized copying problem on the Internet.386 
B. Viagra 
In July 2003, the State Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”) 
invalidated Pfizer’s patent in sildenafil citrate, a key ingredient of 
Viagra.387  Although SIPO’s ruling has yet to be published and it is 
                                                 
 381. See id. at 3-9 (discussing the myth of a market of 1.3 billion people). 
 382. SUN, supra note 23, at 5. 
 383. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 384. Id. at 912. 
 385. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER, III, PROMISES TO KEEP:  TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE 
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 118 (2004) (noting that the appellate court’s rejection of 
the characterization of sampling as “noncommercial” in nature was troublesome, 
because under the court’s interpretation “virtually every unauthorized use of a 
copyrighted work would be ‘commercial’ in character”). 
 386. See generally Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 207 (comparing the massive 
copyright piracy in China to that of the Internet). 
 387. Paul Mooney, China Challenging Drug Patents, SCIENTIST, Aug. 20, 2004, 
http://www.the-scientist.com/news/20040820/02; accord Pfizer v. China, RED HERRING, Aug. 
26, 2004, http://www.redherring.com/article.aspx?a=10812.  See generally Geoffrey K. 
Cooper, Patent Invalidation in Post-WTO China:  Pfizer’s Sildenafil Use, JURISNOTES.COM, 
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unclear how the patent was struck down, media reports suggested that 
Pfizer might have failed to disclose sufficient information about the 
drug and how it was able to cure impotence.388  As a Beijing attorney 
surmised, “Pfizer may have been caught in a catch-22:  they may have 
provided just enough information to the patent office to meet local 
requirements, while holding back some key details to protect the 
process from counterfeiters in China.”389 
After the decision, commentators quickly criticized China for its 
lack of commitment to protect intellectual property rights.390  Some 
also suggested that SIPO’s ruling might violate China’s obligations 
under the TRIPs Agreement, which requires all member countries to 
protect patents regardless of “the place of invention, the field of 
technology, and whether products are imported or locally 
produced.”391  As the former director of policy planning at the USTR 
noted: 
Faced with rising global pressure to crack down on patent 
infringement, Beijing may be in the process of redefining patent 
criteria effectively to safeguard Chinese drug-makers from 
accusations of illegal infringements.  The removal of patents on 
Viagra or Avandia would offer Chinese companies free rein to 
manufacture homegrown copycat drugs without fear of prosecution.  
If these cases continue in their current direction, China may in the 
process violate its obligations to the WTO. 
 For the global research pharmaceutical industry, the ruling 
carries the significant threat of a Chinese government tacitly 
supporting the production of counterfeit drugs by domestic Chinese 
companies.  For China’s trading partners worldwide, the ruling 
demonstrates China’s somewhat cautious embrace of the WTO’s 
rules-based system, which it joined in 2002.392 
                                                 
http://www.jurisnotes.com/IP/articles/patentinvalidation.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 
2005) (discussing the legal issues involved in the reexamination proceeding). 
 388. See Andrew Yeh, Chinese Set Date for Viagra Patent Appeal, FIN. TIMES (Asia), Mar. 
30, 2005, at 18 (reporting that “Chinese officials argued the US group did not provide 
sufficient description of the drug and was unable to prove Viagra was able to cure 
impotence”). 
 389. Mooney, supra note 387. 
 390. See, e.g., Dudley Schleier, Pfizer Clarifies China’s Reversal of Viagra Patent, STRAITS 
TIMES (Sing.), Aug. 6, 2004, at 24 (maintaining that “China’s decision to overturn the 
Viagra patent . . . does indeed break new and unsettling legal ground . . . [and] sends 
a very disturbing message to all who are concerned about China’s commitment to 
intellectual property right”). 
 391. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 27(1). 
 392. Naotaka Matsukata, China’s Counterfeit Commitment to Patents, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 5, 
2004, at 17; see also China’s Viagra Heist, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2004, at A16 (criticizing 
SIPO’s ruling for “ignor[ing] market principles, its own World Trade Organization 
commitments and the long-term interests of its people by overturning the drug’s 
patent”). 
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What these critics failed to realize, or at least acknowledge, was that 
SIPO’s decision was exactly what intellectual property rights holders 
should expect in a country making transition to full compliance with 
the WTO agreements.  Indeed, it was the first time Chinese companies 
took the legal route to challenge a patent owned by a major foreign 
company.  A decade ago, local companies simply ignored the law and 
manufactured counterfeit products; many still do today.  This time, 
however, local companies went to the patent office first, asking for the 
cancellation of Pfizer’s patent for its failure to satisfy the novelty 
requirement.393  That is a great improvement and is largely due to the 
legal reforms introduced in the wake of the WTO accession.394 
Five weeks after SIPO’s ruling, seventeen Chinese pharmaceutical 
companies joined together to explore how they could use their 
combined manufacturing and marketing capabilities to domestically 
produce a version of Viagra.395  While Pfizer was certainly unhappy 
with this alliance, it was not particularly worried about the Chinese 
market.  Although the market has grown quickly and is forecasted to 
be the world’s fifth largest pharmaceutical market by 2010,396 China 
provides only a small market for Viagra, because the drug is deemed a 
controlled substance and can only be legally sold in a few hospitals.397  
Moreover, widespread counterfeiting had significantly damaged the 
market; Pfizer estimated that ninety percent of the drug sold in China 
was fake.398 
Unlike the Chinese market, the international market is very 
important to Pfizer.  In 2003 alone, the company earned $1.88 billion 
from the international market.399  Because SIPO’s ruling has the 
potential to encourage Chinese pharmaceutical companies to produce 
                                                 
 393. Although SIPO has not released its decision, an official indicated that the 
patent had been revoked—not because of the novelty requirement—but because of 
Pfizer’s failure to adequately describe the “technological” uses of sildenafil citrate. 
 394. As one attorney noted, “[a]s long as people are interested in dealing with 
commercial disputes through court, it is a sign that a country is developing a proper 
legal system rather than ignoring it.”  Pfizer v. China, supra note 387 (quoting Doug 
Clark, an intellectual property rights attorney at Lovells who has practiced law in 
China for about a decade). 
 395. Id. 
 396. See SUN, supra note 23, at 143 (citing the July 2002 report from the Boston 
Consulting Group reporting that “China’s pharmaceutical market has grown at an 
average annual rate of 14%for the past decades”). 
 397. See Phelim Kyne et al., China Voids Pfizer’s Viagra Patent, WALL ST. J., July 8, 
2004, at A3 (“Viagra sales in China remain small, hampered by the Ministry of 
Health’s classification of the drug as a controlled substance.  That classification bans 
advertising and limits the drug’s distribution by prescription to only a small number 
of hospitals.”). 
 398. See Mooney, supra note 387. 
 399. See Kyne et al., supra note 397 (reporting that Viagra’s worldwide sales “last 
year rose 8% to $1.88 billion”). 
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generic versions of the drug that can be exported to foreign markets, 
Pfizer was understandably concerned about the decision.  Indeed, if 
these Chinese generics are exported to other markets, like those in 
the United States and other developed countries, they will compete 
directly against Pfizer’s pills, driving down prices and cutting into the 
company’s profits. 
At the industry level, SIPO’s ruling presented a different problem.  
To the concern of the foreign pharmaceutical industry, the Viagra 
ruling had the potential of setting a precedent that could spark a new 
trend of systematic revocation of foreign pharmaceutical patents by 
Chinese stakeholders.  Indeed, because of the Viagra decision, 
GlaxoSmithKline PLC decided to abandon its patent for rosiglitazone, 
a major ingredient of its popular diabetes drug Avandia; the Avandia 
patent had been similarly challenged by local pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.400 
Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether the Viagra decision was an 
isolated incident.  After all, inventors challenge patents all the time 
and all over the world, and most countries accommodate these 
challenges by providing a reexamination or opposition procedure in 
their patent law.  For example, U.S. patent law provides for a 
comprehensive reexamination procedure,401 which states that “[a]ny 
person at any time may file a request for reexamination by the [U.S. 
Patent and Trademark] Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of 
any prior art cited under the provisions of [the patent statute].”402  The 
statute also invites third parties to “cite to the Office in writing prior 
art consisting of patents or printed publications which that person 
believes to have a bearing on the patentability of any claim of a 
particular patent.”403 
The Chinese patent statute is not that different from the U.S. patent 
statute.  Article 45 of the Chinese Patent Law, which was used by the 
local pharmaceutical companies in their challenge of Pfizer’s patent, 
provides:  “[w]here . . . any entity or individual considers that the 
grant of the . . . patent right is not in conformity with the relevant 
provisions of this Law, it or he [or she] may request the Patent 
                                                 
 400. Richard McGregor, Glaxo Fight to Defend Diabetes Patent in China Is Abandoned, 
FIN. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at 21.  As reported in that case, the local companies argued 
that GSK’s patent, which was registered before 1993, “was only granted for the 
compound in one particular formulation.”  Because the Chinese patent law did not 
permit basic compound patents until 1993, they were entitled to make the same 
compound using other formulations.  Id. 
 401. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (2000) (laying out the law for prior art citations and 
the procedure for ex parte reexamination of patents). 
 402. Id. § 302. 
 403. Id. § 301. 
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Reexamination Board to declare the patent right invalid.”404  The 
Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law also offer detailed 
information about the procedure to be used by the Patent 
Reexamination Board.405 
Shortly after SIPO’s ruling, some Pfizer executives and 
commentators accused SIPO of giving preferential treatment to local 
companies,406 citing the fact that the patent challenge was brought by 
leading local pharmaceutical manufacturers, such as Tonghua 
Hongtaomao Pharmaceutical and Lianxiang Pharmaceutical.407  While 
the decision no doubt benefits local companies, it also benefits other 
foreign pharmaceutical companies—in particular generic drug 
companies—which, until now, have been unable to manufacture their 
versions of Viagra in China.  If they decide to compete directly with 
the Chinese companies, there is no guarantee that local companies 
will prevail.  For example, generic drug companies in India have very 
advanced technological capabilities and are increasingly challenging 
patents in developed country markets.408 
Nevertheless, the position taken by those mounting the accusation 
is understandable, when one considers the lack of transparency in 
SIPO’s ruling and the fact that the reversed decision was made two 
years after a seven-year review of the patent application.409  The 
                                                 
 404. Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 45.  For a detailed description of the 
patent invalidation process under the Chinese patent law, see generally SUN, supra 
note 23, at 27-28; Sun, supra note 35, at 285-96. 
 405. See Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (promulgated by the State Council, June 15, 2001) (P.R.C.), 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/flfg/zlflfg/t20020327_33871.htm (laying out 
the procedure to be used by the Patent Reexamination Board). 
 406. See China’s Viagra Heist, supra note 392 (“[T]he decision in favor of a group of 
Chinese pharmaceutical companies who had petitioned the SIPO demonstrates a 
troubling pattern.  Although it is under international pressure to respect intellectual 
property rights, China is acceding to the demands of its own companies for patent-
nullification.”); see also Matsukata, supra note 392 (noting that “[t]he removal of 
patents on Viagra or Avandia would offer Chinese companies free rein to 
manufacture homegrown copycat drugs without fear of prosecution”). 
 407. See, e.g., Kyne et al., supra note 397 (reporting that the challenge on the Viagra 
patent was brought by leading local pharmaceutical manufacturers). 
 408. See Sue Reisinger, A Generic Takes on a Drug Giant, NAT. L.J., Jan. 10, 2005, at 8 
(discussing the aggressive effort by the New Delhi-based generic drug manufacturer 
Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited to challenge Pfizer’s patent in its cholesterol drug 
Lipitor); Meir Perez Pugatch, Intellectual Property, Data Exclusivity, Innovation and 
Market Access, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 108, at 97, 117 (“Two notable 
examples of the shift in the strategy of generic companies reported in the press are 
the cases of . . . Ranbaxy challenging the patent of Lipitor—Pfizer’s best selling 
cholesterol drug—and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories . . . challenging the basic patent of 
Zyprexa—Eli Lilly’s best-selling schizophrenia drug.”). 
 409. See Connie Carnabuci & Peter Yuen, Improve Your Chances of Success, MANAGING 
INTELL. PROP., June 2005, at 35 (maintaining that the Patent Re-examination Board’s 
“revers[al of] the decision made by the SIPO in 2001 after a seven-year review of the 
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situation was worsened by the perplexing rationale given by SIPO for 
the invalidation.  While the Viagra patent was struck down on novelty 
grounds in the United Kingdom and before the European Patent 
Office, SIPO faulted Pfizer for its failure to disclose sufficient 
information in its patent description.410  As a Pfizer executive said in 
his company’s defense, “[testing] data was neither required nor even 
requested at the time the Viagra patent was granted in 2001 but it was 
retroactively used as a basis for overturning the government’s initial 
approval.”411 
Fortunately for Pfizer (and other foreign pharmaceutical 
companies), SIPO does not have the final say over the validity of the 
Viagra patent, thanks to the many intellectual property law reforms 
introduced since the early 1990s.  Article 46 of the Chinese Patent Law 
provides the holders of invention patents, design patents, and utility 
models with the right to seek judicial review of administrative 
proceedings.412  In March 2005, Pfizer’s appeal was heard in the First 
Intermediate People’s Court in Beijing.  Although it is hard to predict 
whether the court will uphold SIPO’s ruling on stated or other 
grounds, the case is likely to receive very careful treatment now that 
the ruling has received considerable international attention.  
Hopefully, the court will decide the case with solid evidence and 
sound legal reasoning, rather than through an accommodation of 
either domestic or foreign interests.413 
Regardless of the outcome, any evaluation of the Viagra decision 
needs to take into account the peculiar characteristics of Viagra’s 
discovery and the many legal troubles confronting the drug.  After all, 
Viagra may be a special case, and what SIPO did in the present ruling 
may not reflect how it will handle the patents in other drugs.  When 
                                                 
patent application made the decision seem irrational,” particularly because during the 
seven-year period there was no indication that Pfizer was not in compliance with 
Chinese regulations regarding patent descriptions). 
 410. See Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 26(3) (stipulating that “[t]he 
description shall set forth the invention or utility model in a manner sufficiently clear 
and complete so as to enable a person skilled in the relevant field of technology to 
carry it out; where necessary, drawings are required”). 
 411. Schleier, supra note 390. 
 412. See Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 46 (stipulating that “[w]here the 
patentee or the person who made the request for invalidation is not satisfied with the 
decision of the Patent Reexamination Board declaring the patent right invalid or 
upholding the patent right, such party may, within three months from receipt of the 
notification of the decision, institute legal proceedings in the people’s court”). 
 413. Cf. Cooper, supra note 387 (arguing that “[i]t is important to China’s 
international legal reputation for the invalidation of the sildenafil use patent to be 
supported by solid evidence and sound legal reasoning, and not to appear to be a 
cynical accommodation by China’s government of the interests of domestic 
manufacturers”). 
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Pfizer applied for the patent in the early 1990s, Viagra was conceived 
as a potential drug for heart problems.414  Pfizer soon discovered that 
the drug had a better use for treating male erectile dysfunction and 
filed a second patent.  Although the United States and many countries 
allowed Pfizer to patent this new and unintended use, some countries 
did not.  In addition to the United Kingdom and the European Patent 
Office, the patent was also invalidated in countries in South 
America.415 
The invalidations are understandable, as it is unrealistic to assume 
that patent offices and courts in other countries will uphold a patent 
merely because it is valid in the United States.  Due to philosophical 
differences and diverging local conditions, decision-makers sometimes 
come to different conclusions even when they apply identical laws to 
identical facts.  Moreover, there has been a growing debate about the 
low quality of patents granted in the United States.416  The fact that 
Pfizer has a valid patent in the United States now does not mean that 
the patent will not be invalidated in the future.  Indeed, following 
Pfizer’s lawsuit against its competitors over erectile dysfunction drugs, 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is currently reviewing the 
patent for Viagra.417 
In the years to come, the Chinese pharmaceutical industry will grow 
rapidly.  Coupled with the increasing respect for the rule of law, this 
growth will lead to an explosion of patent challenges and litigations.418  
                                                 
 414. See id. (providing the scientific background of sildenafil citrate and revealing 
the molecular class’s original claimed medicinal uses). 
 415. See, e.g., Tony Chen, Western Ways, Good and Bad, FIN. TIMES (Asia), July 21, 
2004, at 10 (providing a brief history of the development of Viagra and discussing the 
revocation of the Viagra patent by a U.K. court and the European Patent Office); 
Andy Ho, The Hoopla over Viagra Patenting in China, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), July 14, 
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 416. For discussions of problems within the patent system, see generally FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:  THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT 
LAW AND POLICY (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; ADAM B. 
JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:  HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT 
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STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET AL., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2004).  As John 
Thomas explained, “[b]udgetary limitations, an exploding filing rate, and the 
increasing range of patentable subject matter are among the reasons that U.S. patent 
quality appears to be on the decline.”  John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the 
Rulemaker:  Comparative Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 727, 728 (2002). 
 417. See Pfizer v. China, supra note 387; see also Kyne et al., supra note 397 
(discussing Pfizer’s disputes with Eli Lilly/ICOS and Bayer over their erectile 
dysfunction drugs Cialis and Levitra). 
 418. See Chen, Western Ways, Good and Bad, supra note 415 (“Intellectual property 
disputes have also mushroomed.  Chinese companies are incorporating litigation into 
YU.OFFTOPRINTER 6/11/2006  2:51:07 PM 
2006] FROM PIRATES TO PARTNERS (EPISODE II) 991 
This explosion would be worsened by the fact that “[t]he increased 
numbers of commercial disputes brought on by the market reforms 
have created a certain degree of institutional competition for a share 
of the dispute resolution ‘market.’” 419 
Although commentators and foreign business executives have 
expressed concern that excessive litigation will raise drug prices and, 
therefore, will hurt both foreign rights holders and local consumers, 
there is no easy alternative.  It is unrealistic to expect local companies 
to abide by the laws solely for the benefit of their foreign competitors.  
As the Chinese learn to respect the rule of law, they might have to test 
the system to learn its boundaries and how it operates.  This increased 
litigation will no doubt leave commentators wondering whether the 
number of lawsuits is increasing rapidly because “China is becoming a 
place where business disputes are resolved by rule of law or [rather 
because] it is simply adopting a ‘bad’ habit of the west.”420 
C. Olympics 
In July 2001, Beijing won the bid to host the Olympic Games in 
2008.421  Like the successful bids by Tokyo in 1964 and Seoul in 1988, 
this bid strongly suggests China’s emerging world power status and 
may help position the country in the global economy.422  Because the 
Games will generate significant international attention, Chinese 
leaders are likely to use this widely-anticipated event to transform the 
country’s world image.  Some commentators, therefore, have 
suggested that the Beijing Olympics will provide a perfect opportunity 
for China to strengthen intellectual property rights.423  As one 
                                                 
their business strategy.  Over 9,000 lawsuits were filed in China in 2003.”). 
 419. Potter, supra note 332, at 142. 
 420. Chen, Western Ways, Good and Bad, supra note 415. 
 421. Jere Longman, Beijing Wins Bid for 2008 Olympic Games, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 
2001, at A1. 
 422. As one commentator noted: 
Olympic Games in East Asia—Tokyo in 1964, Seoul in 1988—are not just 
about throwing a few javelins around, but are primarily about positioning the 
nation in the global community.  For Japan, 1964 represented its “return” as 
an upstanding member of the world community after its defeat and 
humiliation in the Second World War—the following year it joined the 
OECD.  As for South Korea, the 1988 Olympics (also followed by the country 
joining the OECD) provided a strong boost to political reform, among other 
things allowing the country to enter the international arena as a constructive 
and credible player, turning its back on the “hermit kingdom” it had been for 
most of its history. 
Jean-Pierre Lehmann, China and the East Asian Political-economic Model, in DOES CHINA 
MATTER? A REASSESSMENT:  ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF GERALD SEGAL 87, 104 (Barry Buzan & 
Rosemary Foot eds., 2004). 
 423. See, e.g., Stacey H. Wang, Note, Great Olympics, New China:  Intellectual Property 
Enforcement Steps Up to the Mark, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 291, 293 (2005) 
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commentator noted, “[w]inning the 2008 Olympics bid has not only 
given China a chance to demonstrate its cultural prowess, but it has 
also made intellectual property enforcement relevant to the Party 
agenda.”424 
Since the successful bid, the Chinese government has introduced 
various measures to protect the Olympic-related marks, which include 
“the Olympic symbol, motto, flag, emblems, anthem, flame, and 
torch.”425  In November 2001, the Beijing municipal government 
issued a decree on the Protection of Olympic Intellectual Property 
Provisions by the Beijing Municipality, which protects the intellectual 
property rights associated with the Olympics.426  A month later, the 
Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Organizing Committee set up a legal 
affairs department to protect all of those rights.427  As a senior 
department official explained, “[t]he establishment of the legal 
department is the first ever in the history of Chinese sports. . . .  
During the bidding stage we have committed ourselves to the 
protection of the Olympic intellectual property rights.  It is our 
indispensable responsibility.”428  In addition, China also enacted the 
Regulations on the Protection of Olympic Insignia and the Measures 
for the Recordal and Administration of Olympic Insignia,429 while the 
authorities have been actively cracking down on infringements and 
the sale of fake Olympic merchandises.430 
                                                 
[hereinafter Wang, Great Olympics, New China] (contending that “the 2008 Olympics is 
in a unique position to set the framework for legal adherence to the rights of foreign 
intellectual property owners”); Steve Friess, The Trouble with Olympic Trinkets, USA 
TODAY, Dec. 12, 2001, at 6B (quoting Michael Payne, marketing director of the 
International Olympic Committee, in his assertion that “[t]here are high expectations 
and hopes that the Olympics will be an important catalyst for China’s trademark 
protection, just as it was in Korea”).  But see Rosie DiManno, Games Won’t Change Way 
Chinese Do Business, TORONTO STAR, July 16, 2001, at C9 (suggesting that “letting the 
Chinese in the front door . . . would predictably result in knock-offs going out the 
back door” and that this was “simply a characteristic of Chinese business, with its 
clever distribution fraud and its grey market, its corruption and espionage”). 
 424. Wang, Great Olympics, New China, supra note 423, at 310. 
 425. Id. at 300. 
 426. Beijing Sets up Department to Protect Olympics Logo, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 27, 
2001, LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File (reporting on the establishment of the first 
local law on Olympics intellectual property rights and the first legal department in the 
history of Chinese sports). 
 427. Id. 
 428. Id. 
 429. Wang, Great Olympics, New China, supra note 423, at 302. 
 430. See Catherine Armitage, Editorial, Run Rings Around Thieves, WEEKEND 
AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 16, 2003, at T6 (reporting that “60,000 bureaus and 440,000 
personnel across China would be working round the clock between now and 2008 to 
protect the Olympic trademarks”); Nailene Chou Wiest, Beijing Cracks Down on Fakes, 
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 16, 2005, at A7 (reporting that “[a]s it prepares to host 
the 2008 Olympics, Beijing is trying to burnish its image as an international city by 
cracking down on counterfeit brand-name goods and the ubiquitous hawkers of 
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While the International Olympic Committee might have included 
stipulations in the Host City Contract that called for these heightened 
efforts of protection, the growing awareness and understanding of 
trademark law among the Chinese leaders and local businesses is not 
to be overlooked.  When Legend, China’s leading manufacturer of 
personal computers, expanded overseas a few years ago, it learned 
painfully that its name had already been registered and used in many 
other countries.431  As a result, the company had to change its name to 
LENOVO.432  Such a name has since become famous around the world 
following the extensive Western media coverage of Lenovo’s purchase 
of IBM’s personal computers division. 
Today, a number of local companies have already achieved 
prominence in the international market, with their trademarks being 
recognized as well-known outside of China.433  Examples of these 
famous local brands include GALANZ (for microwave ovens), HAIER 
(for household appliances), HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES (for 
telecommunications equipment), KONKA (for televisions), LENOVO 
(for personal computers), and TCL (for televisions).  Even the monks 
of the Shaolin Temple reportedly have sought to register the name of 
their temple as a trademark.434 
From the standpoint of China’s internal development, 
strengthening the country’s trademark protection makes a lot of 
sense.  As commentators have noted, there are two primary reasons 
why countries were reluctant to offer stronger trademark protection.  
First, the country wants to encourage its export businesses to free ride 
on the investment of foreign trademark holders by earning profits as if 
they were selling genuine goods that bear the infringing trademarks.  
This competitive strategy is misguided, because it “will result in a 
parasitical business that will always be dependent on the willingness of 
                                                 
pirated CDs”).  But see Irene Wang, Fake Olympic Shirts Make Quick Debut, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Aug. 13, 2003, at A4 (reporting that “[a] week after the logo for the 
2008 Beijing Olympics was unveiled, pirated T-shirts and other souvenirs bearing the 
emblem have appeared on sale at several markets in the capital”). 
 431. See Mark Hall, Welcome, China, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 13, 2004, at 18. 
 432. See id.; Bruce Einhorn & Dexter Roberts, A New Twist in Legend’s Tale, BUS. WK., 
June 23, 2003, at 50. 
 433. See generally DONALD N. SULL WITH YONG WANG, MADE IN CHINA:  WHAT WESTERN 
MANAGERS CAN LEARN FROM TRAILBLAZING CHINESE ENTREPRENEURS 8-13 (2005) 
(providing interesting profiles of successful Chinese local brands in the areas of 
information technology, telecommunications equipment and services, food and 
beverage, and electronic appliances). 
 434. See Call My Lawyer, Grasshopper, TORONTO SUN, Sept. 26, 2002, at 88 (reporting 
that the Shaolin Temple “has been trying to register ‘Shaolin’ and ‘Shaolin Temple’ 
as trademarks with Chinese authorities . . . [and has] . . . set up a firm, Henan Shaolin 
Temple Industrial Development Ltd., to safeguard the temple's name”). 
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the targeted countries to tolerate the infringing imports . . . [and that] 
will never have an established market position that can lay a 
foundation for the development of an internationally competitive 
business.”435  In fact, it does not require much investment to create a 
famous trademark, and even less developed countries have succeeded 
in doing so; CORONA (for Mexican beer) and TSINGTAO (for Chinese 
beer) are good examples.436 
Second, the country does not want its consumers to pay a higher 
premium just because a foreign trademark has established a 
reputation with consumers in the country.  From the perspective of 
economic development, this argument makes a lot of sense.  By not 
protecting famous trademarks, it will save foreign exchange and 
makes consumer products more affordable for its people.  
Unfortunately, the strategy will ultimately backfire on local consumers, 
who will  be unable to use trademarks to identify the source of origin 
of goods and services due to widespread counterfeiting.  As a result, 
local consumers not only will have to spend more time searching for 
the products, but will have no guarantee that they will get the 
products they want.437  Consumer confidence, therefore, will suffer.  In 
fact, with no or only limited trademark protection, producers will have 
little incentive to control the quality of their products.438  Thus, 
consumers often will get at inflated prices poor-quality goods, some of 
which may expose them to health and safety risks.439 
                                                 
 435. Kitch, supra note 207, at 168. 
 436. See Janet H. MacLaughlin et al., The Economic Significance of Piracy, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT?, supra note 
275, at 89, 104 (discussing the Corona example as a success story for the creation of 
trademarks in a less developed country to drive innovation and economic 
development). 
 437. See, e.g., Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that 
“[t]he fundamental purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by 
providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of the particular source of particular 
goods”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on 
the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 778 (2004) (stating that “[b]y protecting against 
deceptive uses of trade symbols in commerce, the law enables sellers to create their 
own reliable shorthand to identify their goods and reduces search costs for 
consumers”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law:  An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 270 (1987) (stating that “the benefits of trademarks in 
lowering consumer search costs presuppose legal protection of trademarks”). 
 438. See Kitch, supra note 207, at 168 (maintaining that “the mark the firms desire 
to copy will inevitably lose its reputation in the less developed country as multiple 
sources produce goods infringing it while none of them has an incentive to protect its 
value as a signal of quality desired by consumers”). 
 439. It is important to note that consumers do not necessarily get inferior products 
due to the lack of trademark protection.  For example, many counterfeit products in 
China are made using the same raw materials and design patterns.  The products are 
counterfeits because the manufacturers did not have authorization from the rights 
holders at the time of production, rather than because they used inferior raw 
materials or production processes.  Indeed, some of the counterfeiters were former 
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There are several additional benefits that are unique to China and 
are seldom mentioned by commentators.  First, compared to 
copyrights and patents, trademark protection will create fewer 
obstacles to China’s modernization efforts.  Trademarks “were a state 
planning tool before they became a marketing device and private 
property,”440 and trademark registrations continued even during the 
Cultural Revolution, although they have been decentralized441 and 
politicized,442 and manufacturers had used such “politically correct” 
pseudonyms and non-identifying labels as “Red Flag,” “East Wind,” 
and “Worker-Peasant-Soldier.”443  By contrast, copyright protection 
affects the country’s ability to maintain cultural and media control 
and may have a negative impact on its extensive propaganda efforts,444 
while patent protection slows down the country’s efforts by draining 
foreign exchange reserves in the form of royalty and license fee 
payments.  It is, therefore, no surprise that the 1982 Trademark Law 
was the first to be enacted after China’s reopening in the late 1970s, 
while the 1990 Copyright Law was the last to be enacted, only after 
significant pressure by the United States.445 
                                                 
contractors and had prior authorization to use the related design patterns. 
 440. FENG, supra note 67, at 344. 
 441. See id. at 293 (noting that trademarks “survived China’s socialist 
transformation of the 1950s, and registration continued even during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), except that, from today’s point of view, it was decentralized 
and ‘irregular’”). 
 442. TAN, supra note 227, at 10 (noting that “[t]rademarks were effectively 
politicized, and common trademarks became the targets of political theatre”). 
 443. Mark Sidel, Copyright, Trademark and Patent Law in the People’s Republic of China, 
21 TEX. INT’L L.J. 259, 272 (1986); see also ANDREW MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY:  
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 197 (2005) (noting that “trademarks 
existed throughout the PRC, even during the Cultural Revolution, although . . . the 
constriction in the universe of ‘politically correct’ brand names . . . often obscured the 
identify of the actual manufacturer—and in the process made trademarks largely 
meaningless); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 259, at 21-22 
(discussing the impact of Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution on intellectual 
property protection in China). 
 444. See MERTHA, supra note 443, at 133-34 (noting that “[t]he copyright 
bureaucracy . . . is embedded within a xitong [functional bureaucratic system] that 
concerns itself with cultural, ideological, and value-laden media and is therefore 
involved in a more politically sensitive environment, even if technical copyright issues 
themselves are no more or less ‘political’ than those pertaining to patents or 
trademarks”); id. at 140 (noting that the Press and Publications Administration, the 
parent body of the National Copyright Administration, “is concerned mainly with 
censorship and has no interest in promoting the rights of authors or creating a free 
market in publishing” (quoting ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, CHINA HAND:  THE 
COMPLETE GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 51 (1999)); see also Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, 
and Perspectives, supra note 259, at 28-32 (discussing the Chinese censorship and the 
information control policy). 
 445. See Naigen Zhang, Intellectual Property Law in China:  Basic Policy and New 
Developments, 4 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 8 (1997) (attributing the delay of 
implementing copyright law to China's concern about controlling ideology by 
regulating publications). 
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Second, although trademark protection requires local consumers to 
pay a premium for the well-known foreign brand, it encourages local 
companies to catch up and compete with the famous Western brands 
by developing more attractive products and focusing on brand 
positioning.  The fact that the Chinese commercial market is still at an 
early, immature stage will only serve to benefit Chinese companies.  As 
one commentator noted, “China’s market is . . . dynamic, with 
consumer loyalty still developing:  consumers are still experimenting, 
and brands come and go with great speed.”446  Under such rapidly-
changing conditions, local companies have the opportunity to attain 
market position and develop the next promising brands. 
Indeed, the ability to develop local brands has been greatly 
enhanced by the failure of foreign businesses to understand the local 
Chinese market conditions.447  Studies have “estimated that less than 
10 percent of Chinese consumers have the level of disposable income 
that can afford to buy Western products.”448  Notwithstanding this 
financial reality, many foreign businesses only focus on the high-end 
market, ignoring the mid-to-low-end customers.  A case in point is the 
microwave market, which Galanz has overtaken recently.  “[I]n 1993 
only 1% of Chinese consumers had microwaves.  Consumption grew—
but not in the pattern expected.  By early 2000, nearly 90% of the 
                                                 
 446. See CHEE, supra note 152, at 30; see also Rick Yan, Short-Term Results:  The Litmus 
Test for Success in China, in HARV. BUS. REV., supra note 208, at 79, 95 (noting that 
“[t]he Chinese market is in such tumult that it is constantly challenging the positions 
of incumbents and creating fresh opportunities for innovative competitors that know 
how to change the rules of the game”).  As one commentator noted: 
In a developing immature market like China, many precious bullets in the war 
for the customer are wasted just to educate the customer and the trade why 
their products are better and how the trade needs to handle its products 
and/or services.  Often what happened was the “first mover” foreign 
competitor did build up significant market share against local competitors 
and enjoyed comfortable margins in the beginning.  These high margins, 
however, were not enjoyed for long, since the next major foreign competitor, 
claiming no. 1 status in their home markets (be it Japan, Germany, Australia, 
etc.), would come along with an aggressive market strategy.  The incumbent, 
having fired most of its bullets, would prefer to cut back on marketing 
spending to reap back its original heavy investment in marketing and 
distribution; instead, the new onslaught of competitors forced them to spend 
heavily to defend their market positions again and again. 
CHAN, supra note 169, at 54-55. 
 447. See CHEE, supra note 152, at 31 (observing that “foreign multinational 
companies . . . are failing to understand the difference between buyer aspiration and 
effective demand”); see also Rick Yan, To Reach China’s Consumers, Adapt to Guo Qing, in 
HARV. BUS. REV., supra note 208, at 123, 125 (noting that “[f]oreign companies seeking 
to win a piece of this growing market must adapt to guo qing . . . , which means 
‘national characteristics’ or ‘a country’s special circumstances’”). 
 448. CHEE, supra note 152, at 31. 
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market was in cheaper models, with the Chinese company Galanz 
dominating.”449 
Unlike foreign companies, Chinese companies usually “produce 
their own brands at low cost first, then gradually develop very strong 
brand positioning.”450  For example, instead of competing directly 
against such famous Japanese household brands as Panasonic and 
Fujitsu, Haier “aimed for the middle ground, positioning itself 
between the leading overseas innovators and lower cost, lower quality 
domestic rivals . . . .”451  Once Chinese companies have built up their 
market share, they will focus on developing their brand positioning.  
Indeed, Chinese companies have been spending a substantial amount 
of money on brand building.  According to Nielsen Media Research, 
“only two foreign brands were ranked among the top ten most 
advertised products in China (Procter and Gamble’s ‘Crest’ and 
‘Safeguard’).”452 
Some commentators have observed that Chinese companies are 
actively purchasing Western companies and their brands for instant 
name recognition,453 rather than spending time to build brand loyalty, 
as Japanese companies have done.  As a China specialist noted, 
“Chinese companies don’t have that much choice but to acquire 
overseas companies.  ‘Very few companies can build organically any 
more.  If they wait 10 to 15 years, they could be dead.’”454  This 
observation might be true.  Nevertheless, foreign companies are also 
actively purchasing Chinese companies to obtain access to the local 
market.  As one commentator noted: 
[F]oreign companies have . . . gradually overtaken Chinese famous 
marks and brand names by way of forming joint ventures with 
                                                 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id. 
 451. How China’s Most Valuable Brand Found Its Niche, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Apr. 
1, 2005, at 38. 
 452. CHEE, supra note 152, at 31-32. 
 453. See SHENKAR, supra note 153, at 158 (noting that some Chinese companies 
“have found a quicker and cheaper way [to build brand names], buying the 
trademarks of companies in distress . . . , taking over customers with whom they have 
done business as an OEM [original equipment manufacturer] . . . , or via an alliance 
with a branded manufacturer”); David Barboza, Name Goods in China but Brand X 
Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at C1 (discussing the strategy of Chinese 
companies of acquiring well-known brand names, such as IBM, Maytag, RCA, to 
obtain access to global distribution networks, sophisticated research and 
development, and recognizable brand names).  But see Steve Lohr, I.B.M. Sought a 
China Partnership, Not Just a Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, at C1 (reporting about how 
IBM Chairman Samuel Palmisano “traveled to Beijing to explore the sale of the 
company’s personal computer business” (emphasis added)). 
 454. Barboza, supra note 453 (quoting Joe Chang, China specialist at McKinsey & 
Company). 
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Chinese companies.  For example, after Kodak bought a Xiamen 
film company, the Chinese mark “Fuda” disappeared from the 
market.  Although another Xiamen company’s mark “Tong Si Da” 
survived after forming a joint venture with General Electric (GE), 
only 5% of its products were sold in the domestic market with the 
Chinese trademark.  The other 95% of its products were exported 
to the US and other markets using GE’s trademark.455 
Third, trademark protection creates the least friction with the 
Chinese culture, and the justification for trademark protection, in 
particular its emphasis on goodwill, is easy for the Chinese to 
understand.  Indeed, the importance of “face” runs deep in the 
Chinese culture and helps explain why it is important to protect 
trademarks.456  Just as “face” is about an individual’s self-respect, 
prestige, and social standing, trademarks, especially well-known ones, 
provide information about the quality, reputation, and commercial 
standing of the products.  In the wake of the WTO accession, China 
strengthened its protection of well-known marks.  Such protection is 
particularly important, as licensed foreign products are increasingly 
sold in different parts of the country. 
Finally, “[t]he Chinese themselves are . . . very brand conscious, a 
legacy of Confucian hierarchy and of their imperial past where rank 
was prominently displayed on bureaucrats’ clothing.”457  The fact that 
the Chinese language consists of pictorial characters and “is strongly 
visual and semiotically promiscuous” also make trademarks and other 
related symbols more important in the Chinese culture.458  Moreover, 
the building of brands “fits with the government’s strategy of 
consolidating strategic industries . . . to create national champions 
that can hold their own in global markets and . . . to restore its 
imperial glory.”459  As Oded Shenkar noted: 
From building the world’s tallest building to hosting the Olympics, 
which is a traditional coming-of-age for Asian nations, symbols are 
important to the Chinese regime, whose legitimacy increasingly rests 
on delivering economic performance and growth on the one hand 
and on nationalist sentiments on the other.  Showcase projects are 
there to impress citizens and outsiders with the regime’s capabilities 
and signal that the aspiration to be counted among the world’s 
leading nations is attainable.460 
                                                 
 455. Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 96. 
 456. See supra Part III.B (discussing “face,” or mianzi, in the Chinese culture). 
 457. SHENKAR, supra note 153, at 157. 
 458. BOB HODGE & KAM LOUIE, THE POLITICS OF CHINESE LANGUAGE AND CULTURE:  
THE ART OF READING DRAGONS 8 (1998). 
 459. SHENKAR, supra note 153, at 158. 
 460. Id. at 36. 
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While the Beijing Olympics, no doubt, will provide an opportunity 
for China to improve intellectual property protection, it is not the 
only major opportunity.  Two years after the event, China will hold the 
World Expo in Shanghai.  The importance of this event is not to be 
understated.  After all, it was the 1873 international exposition in 
Vienna that led to the creation of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, which set the modern standard for 
worldwide protection of patents, trademarks, and other industrial 
property rights.461 
Nevertheless, as much as China wants to showcase its improvement 
in intellectual property protection through these major international 
events, its showcase might be limited to the major cities and the 
coastal areas.  As Part III pointed out, China is a “country of 
countries,” and what happened in its major cities may not be extended 
to other cities, townships, or the rural areas.  This is particularly true 
with respect to trademark protection.  Due to the enormous disparity 
in wealth and purchasing power, the goods that are in high demand 
in the inland and rural areas may be quite different from those in the 
major cities.  The extent of counterfeiting and the protection of 
trademarks, as a result, may vary significantly. 
CONCLUSION 
In the late 1980s, the United States pursued a very aggressive 
foreign intellectual property policy toward China.  It repeatedly 
threatened the country with economic sanctions, trade wars, non-
renewal of most-favored-nation status, and opposition to entry into the 
WTO.  Although the policy had initial success, leading to the 
promulgation of the 1990 Copyright Law, a complete overhaul of the 
Chinese intellectual property system, and the creation of the current 
enforcement infrastructure, the policy had become largely ineffective 
by the mid-1990s.  It cost the U.S. government not only credibility 
before the Chinese leaders, but also the support of its business 
constituency, which increasingly criticized the administration for 
having a counterproductive U.S.-China foreign policy.  Even worse, 
the policy fostered resentment among the Chinese while jeopardizing 
the United States’ longstanding interests in promoting free trade, 
human rights, and rule of law. 
In 2001, China became the 143rd member of the WTO, less than 
two decades years after it (re)introduced a Western-style intellectual 
                                                 
 461. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 105, at 343-48 (discussing the 1873 
international exposition in Vienna and the origin of the Paris Convention). 
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property regime.  China’s WTO accession presents both an 
opportunity and a danger.  While it is beneficial to have China playing 
by the same rules like all other countries, a blunder by this emerging 
trading power could ruin the entire international trading system.  
Policymakers, therefore, are actively exploring options to induce 
China to play by the WTO rules, in particular those concerning 
protection of intellectual property rights under the TRIPs Agreement.  
In exploring these options, countries need to be careful about how 
they engage China in the process, especially at a time when the 
country is still learning how to comply with the different demanding 
requirements of the WTO.  A misstep in the U.S.-China intellectual 
property policy of the 1990s created “a cycle of futility” that backfired 
on the United States’ longstanding interests.  A misstep today would 
have similar effects. 
The piracy and counterfeiting stories about China have been told 
often, but they remain important, and their plots continue to change.  
A careful study of these plots not only reveal the country’s rapidly-
changing local conditions, but also provide critical insights into the 
difficulty countries face in complying with strong intellectual property 
standards, the difference between the Chinese and Western legal 
cultures, the unique nature of intellectual property protection, and 
the different considerations and concerns less developed and 
transition countries have over the one-size-fits-all intellectual property 
system pushed by the European Communities and the United States. 
At the ceremony of China’s WTO accession at the Fourth WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Doha, former Chinese Minister of 
Commerce Shi Guangsheng declared:  “China’s accession to the WTO 
is not only in the interest of China, but also in the interest of the 
world.”462  While the piracy and counterfeiting stories discussed in this 
Article feature China primarily, a better understanding of these stories 
will benefit not just the Chinese, but every member of the 
international trading community. 
 
                                                 
 462. Guangsheng Shi, Introduction:  Working Together for a Brighter Future Based on 
Mutual Benefit, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, supra note 68, at 15, 17. 
